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EDWARD KENNARD RAND



## PREFATORY NOTE

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## SOME ASPECTS OF INVISIBILITY

BY ARTHUR STANLEY PEASE

**I**N ONE of the noblest and most awesome passages in Greek tragedy<sup>1</sup> Sophocles describes, by the medium of a messenger, the last moments of the aged Oedipus, when, after a mysterious voice had cried "Oedipus, Oedipus, why delay we to go? Thou tarriest too long," the outcast king, taking King Theseus with him as a witness, withdrew from his sorrowful children and companions to a supernatural translation. "After no long time we looked back, and Oedipus we saw nowhere any more, but the king alone, holding his hand before his face to screen his eyes, as if some dread sight had been seen, and such as none might endure to behold. . . . But by what doom Oedipus perished, no man can tell,<sup>2</sup> save Theseus alone. No fiery thunderbolt of the god removed him in that hour, nor any rising of storm from the sea; but either a messenger from the gods, or the world of the dead, the nether adamant, riven for him in love, without pain; for the passing of the man was not with lamentation, or in sickness and suffering, but, above all mortals', wonderful."

With this simple, yet highly imaginative story as a point of departure I should like to discuss certain features of the Greek and Roman beliefs in regard to invisibility, clearly recognizing that their civilization furnishes only a part of countless instances of such phenomena, distributed through many centuries and cultures, a few of which from the Jewish-Christian tradition I shall also mention. Though my primary theme is human rather than divine invisibility, I must, for reasons later to become apparent, start with a brief discussion of the invisibility of the gods.

To early Greek anthropomorphism the gods, especially those of

<sup>1</sup> Soph. *O. C.* 1645–1666; cf. also 1623–1630. Jebb's translation has been used. Cf. also W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (Engl. tr., Oxford), I (1939), 282: "Hallowed by pain, he is in some mysterious way brought near to divinity; his agonies have set him apart from other men."

<sup>2</sup> F. Pfister, *Der Reliquienkult im Altertum*, II, Giessen, 1912, 462.

local and limited competence, were by no means always invisible.<sup>3</sup> So long as they differed in degree rather than in kind from ordinary mortals, mingling with men in the activities of war, subject to wounds and accidents (e.g., the laming of Hephaestus by his fall from heaven), joined at times to human spouses, and thus becoming the parents of mortal children, who might, in turn, be supposed to possess more than ordinary claims upon their affections and aid, they were, not unnaturally, at times manifested to individuals or to groups in varying types of theophany. In Homer many of them still move freely among men, and this Homeric tradition crystallizes into a literary convention in later poetry, notably in Virgil and other Roman epic poets—Lucan alone excepted—, while the *deus ex machina* occasionally introduces the same immediate participation of deities into the field of tragedy, with the added necessity of justifying its plausibility to the eye as well as to the ear. With less localized and more syncretistic gods, however, of wider jurisdiction and more obviously superhuman powers, visible association with individual men or even with large human groups is bound to diminish, while the greater refinement of the moral natures of the gods makes them less suited to mingle directly with sinful men in the rough and tumble of military and political issues. As man's own moral nature rises above barbarism, so that he demands more of his gods in character and behavior, the line between the divine and the human becomes more sharply drawn, and visible participation of deities in human affairs is no longer frequent and natural but rare and miraculous, and hence involves either a greater act of faith on the part of mortals who have not seen or else a more convincing array of the evidence of eye-witnesses. This is clearly recognized at a later epoch in the Fourth Gospel,<sup>4</sup> when, after Thomas had addressed Jesus as "My Lord and my God," he received the reply, "Because thou hast seen me thou

<sup>3</sup> On various types of theophany see F. Pfister in PW, IV Supplbd. (1924), 282. While on Olympus the gods were, naturally, not seen by mortals; cf. Schol. *Il.* XIII 21.

<sup>4</sup> *John* 21. 28-29.

hast believed; blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed."

This rarer glimpsing of the face of deity<sup>5</sup> has three distinct results. (1) First, a popular, somewhat superstitious view that the divine vision, as a phenomenon more unusual and startling than it had formerly been considered, might bring distinct perils to the beholder. As the Lord declares to Moses,<sup>6</sup> "Thou canst not see my face, for there shall no man see me and live." As early as Homer<sup>7</sup> it is stated that gods revealed are hard to look upon, and through subsequent literature the thought recurs, for example in the *Ion* of Euripides,<sup>8</sup> in Callimachus<sup>9</sup> (who says: "But the laws of Cronos order thus: Whosoever shall behold any of the immortals, when the god himself chooses not, at a heavy price shall he behold"), in Plato<sup>9a</sup> and in Horace.<sup>10</sup> Accordingly a benign deity or angel often begins his address with the phrase "Fear not."<sup>11</sup>

(2) Second, the more philosophic view gradually develops that God is a spirit,<sup>12</sup> and that things seen are material, and hence temporal<sup>13</sup> rather than eternal. "The divine (*τὸ θεῖον*)," says Em-

<sup>5</sup> God being to the Jews often and to the Christians regularly invisible; cf. *Job* 9. 11; 23. 8-9; *John* 1. 18; *Rom.* 1. 20; *I Tim.* 1. 17; *Heb.* 2. 27.

<sup>6</sup> *Exod.* 20. 19; 33. 20; cf. also *Gen.* 32. 30; *Exod.* 19. 21; *Judges* 6. 22-23; 13. 22; *Is.* 6. 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Il.* XX 131.

<sup>8</sup> *Ion* 1550-1551.

<sup>9</sup> *Hymns* 5. 101-102.

<sup>9a</sup> *Sophist* 254A: *τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὅμματα καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφορῶντα ἀδύνατα.*

<sup>10</sup> *Carm.* II 19. 1-8. For the dazzling of the eye of the soul which tries to gaze upon God compare the passages from Plato and Philo collected by R. M. Jones in *Class. Phil.* XXI (1926), 102; also E. S. McCartney in *Class. Journ.* XXXVI (1941), 485-488.

<sup>11</sup> E.g., *Ov. M.* XV 658; *Matt.* 28. 2-5; *Luke* 1. 11-13; 1. 29-30; 2. 9-10; *Rev.* 1. 17.

<sup>12</sup> *John* 4. 24. *Xen. Mem.* IV 3. 14, compares God to a wind and to the soul, both effective though invisible—an idea often later expressed, e.g., by Theophil. *Ad Autol.* I 5; *Serv. Aen.* VI 724, p. 100 Thilo.

<sup>13</sup> *II Cor.* 4. 18. He who worships visible gods is more wretched than those demons themselves, says Clement (*Protrept.* 10. 97, p. 71 St.). Lactantius asserts (*Inst.* VII 11. 9) that the unseen is eternal because subject to no external violence as are the things which are material; cf. the parallels collected by J. B. Mayor on *Cic. N. D.* I 20.

pedocles,<sup>14</sup> as quoted by Clement of Alexandria,<sup>15</sup> "cannot be approached by our eyes or grasped with our hands"; "God cannot be grasped; if he can be grasped he is not God," declares an anonymous Greek tragic fragment;<sup>16</sup> Isaiah<sup>17</sup> speaks of the *deus absconditus* or hidden God, an idea developed in the thought of some later Christian theologians; "Mortal eyes are too weak to see Zeus" is an Orphic statement quoted by Justin Martyr.<sup>18</sup> The importance of this view in Platonic thought is obvious; the Platonizing Moses, Philo, declares: "When you hear that God was seen by man you must think that this takes place without the light which the senses know, for what belongs to mind can be apprehended only by the mental powers."<sup>19</sup> In the Fourth Gospel<sup>20</sup> we are told that "No man hath seen God at any time," while the Beatitudes promise that it is the pure in heart who shall see God,<sup>21</sup> presumably by inner vision rather than by outward theophany. These selected passages, drawn from a long range of years and a variety of philosophies, may well illustrate the diffusion of this idea, which was sometimes carried a stage further, as when Origen, in the *De Principiis*,<sup>22</sup> asserts that God is not

<sup>14</sup> Fr. 133 Diels.

<sup>15</sup> *Strom.* V 12. 81. 2.

<sup>16</sup> Nauck p. 874, no. 168.

<sup>17</sup> 45. 15.

<sup>18</sup> *Ad Graecos* 15. Cf. Euseb. *P. E.* XIII 12, p. 665a.

<sup>19</sup> *De Mutatione Nominum* 6. In *De Opif. Mundi* 12 Philo further ascribes to Moses a clear distinction in nature between the visible cosmos and the invisible, uncreated, God; cf. *De Abr.* 76; 79.

<sup>20</sup> *John* 1. 18. Cf. *I Tim.* 6. 16; *Heb.* 11. 27.

<sup>21</sup> *Matt.* 5. 8; cf. *Ps.* 23. 3-4; *Matt.* 18. 10; *Heb.* 12. 14; *I John* 3. 2-3; also the similar thought in Schol. Arat. 102, p. 357 Maass:  $\eta$  τὸ δίκαιον τῶν προτέρων ἀνθρώπων θέλων "Ἄparos δεῖξαι φῆσιν, ὅτι καὶ θεὸς οὐσα (sc. Astraea) εἰς τὸ φανερὸν καὶ κατ' αὐτῶν ἐφοίτα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς δικαίους. In Eur. *Bacch.* 502 the converse truth appears, that the impious cannot see God; cf. *Isaiah* 6. 5; also the departure of the gods from among men after the loss of the innocence of the Golden Age; a similar view in Shinto that since the Age of the Gods deities have removed further from earth and are now beyond human vision is noted by W. G. Aston, *Shinto*, London, 1905, 32.

<sup>22</sup> I 1. 8. Whether Origen would have extended this principle to invisible beings other than God may be doubted; had he done so he would have had to reject certain Biblical accounts, such as *II Kings* 6. 17. Perhaps he was denying the claims of medicine-men to a divine vision not vouchsafed to others; cf. J. A. MacCulloch in J. Hastings, *Encycl. of Relig. and Ethics*, VII (1915), 404. Augustine (*C. D.* X 13) devotes a chapter to the question of how the

visible to some yet invisible to others (as may well have been implied by various ancient forms of mystery worship<sup>23</sup>), but is not visible to anyone, because by the nature of his being it is impossible for him to be seen; or as when Philo,<sup>24</sup> yet earlier, had gone so far as to declare God to be invisible both to the physical eye and to the mind. Tertullian<sup>25</sup> contrasts the invisibility of the Father with the manifestation of the Son, a distinction based in part on a Biblical foundation in the words of Jesus, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father."<sup>26</sup>

(3) Thirdly, the attribute of invisibility, emphasized by occasional theophanies as darkness may be by a sudden flash of lightning, was extended to the whole celestial hierarchy of personified forces,<sup>27</sup> demons,<sup>28</sup> angels,<sup>29</sup> heroes,<sup>30</sup> and various figures

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invisible God has often disclosed himself, not in his real form, but in one adapted to the powers of his observers. In *Od.* XVI 160–162 Athena is seen by Odysseus and by his dogs, but not by Telemachus, and such cases are not rare in ancient literature. One might note also Orestes, who in an hallucination sees the Furies (Aesch. *Choeph.* 1061), though they are quite invisible to the sober chorus.

<sup>23</sup> Initiation opens "the veil before human eyes by direct contact with a source of revelation," says A. D. Nock (in *Gnomon* XV (1939), 362), citing Proclus in *Plat. Rep.* I, p. 75, 5 ff.

<sup>24</sup> *De special. Leg.* II 165.

<sup>25</sup> *Adv. Prax.* 14.

<sup>26</sup> *John* 14. 9.

<sup>27</sup> Hesiod, *Op.* 223 (*Δίκη*); *Theog.* 9 (Muses); Hymenaeus as described by Proclus ap. Phot. *Bibl.* 239, p. 321a Bekk.: ὑμέναιον δὲ ἐν γάμοις ἀδεσθαλ φασι κατὰ πόθον καὶ ξήτησιν ὑμεναῖον τοῦ Τερψιχόρας, ὃν φασι γῆμαντα ἀφανῆ γενέσθαι.

<sup>28</sup> Iamb. *De Myst.* I 20. 3; Apul. *De Deo Socr.* 16. In Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* IV 10 a beggar is recognized as a demon, is stoned by the Ephesians, disappears, and is found in the form of a dead dog. Mart. Cap. II 154, remarks that demons are less brilliant in nature than gods, *nec tamen ita sunt corpulenti ut hominum capiantur obtutu*. For the vanishing of the Devil Professor W. H. P. Hatch calls to my attention the *Apophth. Patrum* (*Patr. Gr.* LXV 232).

<sup>29</sup> Philo, *Moses*, I 166, thinks that the pillar of cloud of the Israelites may have enclosed an angel. In *Exod.* 33. 9–10 it hides the Lord. Cf. also *Coloss.* I. 16.

<sup>30</sup> E.g., the hero Bormus, who went to fetch water for reapers and disappeared (*Athen.* XIV 620)—perhaps a replica of the story of Hylas (*Theocr.* 13. 36–54, and the passages cited by Sittig in *PW*, IX (1916), 111–113; *Paroem. Gr.* I 167, no. 21), but suggesting also a victim of amnesia—; the Dioscuri (e.g., Isocr. *Archid.* 18; Marin. *Vit. Procli* 32; Dion. Hal. *Antiq.* VI

of doubtful classification.<sup>31</sup> Invisibility might, however, often be accompanied by audibility of beings of all grades, from Jehovah speaking in the Old Testament<sup>32</sup> to Κληδών, Φήμη, Aius Locutius,<sup>33</sup> and the many cases of *voices ex occulto*<sup>34</sup> among the Greeks and Romans, as well as incidents in the New Testament,<sup>35</sup> and though such utterances might well be awesome there seems to have been no such taboo upon the sound of the voice of a divine being as was associated with the sight of deity.

A further extension of invisibility is to ghosts and other appari-

13. 2; Anon. *De Vir. ill.* 16. 3; Nazar. *Panegyr.* 15. 4 (*Panegyr. Lat.* 168 Baehr.); and probably Val. Max. I. 8, ext. 7; Dio Cass. XLI 61.4. Similar figures appear, give aid, and vanish in *II Macc.* 3. 26–34. More will be said of this type below.

<sup>31</sup> E.g., nymphs (Apollon. *Rhod.* IV 1330) or their lovers, such as Leucippus (Parthen. *Narr. amat.* 15. 4); or the strange woman who sold the Sibylline books to King Tarquin (Dion. Hal. *Antiq.* IV 62. 4; Gell. I 19. 9; Schol. Dan. *Aen.* VI 72), whose supernatural disappearance doubtless contributed not a little to the sanctity of the books themselves; or the mysterious shepherd who appeared on the Roman Capitol (Lyd. *De Mens.* IV 52); or the strange boy with goat's horns seen by shepherds between Cyrene and Carthage and after his prophecies and sudden disappearance worshipped as Jupiter Ammon (Schol. Dan. *Aen.* IV 196); or Attus Navius (Dion. Hal. *Antiq.* III 72. 3); or other cases mentioned in n. 92 infra. Witches, fairies, and saints have in later times been commonly credited with such powers (e.g., Shakesp. *Macbeth* I. 5; S. Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature*, II, Bloomington, 1933, 301–302; III (1933), 33–34).

<sup>32</sup> As in the giving of the Ten Commandments (*Exod.* 18. 3–24; cf. Philo, *De Decalogo* 33; 47), or in the speaking of God to the boy Samuel (*I Sam.* 3. 4–18).

<sup>33</sup> Cf. A. S. Pease on Cic. *De Div.* I 101.

<sup>34</sup> In the deluge-story as given by Syncellus, p. 30a ff. (*FHG* II 501), Xisuthrus, after saving his people, vanishes, and, in the form of a voice from the air, gives them directions ὡς δέον αὐτὸν εἶναι θεοσεβεῖς. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν διὰ τὴν εὐτέβειαν πορεύεσθαι μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσοντα. In another note on Cic. *De Div.* I 101, I have suggested various physical causes for such sounds. Add also Soph. *Aias* 15; 69–70; Eur. *Hippol.* 86; *Bacch.* 1078–1079; Paus. IV 9. 3; Sil. Ital. III 699; XIII 283. In some of these cases the speaker is a god, identified but unseen.

<sup>35</sup> E.g., *Matt.* 3. 17 ("a voice from heaven"); 17. 5 ("a voice out of the cloud"); *John* 12. 28; *Acts* 10. 13–15; *Rev.* 11. 12. Apollo is invisible to Iamus, yet clearly audible (Schol. Pind. *Ol.* 6.106e).

tions on a superhuman yet hardly divine level.<sup>36</sup> If the soul is invisible even during life, while resident in a physical body, it will naturally after death be no less so, unless, indeed, it be one of those souls which, at death, like a clingstone rather than a freestone peach, fail to separate cleanly from their material bodies, as Plato in the *Phaedo*<sup>37</sup> asserts, and so, retaining something of visible substance, are sometimes seen flitting about their funeral monuments. The souls of the men of the Golden Age, Hesiod tells us,<sup>38</sup> roam over the earth, clothed in mist, and beneficent in their effects upon men. Elsewhere<sup>39</sup> Hesiod speaks of thirty thousand spirits who similarly patrol the earth, keeping watch over mortal men. Virgil, more specifically, mentions the phantoms of Creusa<sup>40</sup> and Anchises,<sup>41</sup> each of which appears to Aeneas, but after delivering its message eludes his physical grip and vanishes, like the kinsmen of Scipio from his grasp in Hades, as related by Silius,<sup>42</sup> or the ghost of Achilles from Apollonius of Tyana.<sup>43</sup> Phlegon<sup>44</sup> describes a ghost which consumes a corpse and then vanishes.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. J. A. MacCulloch in J. Hastings, *Encycl. of Relig. and Ethics*, VII (1915), 405-406.

<sup>37</sup> P. 81c-d; cf. Plut. *Rom.* 28. 7.

<sup>38</sup> *Op.* 121-126.

<sup>39</sup> *Op.* 252-255.

<sup>40</sup> Virg. *Aen.* II 791-795.

<sup>41</sup> Virg. *Aen.* V 740; cf. VI 700-702, though there Anchises associates with Aeneas in the underworld in a manner like that of life save that his form is impalpable to Aeneas's grasp; contrast the scene of Jesus and the doubting Thomas in *John* 20. 24-29.

<sup>42</sup> XIII 648-653; cf. XVII 547, where the fictitious phantom of Scipio vanishes from Hannibal.

<sup>43</sup> Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* IV 16. On the invisibility of spirits cf. E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, I (1874 ed.), 429, and especially 446-447: "To declare that souls or ghosts are necessarily either visible or invisible, would directly contradict the evidence of men's senses. But to assert or imply, as the lower races do, that they are visible sometimes and to some persons, but not always or to everyone, is to lay down an explanation of facts which is not indeed our usual modern explanation, but which is a perfectly rational and intelligible product of early science." Also cf. S. Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature*, II (1933), 394, et al. For another instance of the vanishing of a ghost—this time not suddenly but gradually—cf. [Quintil.], *Declam. maiores* 10.6, p. 193 Lehnert.

<sup>44</sup> *Mirab.* 2, p. 124 Westerm. (= *FHG* III 615).

Not always clearly differentiated from ghosts are the forms, divine or human, living or deceased, which appear in dreams, and from the manner in which these vanish when their task or message is concluded one might conjecture that the literary technique of such sudden disappearances is very naturally and in large measure derived. Such dream-phenomena,<sup>45</sup> in fact, are so commonly experienced that their imitation in literature involves no great strain upon the credulity of the reader. Thus even a writer who, like Lucan, definitely rejects most of the celestial machinery of the traditional epic, may still elaborate the effects of prophetic dreams,<sup>46</sup> as he may those of human prophets.<sup>47</sup>

If the gods, even when pictured as partly physical, are yet able to conceal their own presence from all or some human beings—by means of which I shall presently speak—it involves no great additional assumption to suppose that they can at times extend the mantle of their own invisibility to cover favored mortals. The common Homeric method is by wrapping men in a cloud,<sup>48</sup> and Erwin Rohde<sup>49</sup> lists such cases as those of Paris hidden by Aphrodite,<sup>50</sup> Aeneas by Apollo,<sup>51</sup> Idaeus by Hephaestus,<sup>52</sup> Hector by Apollo,<sup>53</sup> Aeneas by Poseidon,<sup>54</sup> Antenor by Apollo<sup>55</sup>—so far all Trojan heroes,—, and the two Moliones

<sup>45</sup> To the cases collected in my notes on Virg. *Aen.* IV 278 and IV 570 add: *Enn. Ann.* 47–51 (dream of Ilia); *Sil. Ital.* VIII 184 (Dido); *Ael. V. H.* XII 1; *Philostr. Vit. Apoll.* IV 16 fin.; *Pap. Oxyrh.* no. 1381, lines 122–125; *Sulp. Sev. Ep.* II 1. 4 (a vision of St. Martin); J. A. MacCulloch in *J. Hastings, Encycl. of Relig. and Ethics*, VII (1915), 405–406; M. H. N. in *Musée Belge*, XXV (1921), 208.

<sup>46</sup> E.g., *Luc.* 3. 8–35.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. C. H. Moore in *H.S.C.P.* XXXII (1921), 151.

<sup>48</sup> Schol. E on *Od.* VII 14 interestingly differentiates: *καὶ ὁ ἄληρ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἄληρ τὸ αὐτό· ἡ ἄληρ γὰρ ἡ ἀοραστα, ὁ ἄληρ εἰ μὴ ἔχει τὸ φωτίζον.*

<sup>49</sup> *Psyche*, I<sup>4</sup>, Tübingen, 1907, 70, n. 2.

<sup>50</sup> *Il. III* 380–381. Horace (*Carm.* II 7. 13–14) has this or some similar passage in mind in his playful account of how Mercury rescued him from the battlefield of Philippi. For other cases cf. S. Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature*, IV (1934), 335.

<sup>51</sup> *Il. V* 344–346.

<sup>52</sup> *Il. V* 23.

<sup>53</sup> *Il. XX* 443–444.

<sup>54</sup> *Il. XX* 325.

<sup>55</sup> *Il. XXI* 595–596. Rohde thinks this an early case imitated in other parts of the poem.

by Poseidon.<sup>56</sup> These mists on the battlefield, as Conway<sup>57</sup> suggests, may be derived from the common experience of warfare, as historically at the battle of Lake Trasimene in 217 B.C., and at other times the notion may have been drawn from clouds of dust, which are often mentioned in antiquity. In actual historic times Silius<sup>58</sup> represents Hannibal at Cannae as carried in a cloud to another part of the field. The experience of British and German forces in the Libyan campaign at present raging indicates the use which may be made of such atmospheric conditions by shrewd commanders. This principle is not, however, limited to the crises of battle, for in the *Odyssey* we may note the concealment of Odysseus in Phaeacia and in Ithaca by divinely sent mists,<sup>59</sup> while in other writers Helen is carried by Hermes in folds of air from Troy to Egypt;<sup>60</sup> the gods save Phrixus and Helle from sacrifice at the hands of Athamas, and carry them off through the air on the ram with the golden fleece;<sup>61</sup> the Argonauts are concealed by Hera as they traverse hostile places;<sup>62</sup> Aeneas and Achates observe Carthage from the cover of a cloud;<sup>63</sup> Liber sends a cloud to save Ino and Melicertes from death;<sup>64</sup> Artemis rescues Iphigenia in a cloud at Aulis,<sup>65</sup> and similarly Erigona;<sup>66</sup> in the *Book of Enoch* that worthy is taken away in a mist;<sup>67</sup> and Josephus<sup>68</sup> describes a mist as thrown by God to prevent the forces of King Ben-hadad from seeing Elisha—this mist being, as Dr. Ralph Marcus has observed,<sup>69</sup> a rationalistic

<sup>56</sup> *Il.* XI 750–752.

<sup>57</sup> On *Virg. Aen.* I 411.

<sup>58</sup> IX 484–485.

<sup>59</sup> *Od.* VII 14–17; VII 41–42; VII 139–143; XIII 189; XIII 352; XXIII 372.

<sup>60</sup> *Eur. Hel.* 44–45; 605–606; 1134–1136; 1219; *Orest.* 1495–1497; 1557; 1629–1632.

<sup>61</sup> Apollod. *Bibl.* I 9. 1; Zenob. IV. 38. Cf. Hygin. *Astron.* 2. 20.

<sup>62</sup> Apollon. *Rhod.* III 210–214; IV 648; cf. Val. Fl. V 400; VI 745–746.

<sup>63</sup> *Virg. Aen.* I 411–414; I 439–440; I 516; I 586–587. In II 604–606; V 808–810 Aeneas is said to have been thus saved by Zeus at Troy; in XII 52–53 he is accused of having been concealed by his mother *nube feminea*.

<sup>64</sup> Hygin. *Fab.* 2. 4.

<sup>65</sup> Hygin. *Fab.* 98. 4; but contrast *Eur. I. A.* 1583; 1608; where the mode of her disappearance remains in mystery; cf. *I. T.* 28–30; Schol. Dan. *Aen.* III 331; Proclus, *Cypria*, 22 (*Mythog. Gr.* I 240 Wagner).

<sup>66</sup> Hygin. *Fab.* 122. 3. <sup>67</sup> 14. 18; but cf. n. 83 infra. <sup>68</sup> *Ant.* IX 56–57.

<sup>69</sup> Loeb Classical Library edition of Josephus, vol. VI 31, note c.

detail added by Josephus to the story as told in *II Kings*, 6. 14, and an indication<sup>70</sup> of the presence of deity on the side of the prophet.<sup>71</sup>

Man's invisibility<sup>72</sup> may occur, then, as a result of concealment in mist or dust,<sup>73</sup> natural or artificial—like the modern smoke-screen—in a tempest of wind or rain,<sup>74</sup> during a solar eclipse,<sup>75</sup> into darkness,<sup>76</sup> in fire,<sup>77</sup> into water,<sup>78</sup> in fissures in the earth,<sup>79</sup>

<sup>70</sup> *Ant.* IX 60.

<sup>71</sup> With cases of human concealment there may be compared *Il.* VIII 50, where Zeus hides his horses under the cover of mist.

<sup>72</sup> Among the phrases used ἀφανῆς ἐγένετο and *non comparuit* are especially frequent. Cf. L. Deubner, *De Incubatione*, Leipzig, 1900, 13.

<sup>73</sup> Sil. Ital. II 173; A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, III, Cambridge (Engl.), 1940, 103, n. 2, and works there cited. A favorite method of vanishing is into thin air; cf. A. S. Pease on Virg. *Aen.* IV 278. A reminiscence of this device is found in Liban. *Orat.* 18. 110; cf. 59. 97; *Declam.* 41. 32.

<sup>74</sup> As in the cases of Ganymede (Hom. *Hymn. Ven.* 202–209, especially 208), Romulus (Liv. I 16. 1; Eutrop. I 2. 2; Plut. *Camill.* 33. 7; see also a fuller treatment below), and Basileia, daughter of Uranus (Diod. III 57. 8).

<sup>75</sup> So the account of Romulus in Plut. *Camill.* 33. 7.

<sup>76</sup> E.g., Virg. *Aen.* II 621; IV 570 (and note by A. S. Pease *ad loc.*).

<sup>77</sup> Hamilcar in Hdt. VII 167; cf. n. 146 *infra*. Elijah (*II Kings* 2. 11–12) went to heaven in a whirlwind with chariot and horses of fire; cf. Tert. *De An.* 50.

<sup>78</sup> Sea deities thus vanish in Apollon. Rhod. IV 865 (Thetis); IV. 1590 (Triton). Cf. also Hylas at the fountain (Theocr. 13, and other passages cited by Stein in PW IX (1916), 111–113), Scamander (Schol. Dan. *Aen.* III 108), Sarnus (n. 161 *infra*), the hero Bormus (Athen. XIV 620a), and Euthymus the Locrian (Ael. V. H. VIII 18). Some thought Aeneas thus disappeared (Dion. Hal. *Antig.* I 64. 4–5; Schol. Juv. 11. 63). See also the story of Glaucus (Schol. Plat. *Rep.* I. 611d), who περιτυχὼν τῇ ἀθανάτῳ πηγῇ καὶ κατέλθὼν εἰς αὐτὴν ἀθαναστας ἔτυχεν. He became a sea divinity and was described as invisible. The case of Alexander the Great (Arr. *Anab.* VII 27. 3) is further discussed below. Rohde, *Psyche*, II<sup>4</sup> (1907), 374 (cf. *id.*, *Gr. Roman*<sup>3</sup>, Leipzig, 1914, 117, and n. 1), groups together rapes of beautiful youths by nymphs. Might it be further suggested that these are due to the romanticizing of various unsolved disappearances by drowning or by being lost in the wilds? Cf. *CIL* VI 29195 (= Dessau 8482): *hic situs est M. Ulpius Firmus A. l. anima bona superis reddita, raptus a Nymphis, vix. ann. VIII, m. VI.* Note also the case of the death of a disparager of Hector at Troy, who was carried off by a sudden torrent (Philostr. *Heroic.* p. 152 K.). The motif has been effectively used by Tennyson in *The Passing of Arthur* for the arm “clothed in white samite.”

<sup>79</sup> Some of these are perhaps due to faulting. A deity may thus vanish,

by putting to sleep<sup>80</sup> or temporary blinding<sup>81</sup> of one's enemies, by simply slipping away and evading one's companions,<sup>82</sup> or by methods not clearly stated, and hence, as in the case of Oedipus with which I started, mysterious.<sup>83</sup> As with a god ἀπαλλαγή is as

e.g., Hecate (Lucian, *Philops.* 24), Amphiaraus—swallowed up with chariot and horses (Schol. Pind. *Nem.* 10. 14; Wolff in Roscher, *Ausf. Lex.* I (1884), 298; Rohde, *Psyche*, I<sup>4</sup> (1907), 114, n. 1), and Tages (A. S. Pease on Cic. *De Div.* II 50; Weinstock in PW, IVA (1932), 2009–2011). Or the one disappearing may be a mortal, as Daphne (Schol. Dan. *Aen.* III 91), Laodice, daughter of Priam (Höfer in Roscher, *Ausf. Lex.* II (1894), 1830), Empedocles (discussed below), or Curtius (Stein in PW, IV (1901), 1864–1865). Note also the case of the Christian Thecla (*Acts of Paul and Thecla*, fin.), and the mass destruction of Korah, Dathan, Abiram, and their followers (*Numbers* 16. 28–34), or of seven thousand worshippers of the viper-god (*Acts of Philip*). Various other cases of beings (Trophonius, Caeneus, Althaemenes, Amphilochus) swallowed up by the earth and thereafter regarded as chthonic deities (or at least as having achieved immortality) are collected by Rohde, *op. cit.* I<sup>4</sup> (1907), 113–118, who distinguishes between this form of Höhlenentrückung and transportation to the Isles of the Blest or to Elysium, and (p. 121) definitely connects the first-mentioned type with the phenomenon of *incubatio*, arising, like it, in the post-Homeric period. Further F. Pfister (*Der Reliquienkult im Altertum*, II (1912), 480) distinguishes between the regard paid to those who have gone up to heaven (*θυστοι*) and that rendered to chthonic beings (*τραγισματα*). For the motif of swallowing in the earth as it appears in oaths or appeals cf. A. S. Pease on Virg. *Aen.* IV 24. Deaths by lightning are considered by Rohde (*op. cit.* I<sup>4</sup> (1907), 136, n. 3) as a closely related form of translation.

<sup>80</sup> *Il.* XXIV 445.

<sup>81</sup> Aug. *Quaest. in Hept.* I, 43, mentioning cases in *II Kings* 6. 18; *Luke* 24. 16.

<sup>82</sup> E.g., Dio Cass. LXIII 6. 2; Achill. Tat. II 11. 1; Suid. s. vv. 'Αρποκρᾶς, 'Ορπαπόλλων. Tert. *Ad Nat.* II 9, suggests that Aeneas was not divinely hidden in battle but merely fled. In the Gospels Jesus sometimes slips away from a crowd.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. the translation of Enoch: "And Enoch walked with God; and he was not, for God took him" (*Gen.* 5. 24; cf. *Eccl.* 44. 16; 49. 14; *Enoch* 14. 8; *Secrets of Enoch* 3. 1; *Wisdom of Solomon* 4. 10–11; *Heb.* 11. 5; Greg. Naz. *Epitaph.* 92. 1 (*Patr. Gr.* XXXVIII 57). Philo (*De Mutatione Nominum* 38) thinks Enoch still existed but was hidden from men and shunned their company; cf. Tert. *De An.* 50: *translatus est Enoch et Helias nec mors eorum reperta est, dilata scilicet*; [Lact.], *De Mort. Persec.* 2. 8. Is the *Wisdom of Solomon* 4. 10, based on these cases? The disappearance of Philip from the eunuch (*Acts* 8. 39–40) is highly mysterious in character. Arrian (*Indica* 31. 2) describes an island where all who land disappear.

characteristic as *ἐπιφάνεια*, both being usually of lightning rapidity,<sup>84</sup> so, though in a slightly lesser degree, in the disappearance of mortals. The purpose may vary from divinely inflicted punishment<sup>85</sup> to "protective arrest," escape from enemies, suicide, or the passage to a higher, even to a divine, level of existence. Thus Strabo<sup>86</sup> says that some mythographers declared that Diomedes was caused to disappear and his comrades were turned to happy and almost human birds on the Islands of Diomedes, but Eusebius<sup>87</sup> tells us that the translation of Enoch was that of the "true man," taken up by God to be his friend.

From such translation which makes human beings the companions of deity to that which carries man himself to a divine state is no long step, and to draw the line between the immortality of the soul after the death of the physical body and the happy eternity of superhuman beings was not always easy. Ancestor-worship, the uncertain status of hybrid beings with one divine and one human parent, Euhemeristic rationalizing of the gods as deceased and subsequently deified human benefactors or rulers—all these, added to the basic and obvious invisibility of man's spirit both before and after death, may have contributed to the notion that full attainment of invisibility, with the presence of a material corpse no longer standing as an obstacle to belief in the complete withdrawal of the personality of its former occupant,<sup>88</sup> forms a guarantee of his divinity. Eitrem<sup>89</sup> has remarked that the humanization of the gods is

<sup>84</sup> Eitrem in PW, VIA (1936), 879. On the term *ἐπιφάνεια* (or *ἐπιδημία*) for theophany and *παρουσία* for the divine presence cf. L. Weniger in *Arch. f. Religionswiss.* XXII (1923), 20.

<sup>85</sup> Note the disappearance of the discredited accuser of an innocent Vestal (Dion. Hal. *Antiq.* II 69. 3).

<sup>86</sup> VI 3. 9, p. 284. Ibucus (ap. Schol. Pind. *Nem.* 10. 7) says that for his valor he was immortalized and worshipped as a god on the holy isle of Diomedea.

<sup>87</sup> *P. E.* VII 8, p. 308b.

<sup>88</sup> F. Pfister (in *Woch. f. kl. Philol.* XXVIII (1911), 84; *id.*, *Der Reliquienkult im Altertum*, II (1912), 481) well emphasizes the mutual exclusiveness of a grave—implying a physical corpse—and traditions of translation to heaven.

<sup>89</sup> In *Symb. Osloenses* XV (1936), 125.

followed by the deification of man, and, finally, by the wiping out of boundaries between the divine and the human. We may, then, I think, contrast theophany, in which the god temporarily assumes a visible and quasi-material form,<sup>90</sup> with disappearance, in which man is imagined as putting on the divine. Each is, in a sense, characterized by that metamorphosis so dear to the thought of the Hellenistic and following ages, which is exemplified in literary form by authors like Parthenius in Greek and Ovid and Apuleius in Latin.<sup>91</sup> "He disappeared and was worshipped as a hero (or as a god)"; this is the statement recurring again and again through antiquity,<sup>92</sup> clearly indicating the association of invisibility and divinity.<sup>93</sup> Origen<sup>94</sup> reports that Celsus declared that a Jew had alleged that descents to the underworld and rising again are mere tricks of jugglery; the heroes had disappeared for a time and then gave themselves out to have returned from Hades. Such, he continues, were Orpheus, Protesilaus, Heracles,<sup>95</sup> and Theseus. Others in Greek tradition who similarly vanished and were deified are Dionysus,<sup>96</sup> Ganymedes,<sup>97</sup>

<sup>90</sup> As in the case of Jesus in the presence of Thomas (*John* 20. 24-28).

<sup>91</sup> E.g., [Lucian], *Asinus* 54, where the ass vanishes and Lucius appears restored in his human form.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. Schol. Lucan. VIII 868: *peribunt: id est probari non poteris in Aegypto esse sepultus, posteri cum tuum tumulum non videbunt et idcirco inter deos te esse iudicabunt*; also n. 31 supra. In Arnob. VII 46 (cf. Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 94) a similar phrase is used for the serpent of Aesculapius after it had taken up refuge on the Insula Tiberina.

<sup>93</sup> Ael. *V. H.* III 18, says of Silenus: *θεοῦ μὲν ἀφανέστερος τὴν φύσιν, κτλ.*

<sup>94</sup> C. *Cels.* II 56. The subject apparently interested various writers; cf. Procl. in Plat. *Rep.* II 113. 6 Kroll (= Diels, *Vorsokr.*, frg. of Democritus B 1): *τὴν μὲν περὶ τῶν ἀποθανεῖν δοξάντων ἐπειτα ἀναβιούντων ἴστορίαν ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἥθροισαν καὶ Δημόκριτος δὲ φυσικὸς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ "Αἰδου γράμμασιν.*

<sup>95</sup> Cf. Lysias 2. II; also various passages to be discussed below, nn. 234-239. On Heracles and his successors in the art of becoming a god (Alexander, Romulus, Scipio Africanus, Pompey, Caesar, Antony, and Augustus) cf. A. R. Anderson in *H.S.C.P.* XXXIX (1928), 7-58.

<sup>96</sup> Eur. *Bacch.* 1076-1079.

<sup>97</sup> Stat. *Silv.* III 4. 12-19.

Amphiaraus,<sup>98</sup> Bormus,<sup>99</sup> Marathon,<sup>100</sup> Cleomedes,<sup>101</sup> Belus,<sup>102</sup> Aristaeus,<sup>103</sup> Branchus,<sup>104</sup> Basileia daughter of Uranus,<sup>105</sup> and Astarte.<sup>106</sup> Similar is the case of Semiramis, the legendary queen of Nineveh,<sup>107</sup> who learned from the oracle of Ammon that she would disappear from among men and receive among some of the peoples of Asia immortal honor. Roman tradition, surely under strong Greek influence, had also its canon of vanishing worthies: Saturnus,<sup>108</sup> Aeneas,<sup>109</sup> of the manner of whose dis-

<sup>98</sup> Cf. n. 79 supra.

<sup>99</sup> Athen. XIV 620a; described by Hesych. s.v. Βῶρμον as νυμφόδληπτος.

<sup>100</sup> Paus. I 32. 5. A man in rustic dress helped the people of Marathon in battle by slaughtering many of the barbarians. After the fight he vanished, and when the Athenians inquired of the god about him they were directed to honor him as the hero Echetlaeus.

<sup>101</sup> Plut. *Rom.* 28. 4-5; Paus. VI 9. 7-8; Cleomedes hides in a chest, is not to be found when the chest is opened, and is declared by the Pythia worthy of honor as a hero. Plutarch in this passage (cf. Paus. IX 16. 7; Diod. IV 58. 6) also describes the vanishing of the corpse of Alcmene on its way to burial, a stone being found in its place on the bier. Pherecydes (ap. Ant. Lib. 33) represents Alcmene as transported to the islands of the blest, and Diodorus (*l.c.*) says: ἄφαντος γενομένη τιμῶν ἵστειν ἔτυχε παρὰ τοῖς Θηβαῖοις. F. Pfister (in *Woch. f. kl. Philol.* XXVIII (1911), 82-83; *id.*, *Der Reliquienkult im Altertum*, II (1912), 481, thinks that the lack of relics of Alcmene caused the legend of her translation, with which he compares the legend of the Assumption of Mary, in which the eleven apostles correspond to the Heraclidae, the angel to Hermes, paradise to the isles of the blest, and the church to the ἡρῷον. See also Pfister, *Reliquienkult*, I (1909), 125, n. 443.

<sup>102</sup> Abydenus ap. Euseb. *P. E.* IX 41, p. 457c, where Belus, after fortifying Babylon with a wall, vanishes.

<sup>103</sup> Diod. IV 82. 6; Plut. *Rom.* 28. 4.

<sup>104</sup> II *Myth. Vat.* 85.

<sup>105</sup> Diod. III 57. 8.

<sup>106</sup> Lucian, *Syr. Dea* 4.

<sup>107</sup> Diod. II 14. 3; but cf. II 20. 2.

<sup>108</sup> Macrob. *Sat.* I 7. 24. His disappearance was followed by his being honored by the Saturnalia.

<sup>109</sup> The passages are cited by A. S. Pease on Virg. *Aen.* IV 620 (to which add Serv. *Aen.* IX 742; Paul. ex Fest. p. 106 M.; Solin. II 15). Liv. I 2. 6; Ov. M. XIV 608; *CIL* X 808 (= 63 Dussau); and Schol. Dan. *Aen.* I 259 identify him with Iuppiter Indiges. The language of Procopius, VIII 22. 31, seems to imply the vanishing of Anchises at Anchialus, but I do not find this tradition elsewhere confirmed. F. Pfister (in *Woch. f. kl. Philol.* XXVIII (1911), 85) notes that the Greek Aeneas is an importation at Rome, and was consequently unprovided with physical relics or a native shrine; hence the

appearance there were conflicting accounts, but general agreement as to the deification which followed it; King Latinus,<sup>110</sup> who vanished in battle with Mezentius and was worshipped as Iuppiter Latiaris; Anna,<sup>111</sup> transformed into the nymph Anna Perenna; Larentia;<sup>112</sup> King Aventinus, after whom, says Augustine,<sup>113</sup> there was no one deified in Latium save Romulus. The deification of Romulus, the founder of so mighty a city, merits especial attention and forms a very typical case. A significant passage in Livy<sup>114</sup> declares: "The concession is granted to antiquity that by mingling things human with things divine it may ennable the foundings of cities, and if any people should be allowed to hallow its origins and to trace them back to the gods, such is the military glory of the Roman people that, when it boasts of Mars as its parent and that of its founder, the races of men should allow this claim as willingly as they endure its sovereignty." The deification of Romulus appears as early as Ennius,<sup>115</sup> in the second century B.C.; the tradition of his vanishing as early as Cicero.<sup>116</sup> The details of the event vary a good deal; according to some<sup>117</sup> he was presiding over the Senate convened in the precinct of Vulcan; according to others addressing an assembly of the people in the Campus near the Goat's Marsh.<sup>118</sup> In the latter version the sun failed and a furious storm dispersed the multitude, but not the senators,<sup>119</sup> and after the storm

easy opportunity for a legend of his having vanished, and the situation with Latinus was not dissimilar.

<sup>110</sup> Fest. p. 194 M.      <sup>111</sup> Sil. Ital. VIII 192-225.      <sup>112</sup> Plut. Rom. 5. 4.

<sup>113</sup> C. D. XVIII 21; he vanishes in battle and becomes a god.

<sup>114</sup> Praef. 7.

<sup>115</sup> Ann. 65-66; 111-113; cf. Rosenberg in PW, IA (1920), 1097-1098. C. Hönn, *Stud. z. Gesch. d. Himmelfahrt im kl. Alt.*, Mannheim, 1910, 25-26, notes that this is a late and literary rather than an early and popular legend.

<sup>116</sup> Rep. I 25; II 17. Other passages are cited by Rosenberg, *l.c.*, to which add: Quintil. Inst. III 7. 5; Plut. Camill. 32-33; Eutrop. I 2. 2; Lamprid. Commod. 2. 2; Julian, *Or.* 4, p. 154 D (the mortal part of his body was destroyed by fire from a thunderbolt); Aug. C. D. III 15; XVIII 24; Phot. Bibl. 57 init.

<sup>117</sup> Cf. Plut. Rom. 27. 5. In 28. 4 he compares the legend with those of Aristeas and Cleomedes, remarking (28. 6): *καὶ δλῶς πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μνθολογοῦσι, παρὰ τὸ εἰκός ἐκθειάζοντες τὰ θυητὰ τῆς φύσεως ἀμα τοῖς θεοῖς.*

<sup>118</sup> Liv. I 16. 1; Dion. Hal. *Antiq.* II 56. 2; Plut. Rom. 27. 6.

<sup>119</sup> Plut. Rom. 27. 7.

Romulus was not to be found. In what follows, three elements are to be noted, though their sequence may be variously interpreted and disputed: (1) a story that Romulus had been caught up into heaven;<sup>120</sup> (2) a conflicting tradition that, during the storm, he had been made away with by the disaffected senators;<sup>121</sup> (3) a sworn declaration to the people by an intimate friend of Romulus named Proculus Iulius (a descendant of Ascanius<sup>122</sup>) that the deified Romulus, who willed henceforth to be called Quirinus,<sup>123</sup> had appeared to him on the road or in a garden,<sup>124</sup> announced his own divinity, and predicted the future greatness of the city of Rome. The lack of any Latin shrine of Romulus and the inadequate character of the so-called "grave of Romulus" in the Roman Forum (Varro ap. Porphy. ad Hor. *Epod.* 16. 13; Fest. p. 177 M.) are suggested by Pfister (*Woch. f. kl. Philol.* XXVIII (1911), 85) as reasons for the origin of a legend of his vanishing.

So far vanishing figures have fallen in considerable measure in the field of popular legend, or, in the case of early Roman kings, in that of literary imitation of such. But the principle was too suggestive to be overlooked in periods like the age of Alexander or the early Roman Empire, when every occasion for glorifying and legitimizing the ruling dynasty was eagerly sought. Arrian, in a passage to be later discussed,<sup>125</sup> shows this motive already at work in the case of Alexander himself, and with Julius Caesar it is reborn. He had obviously died a purely human death,

<sup>120</sup> Liv. I 16. 2: *sublimem raptum*.

<sup>121</sup> Liv. I 16. 4; Dion. Hal. *Antiq.* II 56. 3-4 (alleging reasons for the murder); Val. Max. V 3. 1; Flor. I 1. 1. 16-17; Plut. *Rom.* 27. 8; App. B. C. II 114; [Acro] in Hor. *Epod.* 16. 14; Phot. *Bibl.* 57, p. 15 Bekk.: ἐσφάγη, ή ὡς ἀλλοι φαστν, ἡφαντοθη. Plut. *Rom.* 27. 4-5 compares similar gossip about the demise of Scipio Africanus.

<sup>122</sup> Dion. Hal. *Antiq.* II 63. 3.

<sup>123</sup> Cf. Rosenberg, *op. cit.* 1099; Cic. *Rep.* II 20; Flor. I 1. 1. 18; Anon. *De Vir. ill.* II 13-14; Min. Fel. 21. 9; Cypr. *De Idol. Vanit.* 4; Lact. *Inst.* I 15. 32; Hier. *Chron.* ann. Abr. 1301; Prob. in Virg. *G.* III 27-29; Suid. s.v. *Kυρινός*.

<sup>124</sup> So perhaps Cic. *Legg.* I 3. In *Rep.* II 20 Cicero says it was on the hill later called the Quirinal.

<sup>125</sup> *Anab.* VII 27.3.

stabbed with twenty-three very real wounds,<sup>126</sup> yet his demise, at the hands of disaffected senators, presented likenesses to that of Romulus,<sup>127</sup> and the comet appearing at the time of his death furnished a convenient basis for the theory that his soul had been enshrined in a new star,<sup>128</sup> in the fashion of such Hellenistic καταστερισμοι as those described by Eratosthenes<sup>129</sup> in the third century B.C. Augustus, in his attitude toward Hercules and Romulus,<sup>130</sup> perhaps encouraged the notion of an immortality *ex virtute* which might later be his own lot also; at any rate, at his funeral an eagle released from the pyre soared aloft, appearing to bear his spirit to heaven,<sup>131</sup> and his widow Livia, according to Dio Cassius,<sup>132</sup> gave a million sesterces to a senator, Numerius Atticus by name, who swore that he had seen Augustus ascending to the heavens, just as Proculus Iulius had declared about Romulus. Similarly attested by oath was the ascension of Caligula's mother, Agrippina,<sup>133</sup> and that of his sister, Drusilla.<sup>134</sup> Such imperial apotheoses<sup>135</sup> are doubtless intended to be satirized

<sup>126</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 83. 2. Cf. the very real wounds of Jesus on the Cross.

<sup>127</sup> App. *B. C.* II 114.

<sup>128</sup> Cf. C. Hönn, *op. cit.*, 29, n. 99 and works there cited; L. R. Taylor, *The Divinity of the Roman Emperor*, Middletown, 1931, 90–92, on the star as an emblem of Caesar's godhead.

<sup>129</sup> Or those of Calpurnius Piso (in the second century after Christ?) mentioned by Plin. *Ep.* V 17. 2. Cf. the catasterism of the Lock of Berenice (Callim. *Coma Ber.*, including the new papyrus fragments published by R. Pfeiffer in *Philol.* LXXXVII (1932), 179–228; Schol. *Arat.* 146; Catull. 66) or of Berenice herself (Theocr. 17. 46–50).

<sup>130</sup> L. R. Taylor, *op. cit.*, 164–165. Cf. also Hor. *Carm.* III 3. 11–16; *Epist.* II 1. 5–10; Suet. *Aug.* 95. But Cicero had already spoken (*N. D.* II 62) of such a theory about the deification of Romulus and others.

<sup>131</sup> Dio Cass. LVI 42. 3; and cf. the references given by Hönn, *op. cit.*, 29, n. 100.

<sup>132</sup> LVI 46. 2; cf. Suet. *Aug.* 100. 4; Justin Martyr, *I Apol.* 21.

<sup>133</sup> Dio Cass. LIX 11. 4.

<sup>134</sup> Sen. *Apoc.* 1. 2 (where the testimony of an eye-witness is sarcastically recorded); cf. Taylor, *op. cit.* 229, n. 10. [Lact.], *De Mort. Persec.* 2. 7, says that Nero at his downfall so suddenly and completely disappeared that the place of his burial was unknown.

<sup>135</sup> For which cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, II<sup>4</sup> (1907), 375, n. 1.

by Lucian,<sup>136</sup> when he describes the old bearded man who after the death of Peregrinus—the exhibitionist philosopher who imitated Heracles by his death on the pyre—assured Lucian that Peregrinus had appeared to him in the form of Proteus, clad in a white robe. But I cannot further discuss ordinary cases of emperor-worship, in which the Emperor appears as a god in very presence (*θεὸς ἐπιφανῆς, deus praesens*)<sup>137</sup> and so presumably capable at death of divine invisibility. I merely wish to emphasize the principle of having appearances after death attested by oath or by one or more witnesses,<sup>138</sup> a practice of which Tertullian in a badly corrupted passage,<sup>139</sup> seems to speak with scorn.

In the cases thus far discussed disappearance may or may not profit the one who vanishes, but is either brought about by divine interposition in his behalf or asserted about him by other human beings, in either case without his own distinct volition. My next group comprises those who, without deliberate recourse to magic, yet actively sought by mysterious disappearances to encourage the belief that their invisibility was an evidence of their own divinity. Thus the Thracian Zamolxis, after teaching his countrymen a belief in the immortality of the soul, hid in an underground chamber for three years, was mourned as dead, and reappeared in the fourth year.<sup>140</sup> Tertullian and Suidas<sup>141</sup> have

<sup>136</sup> *De Morte Peregr.* 40. Cf. n. 134 supra for Seneca's similar attitude, seen throughout the *Apocolocyntosis* (cf. K. Scott in *Am. Journ. Philol.* LII (1931), 49).

<sup>137</sup> S. Eitrem in *Symb. Osloenses*, XV (1936), 111–128.

<sup>138</sup> Of the significance of the number I shall later speak.

<sup>139</sup> *Ad Nat.* I 10, pp. 77–78 Wissowa.

<sup>140</sup> Hdt. IV 95; cf. Strab. VII 3. 5; Lucian, *Deorum Concil.* 9; Hellanicus ap. Suid. and *Etym. M.* s.v. Ζάμολξις, who adds (suggestive of *John* 14. 19; *Rom.* 6. 8): ἀθανατίζοντι δὲ καὶ Τέριζοι καὶ Κρόβυζοι, καὶ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας ὡς Ζάμολξιν φασιν οἰχεοθαι, ἥξειν δὲ αὐθις. Apollonius of Tyana, after his death, resorted to an epiphany to convince a doubting young man of the truth of immortality (Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* VIII 31).

<sup>141</sup> Tert. *De An.* 28; Suid. s.v. Ηδη; also Schol. Soph. *El.* 62. A. B. Cook (*Zeus*, II (1925), 934) thinks that Pythagoras, by entering a cave in Crete where Zeus was buried, perhaps hoped to share in the death and resurrection of that god, i.e., to enter as a mortal and come forth as a god. Whether the same idea may have played a part in other cave-rites and initiations might well be queried.

a similar story of Pythagoras—who was considered by Empedocles<sup>142</sup> as a man of superhuman knowledge—, with the underground sojourn increased to seven years, and, as I have already said, Celsus<sup>143</sup> reported the allegation of a Jew that such descents to the underworld and risings again from it were mere jugglery, the heroes having disappeared for a time and then pretended to have returned from Hades. So Orpheus, Protesilaus, Heracles, and Theseus, with whom he compared Jesus, had indulged in such disappearances. Gregory of Nazianzus<sup>144</sup> similarly declares that Heracles, Aristaeus, Empedotimus, and Trophonius had sought glory by hiding away in inaccessible spots, but had won more contempt from being discovered than glory from their concealment.<sup>145</sup> The Carthaginian Hamilcar, after his defeat by Gelo in 480 B.C., could nowhere be found, dead or alive, and his countrymen declared that when he saw his army routed he threw himself on the sacrificial fires and was completely consumed and hence no more seen, but received honors of sacrifice, apparently as a god.<sup>146</sup> More famous is one tradition of the disappearance of the philosopher Empedocles, who, having dreamed that he was a god,<sup>147</sup> and having declared that the divine cannot be approached by our eyes or grasped by our hands,<sup>148</sup> in the dead of night<sup>149</sup> leaped into the crater of Mt. Etna,<sup>150</sup> preferring this disappearance to the corruption of an obscure grave,<sup>151</sup> and hoping

<sup>142</sup> Frg. 129 Diels (ap. Porphy. *Vit. Pythag.* 30). On the high estimate set by later philosophers upon Pythagoras as a wonder-worker or deity cf. C. Hönn, *Stud. z. Gesch. d. Himmelfahrt im kl. Altertum* (1910), 28.

<sup>143</sup> Orig. *C. Cels.* II 56.

<sup>144</sup> *Or.* 4. 59 (*Patr. Gr.* XXXV 581B-C); *Carm. ad Alios*, 7. 281-290 (*Patr. Gr.* XXXVII 1573A); *Epitaph.* 70. 1-3 (*Patr. Gr.* XXXVIII 47A).

<sup>145</sup> Nonnus Abbas ad Greg. Naz. *Or.* 1 (*Patr. Gr.* XXXVI 988A) remarks that Trophonius, Aristaeus, and Empedotimus were all from Lebadia. Perhaps this chthonic centre encouraged practices of this sort.

<sup>146</sup> Hdt. VII 166-167.

<sup>147</sup> Tert. *De An.* 32; cf. Diog. L. VIII 66. Lucr. I 733 says of him, *vix humana videatur stirpe creatus*.

<sup>148</sup> Clem. *Strom.* V 12. 81. 2.

<sup>149</sup> Diog. L. VIII 68; Lact. *Inst.* III 18. 5; Suid. s.vv. ἀμύκλαι, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς.

<sup>150</sup> Strab. II 6. 8; Lucian, *De Mort. Peregr.* 1; Tert. *Apol.* 50 (cf. *Ad Martyr.* 4); Greg. Naz. *Or.* 4. 59; Suid. s.v. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς.

<sup>151</sup> Tert. *De An.* 32.

thus to establish a belief in his divinity.<sup>152</sup> One of his brazen sandals, found just outside the rim of the crater, bore tell-tale witness to his fate,<sup>153</sup> but at the instigation of his friend Pausanias sacrifice was offered to him as to a god.<sup>154</sup> The historian Timaeus, however, explains his disappearance on entirely rational grounds, as due to his having gone away from Sicily to parts unknown.<sup>155</sup> Heraclides of Pontus, whose life fell at a time when prominent men were beginning to be deified after death,<sup>156</sup> according to the account of Suidas,<sup>157</sup> was thought by some to have become a god, but by others to have thrown himself into a well so that he might seem to have been made immortal. Various cases of Germanic kings at death going while still alive into the earth where they were supposed to continue to live are discussed by Hermann Usener in his *Kl. Schriften*, IV (1913), 200. Perhaps suggested by the legend of Empedocles is the statement of Arrian,<sup>158</sup> that an unnamed writer, in discussing the death of Alexander the Great, had asserted that when Alexander knew that his end was near he went to throw himself into the Euphrates, so that he might disappear from among men and leave a more credible tradition to posterity that his birth was from a god and his passing away (*ἀποχώρησις*) was to the gods. When his wife Roxana prevented him he cried aloud and reproached her for grudging him this fame. It may in this connection be recalled that Alexander had earlier been interested in deification, and

<sup>152</sup> Hor. *A. P.* 464-466: *deus immortalis haberi / dum cupid Empedocles,* *ardentem frigidus Aetnam / insiluit* (and see [Acro] *ad loc.*); Diog. L. VIII 69: *βουλόμενον τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ φήμην βεβαιώσαι ὅτι γεγόνοι θεός*; VIII 70.

<sup>153</sup> Strab. II 6. 8; Diog. L. VIII 69; Suid., *l.c.*

<sup>154</sup> Diog. L. VIII 68. For the ascension of other philosophers from earth to heaven cf. E. Pfeiffer, *Stud. z. ant. Sternglauben* (1916), 123 (= *ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΑ*, II).

<sup>155</sup> Diog. L. VIII 71.

<sup>156</sup> Cf. Daebritz in PW, VIII (1913), 474, and works there cited.

<sup>157</sup> S.v. 'Ηρακλείδης Εὔφρονος.

<sup>158</sup> *Anab.* VII 27. 3. Cf. Diod. XVIII 56. 2; Rohde, *Psyche*, II<sup>4</sup> (1907), 375, n. 1, who points out that Christian writers carried over the story to apply to the death of the Emperor Julian; C. Hönn, *Stud. z. Gesch. d. Himmelfahrt im kl. Altertum* (1910), 28, who cites Ps. Callisthenes II 41: *ἀνὴλθε μερ' αἰτῶν* (eagles) *οἱ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν τῷ ἀέρι εἰς τὸ ὄντος*, and discusses the relations of this story to the deification of Hellenistic rulers.

had asked the Hindu Gymnosophists how man could become God, to which they had replied, by doing what it is impossible for men to do<sup>159</sup>—the motive, it may be observed, of many wonder-workers. King Numa had similarly recognized, as Dio Cassius relates,<sup>160</sup> that men despise what is like themselves but worship that which is unseen and different, as being superior. Alexander's design also suggests one C. Epidius of Nuceria,<sup>161</sup> who leaped into the source of the Sarnus River, reappeared with the horns of a bull,<sup>162</sup> immediately vanished, and was held in the number of the gods.

I now pass to cases of invisibility deliberately procured by magical wonder-workers, often attempting to capitalize this power like other supposedly miraculous faculties. The archenchantress Medea<sup>163</sup> had already, in the age of legend, cast a mist over the eyes of the daughters of Pelias to delude them as to her real purposes, but the instances to be particularly noted here belong to the later recrudescence of obscurantism and theurgy in the early centuries of our era, represented in the New Testament and the early Fathers by the figure of Simon Magus,<sup>164</sup> who desired to be reckoned a god<sup>165</sup> and who professed the power to become invisible and visible again at will.<sup>166</sup> Apollonius of Tyana, also, had, in his travels, found at the castle of the Hindu sages the

<sup>159</sup> Clem. *Strom.* VI 4. 38. 9.

<sup>160</sup> I 6. 3.

<sup>161</sup> Suet. *De Gram.* 28. For the divine character of the Sarnus cf. P. Aebischer in *Rev. belge de phil. et d'hist.* IX (1930), 421–454. Cf. also the case of Scamander (n. 78 *supra*).

<sup>162</sup> The reading is here uncertain; cf. R. P. Robinson *ad loc.* For the manuscript readings *aureis* or *auribus* I hesitatingly accept the conjecture of Jahn, *taureis*, since river-gods were commonly conceived in the form of bulls (e.g., *Il.* XXI 237 (and schol.); Soph. *Trach.* 11–13 (and schol.); Eur. *Ion* 1261; Hor. *Carm.* IV 14. 25; Strab. X 2. 19 (with reasons); Ael. *V. H.* II 33 (with a list of such rivers); Athen. III 122 f; Paus. II 32. 7; Auson. *Mos.* 469; Nonnus XIX 345; XLI 300; XLVIII 938–939; O. Gruppe, *Gr. Myth. u. Relig.* II, Munich, 1906, 1059, n. 3; E. L. Highbarger, *The Gates of Dreams*, Baltimore, 1940, 25). Yet cf. Mart. X 7. 6, where a water-deity has *cornibus aureis*.

<sup>163</sup> Hygin. *Fab.* 24. 3, and H. J. Rose's note.

<sup>164</sup> Acts 8. 9–24; cf. R. P. Casey in F. J. F. Jackson and K. Lake, *The Beginnings of Christianity* V, London, 1933, 151–163.

<sup>165</sup> [Clem.], *Recognit.* 3. 63.

<sup>166</sup> [Clem.], *Recognit.* 2. 9.

tradition of persons resident there who were able, by means of a cloud floating around their hill, to render themselves invisible when they chose,<sup>167</sup> and apparently he made good use of this learning at his trial before the Emperor Domitian, when, after his public acquittal but before a private interview with the Emperor, he suddenly vanished.<sup>168</sup> Lucian<sup>169</sup> mentions the sudden disappearance of the magician Pancrates, whether by magical means or by simple evasion is not quite clear. Yet such magical escapes appear elsewhere, e.g., in that of Papa narrated by Ammianus Marcellinus,<sup>170</sup> or in that ascribed to the magician Virgil by the *Mirabilia Urbis Romae*<sup>171</sup> of the twelfth century. A particularly curious case is described by Irenaeus,<sup>172</sup> who says of certain disciples of the heretic and magician Marcus that because of their "redemption" (ἀπολύτρωσις)<sup>173</sup> they cannot be arrested for their deeds or seen by the judge. If arrested they repeat a formula: "O thou who sittest beside God (i.e., *Sophia* ?), and the mystical, eternal Silence (*Sige*), . . . behold the judge is at hand and the crier orders me to make my defence. But do thou, as knowing the affairs of both, present the cause of both of us to the judge, since it is really but one cause." Now as soon as the Mother hears these words she puts the Homeric<sup>174</sup> helmet of Pluto upon them, so that they may invisibly escape the judge. And then she at once catches them up, conducts them to the bridal-chamber, and hands them over to their consorts. According to Suidas,<sup>175</sup> Pases, by means of magical arts, causes rich feasts and waiters at them to appear and then to vanish again, suggesting the Barmecide feasts of the *Arabian Nights*, and

<sup>167</sup> Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* III 13.

<sup>168</sup> Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* VIII 5; VIII 12; Hier. *C. Ioann. Hierosol.* 34; Lact. *Inst.* V 3. 10, who says that it was in order to escape punishment.

<sup>169</sup> *Philops.* 36.

<sup>170</sup> XXX I. 17.

<sup>171</sup> J. W. Spargo, *Virgil the Necromancer*, Cambridge, 1934, 280.

<sup>172</sup> C. *Haeres.* I 13 (*Patr. Gr.* VII 588-589).

<sup>173</sup> Iren. *op. cit.*, I 21, says that the followers of Marcus hold that redemption is invisible, incomprehensible, and the mother of things which are invisible and incomprehensible.

<sup>174</sup> Cf. *Il.* V 844.

<sup>175</sup> S. v. Πάσης.

exhibiting, like them, a distinctly Oriental atmosphere. Not easily classified is the curious case of the Emperor Justinian, who was begotten, as his mother told her intimate friends, of a demon. When Justinian walked about, his head would at times disappear while his body still went on, and later the head was restored again.<sup>176</sup>

As the methods of divine disappearance have varied, with the employment of cloud, storm, dust, water, etc., so the magical technique of voluntary human invisibility has had its various forms. The famous story of the ring taken from the hand of a corpse in a hollow bronze horse in a chasm underground by an ancestor of Gyges, the Lydian—another story smacking of the Orient and of the flavor of the *Arabian Nights*, though E. Müller<sup>177</sup> has tried to find its origin in a volcanic myth—, is told by Plato<sup>178</sup> and copied from him by Cicero<sup>179</sup> and other writers.<sup>180</sup> As Gyges turned the ring about on his finger at a public gathering he became invisible, and was spoken of by his companions as though absent; on turning the ring back he again became visible. Plato describes the use which the owner made of the ring to seduce the king's wife, and queries whether any man could be found so just as to resist such temptations to sin which could not be

<sup>176</sup> Procop. *Anecd.* 12. 21.

<sup>177</sup> *Philol.* VII (1852), 239–254; cf. K. F. Smith in *Stud. in Hon. of B. L. Gildersleeve*, Baltimore, 1902, p. 291.

<sup>178</sup> *Rep.* II 359D–360B; X 612B.

<sup>179</sup> *Off.* III 38; cf. III 78 (Cicero makes the finder Gyges himself rather than an ancestor).

<sup>180</sup> Lucian, *Bis accus.* 21; *Navig.* 42; Greg. Naz. *Or.* 4. 94 (*Patr. Gr.* XXXV 628B); Liban. *Or.* 56. 10; 64. 35; *Ep.* 432. 5; *Paroem. Gr.* I 15; I 186; I 232 (and note of von Leutsch and Schneidewin); I 358; II 20; II 106; II 154; II 353; II 649–650; Suid. s.v. Γύγος δακτύλιος; Tzetz. *Chil.* I 3; Eudoc. *Viol.* 99. The story is also copied into the literature of India; cf. J. G. Frazer on Paus. IV 21. 5. Hdt. I 8–12, discusses Gyges, but says nothing of the magic ring; K. F. Smith (*Am. Journ. Philol.* XXIII (1902), 382–383) suggests that he removed the marvellous part of a popular original which was by Plato retained to illustrate the moral which Plato was treating, and Smith (pp. 383–385) attempts to reconstruct the original form of the tale. P. Shorey (on Plat. *Rep.* II 359D) compares H. G. Wells, *The Invisible Man*. On rings which render their wearers invisible cf. the works cited by S. Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature*, II (1933), 177–178.

detected. Weicher suggests<sup>181</sup> that the legend may rest on an official Lydian tradition according to which the founder of the new dynasty was a god. A similar motif is found in the ring of Midas, mentioned by the Elder Pliny,<sup>182</sup> which makes its wearer invisible, and K. F. Smith<sup>183</sup> has studied this story in relation to that of Gyges. The same principle appears frequently in mediaeval tradition.<sup>184</sup> Other objects with the power of conferring invisibility include the stone called *heliotropium*,<sup>185</sup> a leek-green gem, mottled with red veins, found in Ethiopia, Africa, and Cyprus, and used for various purposes, but which the magicians say can be mixed with the plant of the same name, and, when accompanied by certain incantations, can render invisible whoever carries it. The converse of this might seem to be the stone found in the head of Indian serpents and called *dracontitis*, of which Philostratus<sup>186</sup> says that it has a power opposite to that of the ring of Gyges. Pliny<sup>187</sup> calls it *draconitis* and *dracontia*, and says that it must be cut from the living snake while the reptile sleeps. Its powers are undoubtedly connected with those of the bright eyes of the snake itself.<sup>188</sup> The possession of a *pupula duplex*<sup>189</sup> was also a proof against obscuring powers like those of the ring of Gyges. Again, Pliny, when speaking of the

<sup>181</sup> In PW, VII (1912), 1966.

<sup>182</sup> N. H. XXXIII 8.

<sup>183</sup> In Am. Journ. of Philol. XXIII (1902), 261-282; 361-387.

<sup>184</sup> Smith, *op. cit.*, 268, n. 2.

<sup>185</sup> Plin. N. H. XXXVII 165; Solin. 27. 37; Isid. Etym. XVI 7. 12; Gervasius of Tilbury, *Otia imper.* p. 970. Cf. the long note of F. Liebrecht, *Des Gervasius von Tilbury Otia Imperialia*, Hannover, 1856, 111, with many mediaeval parallels. See also the "raven-stone" (F. E. Hulme, *Nat. Hist. Lore and Legend*, London, 1895, p. 245), and the references in S. Thompson, *op. cit.*, II 176.

<sup>186</sup> Vit. Apoll. III 8; cf. Chennus ap. Phot. Bibl. 190, p. 150 Bekk.; 241, p. 326 Bekk. Magical anointing with the juice of a plant so as to see truly who one really is may be found mentioned in [Clem.], *Homil.* 20. 16; 20. 17. Cf. also the magic eye-salves noted by J. A. MacCulloch in J. Hastings, *Encycl. of Rel. and Ethics*, VII (1915), 405.

<sup>187</sup> N. H. XXXVII 158; Solin. 30. 16.

<sup>188</sup> A. S. Pease on Virg. *Aen.* IV 484.

<sup>189</sup> K. F. Smith in *Stud. in Hon. of Gildersleeve* (1902) 287-300; *id.* in Am. Journ. of Philol. XXIII (1902), 368, n. 6.

various uses of the chamaeleon,<sup>190</sup> asserts that if its left foot be roasted along with the herb of the same name, and then the whole be mixed with unguent, made into lozenges, and kept in a wooden box, it will give the bearer the power to be invisible to others, and then, not without his bit of humor, he adds, *si credimus*. Other recipes for invisibility are found in the magical papyri, of which I give but one or two samples. "Take the plant cynocephalidion and keep it under your tongue during your sleep, and early in the morning arise, and before talking speak the names and you shall be invisible to all."<sup>191</sup> "If you wish to accomplish something striking and yourself to be freed from danger, stand at the door, speak the word, and then go away, adding, 'Let the fetters of so-and-so be loosed and let the doors open for him, and let no one behold him.'"<sup>192</sup> "Take the egg of a hawk, gild one-half and paint the other with cinnabar. Carry this and you will be invisible if you speak the name in addition."<sup>193</sup> In another passage the magic power seems to reside solely in the incantation to the primal darkness ( $\tauὸ\ πρωτοφαὲς\ σκότος$ ).<sup>194</sup> The favorite later method of procuring invisibility by the use of fern-seed, gathered on Mid-summer Eve and worn in the shoe,<sup>195</sup> seems not to be attested for antiquity. Hippolytus<sup>196</sup> describes how to make an artificial skull out of clay, wax, and other materials, which can speak aloud, and then, when one wishes it to

<sup>190</sup> *N. H.* XXVIII 115; repeated by Gell. X 12. 5.

<sup>191</sup> *Pap. Gr. magicae*, II (1931), 28, lines 620-622 Preisendanz.

<sup>192</sup> *Id.*, II 69, lines 161-164.

<sup>193</sup> *Id.*, II 99, lines 235-237.

<sup>194</sup> *Id.*, II 101, lines 268-269.

<sup>195</sup> T. F. Thiselton Dyer, *The Folk-Lore of Plants*, New York, 1889, 205-207; J. G. Frazer, *Golden Bough*, XI<sup>3</sup> (1914), 65 (with bibliography in n. 2); J. A. MacCulloch in J. Hastings, *Encycl. of Rel. and Ethics*, VII (1915), 406b, and n. 6; Marzell in Hoffmann-Krayer, *Handwörterbuch d. deutschen Aberglaubens*, II, Berlin, 1930, 1215 ff., especially 1221-1223 (with bibliography); J. G. Frazer, *Garnered Sheaves*, London, 1931, 109; 125; S. Thompson, *op. cit.*, II (1933), 176. For various other ancient recipes cf. A. Abt, *Die Apologie des Apuleius*, Giessen, 1908, 51, nn. 6-9; J. G. Frazer, *Garnered Sheaves*, 124; 325; 478; A. Delatte, *Catoptromancie grecque*, Liège, 1932, 155; *id.*, *Herbarius*, Liège, 1938, 84.

<sup>196</sup> *Philosophum.* IV 41.

be invisible, how to put coals about it, as though burning incense, whereupon the wax will melt and the skull is supposed to become invisible.

Forms of headdress which provide invisibility appear from as early as the time of Homer,<sup>197</sup> who makes Athena, to avoid being seen by Ares, don the cap or helmet of Hades—in which phrase Hades “evidently preserves something of its original sense, the Invisible (Αἰδώνης).”<sup>198</sup> In the pseudo-Hesiodic *Scutum*,<sup>199</sup> Perseus wears this same object which has the awful gloom of night, and which appears also, in a comic sense, on Hieronymus in the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes,<sup>200</sup> and is mentioned, along with the ring of Gyges, by Plato in the *Republic*,<sup>201</sup> as well as by Lucian,<sup>202</sup> while Apollodorus describes it as worn by Hermes,<sup>203</sup> certain nymphs,<sup>204</sup> and Perseus.<sup>205</sup> Similar objects, such as the “Tarn-kappe” and the magic cloak of Manannan, are found in many other cultures, including Germanic, Norse, Italian, and Kal-muck.<sup>206</sup> It has been suggested,<sup>207</sup> with a moderate degree of plausibility, that some of these concealments connected with clothing may have originally arisen from different but rather simple types of disguises.

After these general illustrations taken chiefly from Greek and Roman antiquity (with a few from the Old Testament), I should like to consider briefly some of the cases of invisibility described

<sup>197</sup> *Il.* V 844–845; cf. Greg. Naz. *Or.* 4. 94 (*Patr. Gr.* XXXV, 628B); Schol. Plat. *Rep.* X 612B (where W. C. Greene compares Eustath. p. 613, 23); Suid. s.v. “Αἴδος κυνῆ; *Etym. M.* s.v. “Αἴδος κυνέη; *Paroem. Gr.* I 15 (and the parallels collected by von Leutsch and Schneidewin); II 4; II 56; II 104; II 132; II 139; Hygin. *Astron.* 2. 12.

<sup>198</sup> W. Leaf *ad loc.*

<sup>199</sup> 227: νυκτὸς ἄσθενος αἰνὸν ἔχοντα; cf. Nonnus XLVII 524.

<sup>200</sup> *Acharn.* 390; Suid. s.v. “Αἴδος κυνῆ.

<sup>201</sup> X 612B.

<sup>202</sup> *Bis accus.* 21. Cf. also Liban. *Or.* 64. 35.

<sup>203</sup> *Bibl.* I 6.2.

<sup>204</sup> *Bibl.* II 4. 2, based on Pherecydes 26 (*FHG* I 76).

<sup>205</sup> *Bibl.* II 4. 2–3.

<sup>206</sup> J. A. MacCulloch in J. Hastings, *Encycl. of Rel. and Ethics*, VII (1915). 406.

<sup>207</sup> MacCulloch, *l.c.*

in the New Testament. In the Synoptic accounts of the Transfiguration,<sup>208</sup> at the summit of a high mountain, the beginning of the incident is imperfectly described. The face of Jesus, present with the three disciples, Peter, James, and John (who appear in all three accounts as witnesses), becomes suddenly shining and his clothes white and glistening. Then, in some unexplained manner, there appear the two additional figures of Moses and Elias, their selection probably being made not merely on the ground that they had been great national heroes—in which rôle Abraham or David might almost equally well have qualified—but because they too had passed from earth in a mysterious and supernatural manner.<sup>209</sup> Moses had died on Mt. Pisgah,<sup>210</sup> by a death similar to the passing of Oedipus, the site of his sepulchre being known to none, though Josephus<sup>211</sup> makes him at death disappear into a ravine. "But," continues Josephus, "he has written of himself<sup>212</sup> that he died, lest they should venture to say that by reason of his surpassing virtue he had gone back to the deity." The translation of Elijah<sup>213</sup> had been a more spectacular event, viewed either by Elisha alone or perhaps also by fifty sons of the prophets.<sup>214</sup> Imitations of the Transfiguration occur in later Christian imagination, for example in the *Acts of Peter and Andrew*,<sup>215</sup> where Andrew was snatched up by a luminous cloud to a mountain where sat Peter, Matthew, and Alexander, or in the *Acts of Andrew and Matthias*, where Andrew commanded a cloud which took up Matthias and the disciples of Andrew and set them on the mountain beside Peter. At the end of the Transfiguration story in the Synoptic Gospels

<sup>208</sup> *Matt.* 17. 1-8; *Mark* 9.2-8; *Luke* 9. 28-36.

<sup>209</sup> Cf. C. Hönn, *Stud. z. Gesch. d. Himmelfahrt im kl. Altertum* (1910), 31, and n. 106.

<sup>210</sup> *Deut.* 34. 1-6. Professor W. H. P. Hatch calls to my attention that Arabic tradition has localized this grave at En-Nebi Mûsâ near the Dead Sea.

<sup>211</sup> *Ant.* IV 326.

<sup>212</sup> In the *Deuteronomy* passage cited.

<sup>213</sup> *II Kings* 2. 11-12; cf. *I Macc.* 2. 58; Tert. *De Resurr. Carn.* 58; *De An.* 50; Greg. Naz. *Epitaph.* 92. 1 (*Patr. Gr.* XXXVIII 57); 100. 1 (*Patr. Gr.* XXXVIII 60).

<sup>214</sup> *II Kings* 2. 7; 2. 15.

<sup>215</sup> *Init.*

a cloud overshadows Jesus, Moses, and Elias, and when the disciples are next able to look clearly they see no man save Jesus only.

The Gospel accounts of the Crucifixion seem to rest on a firmer foundation of historic fact, yet even here the attempt to introduce the motif of supernatural invisibility is early found. This was not, to be sure, under cover of the darkness lasting from the sixth to the ninth hour,<sup>216</sup> but in the early second century the Gnostic Basilides<sup>217</sup> maintained that Simon of Cyrene, who carried the cross for Jesus,<sup>218</sup> was actually the one crucified, while Jesus, as an incorporeal power, who could transform himself as he willed, took the form of Simon, laughed at his captors, and ascended invisibly to God who had sent him. Somewhat later Marcion<sup>219</sup> asserted that Christ, the son of God, was manifested in appearance only, and experienced neither birth nor passion, save in appearance, while Noetus,<sup>220</sup> in the third century, identifying the Father and the Son, declared that Christ died in appearance only and raised himself on the third day. It would have helped to show the divinity of Jesus, Celsus quotes a Jew as saying,<sup>221</sup> if he had at once miraculously disappeared from the cross. But this would, of course, have diminished his human—not to say his historic—character, though Origen, in defence of his divinity, cites his vanishing from Simon and Cleopas at Emmaus<sup>222</sup> as a sufficient indication of his power to become invisible. Possibly the Jew's words may reflect the Gospel statement<sup>223</sup> that the Jews asserted that the body of Jesus had been stolen from the tomb by his disciples.

<sup>216</sup> *Matt.* 27. 45; *Mark* 15. 33; *Luke* 23. 44. H. J. Rose (*Harv. Theol. Rev.* XXXI (1938), 137–138) observes that only Luke calls this an eclipse; but an eclipse would not have lasted three hours.

<sup>217</sup> *Iren. C. Haeres.* I 24. 4.

<sup>218</sup> *Matt.* 27. 32; *Mark* 15. 21; *Luke* 23. 26.

<sup>219</sup> Cf. Hippol. *Philosophum.* X 15.

<sup>220</sup> *Id.* IX 5. <sup>221</sup> *Orig. C. Cels.* II 68.

<sup>222</sup> Cf. K. Lake, *The Hist. Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, New York, 1907, 98–99.

<sup>223</sup> *Matt.* 28. 15. This the guard at the tomb was, of course, designed to prevent. Lake (*op. cit.*, 180–181) thinks that the guard was not a part of the earliest tradition of the event.

The disappearance of the body of Jesus from the tomb<sup>224</sup> presents likenesses to certain pagan traditions.<sup>225</sup> Noteworthy is the case of Aristeas, a poet and wonder-worker of uncertain date, who, Herodotus<sup>226</sup> tells us, went into a fuller's shop at Proconnesus on the Propontis and there died. The fuller shut up his shop and went to tell the dead man's kinsmen, but the report of the death of Aristeas, now noised through the city, was disputed by a man of Cyzicus, who had come from the seaport of Cyzicus and said that he had met Aristeas going toward the town and had spoken with him. While he so spoke, the kinsmen of the dead man came to the fuller's shop with all that was needful for the burial, but when the shop was opened no Aristeas was there, either dead or alive. Seven years later Aristeas appeared at Proconnesus and made that poem which the Greeks later called the *Arimaspea*, after which he again vanished. The same story is quoted, with some further details, from Celsus by Origen,<sup>227</sup> with the statement that though Apollo had enjoined the people of Metapontum to regard Aristeas as a god yet no one so considers him. This account, says Origen, Celsus seems to have taken from Pindar and Herodotus. Plutarch<sup>228</sup> also briefly narrates the tale, and adds that the boxer Cleomedes of Astypalaea<sup>229</sup> went mad, pulled down (like Samson) the pillar that supported a roof, and so killed sixty children. Then, when stoned by the indignant people,

<sup>224</sup> Cf. Lake, *op. cit.* 56, on the universal early Christian opinion that the story of the Resurrection necessarily implied that the tomb was empty (cf. n. 250 infra). *Luke* 24. 2-3 emphasizes this view because his work is partly, at least, directed against the Docetic heresy, according to which (*Iren. C. Haeres.* I 30. 13 (*Patr. Gr.* VII 702)) Christ withdrew and Jesus was crucified.

<sup>225</sup> F. Pfister, *Der Reliquienkult im Altertum*, II (1912), 488-489, who does not treat in detail the Resurrection of Jesus, yet raises the question whether the tradition in regard to it is a spontaneous growth, like similar ones about Greek heroes (i.e., an aetiological legend to explain the absence of physical remains of Jesus), or a story based by analogy upon Hellenistic and Roman apotheoses, which saw in translation the highest honor which could be ascribed to one dead. He admits both possibilities, but seems to incline to the second.

<sup>226</sup> IV 14.

<sup>227</sup> *C. Cels.* III 26; III 29 (on the failure to treat Aristeas as a god). On this subject see also Bethe in *PW*, II (1896), 876-878.

<sup>228</sup> *Rom.* 28. 4-5.

<sup>229</sup> Cf. *Paus.* VI 9. 6-8.

he took refuge in a chest in a temple of Athena and closed the lid. When this was with great difficulty opened no Cleomedes was found, but the Pythia bade the Astypalaean honor him as a hero. A somewhat similar curious disappearance of the *sortes Praenestinae* from the chest in which they were regularly kept when Tiberius attempted to interfere with the cult of their famous temple by removing them to Rome is described by Suetonius.<sup>230</sup> Plutarch, in his catalogue of such cases,<sup>231</sup> relates that the corpse of Alcmene disappeared while being carried forth for burial, and in its place on the bier was found a stone. "In short," he says, "many such fables are told by writers who improbably ascribe divinity to the mortal features in human nature as well as to the divine. At any rate, to reject entirely the divinity of human virtue were impious and base, but to mix heaven with earth is foolish. . . . We must not, therefore, violate nature by sending the bodies of good men with their souls to heaven, but implicitly believe that their virtues and their souls, in accordance with nature and divine justice, ascend from men to heroes." In the cases just mentioned a body or a corpse closely confined mysteriously disappears, in the instance of Aristaeus with a subsequent epiphany and a subsequent vanishing.<sup>232</sup> In the case of Zeus himself we learn that his tomb was exhibited at Cnossus in Crete<sup>233</sup>—doubtless to the concern and confusion of some worshippers—, though he himself had become a god in heaven.

A different type of illustration is afforded by Heracles, whose sufferings and glorification after death have not infrequently been compared to those associated with Jesus. This comparison appears as early as Justin Martyr,<sup>234</sup> in the second century, and most recently by the German philologist Pfister,<sup>235</sup> who suggests

<sup>230</sup> *Tib.* 63. <sup>231</sup> *Rom.* 28. 6-8.

<sup>232</sup> After the battle of Lake Trasimene the body of Flaminus disappeared, none knew how. *Plut. Fab. Max.* 3. 3.

<sup>233</sup> *Cic. N. D.* III. 53; *Lact. Inst.* I 11. 46.

<sup>234</sup> *I Apol.* 22.

<sup>235</sup> In *Arch. f. Religionswiss.* XXXIV (1937), 42-60, on many alleged parallels between Heracles and Christ, in regard to birth, life, and death. But the important criticisms of Pfister's paper by H. J. Rose (*Harv. Theol. Rev.* XXXI (1938), 113-142) should certainly not be overlooked.

that the composer of the *Urevangelium* had before him a Cynic-Stoic biography of Heracles. Diodorus<sup>236</sup> relates that the pyre which Heracles had ascended on Mt. Oeta was lighted by Philoctetes at his command but also by lightning which fell from heaven and wholly consumed it. According to Servius,<sup>237</sup> Heracles earnestly entreated Philoctetes not to show the remains of his body to anyone, and when the companions came to gather up the bones of the hero and found not a single bone anywhere,<sup>238</sup> they assumed that, in accordance with the words of the oracle, he had passed from among men into the company of the gods. This is a more rationalistic account than that of Apollodorus,<sup>239</sup> in which, during the burning of the pyre, Heracles is wafted by a cloud to heaven, in a manner which some have thought suggestive of the description in the first chapter of *Acts*,<sup>240</sup> where Jesus is taken up into heaven and received by a cloud out of the sight of the disciples.

But to return to the empty tomb. It should be observed that in the Gospel narratives it is viewed either by Mary Magdalen,<sup>241</sup> by the two Marys,<sup>242</sup> or by the two Marys and one other woman,<sup>243</sup> and, in some accounts, later inspected by Peter<sup>244</sup> or by Peter and John.<sup>245</sup> The attempt to emphasize the evidence for the disappearance of the body from the tomb, by means of the testimony of the regular Jewish number of two or three witnesses,<sup>246</sup>

<sup>236</sup> IV 38. 4-5.

<sup>237</sup> *Aen.* III 402.

<sup>238</sup> *Sen. H. O.* 1756; 1828-1831 represents Alcmene as carrying an urn with the ashes of Heracles. In 1940-1943 and 1963-1976 the voice of the deified Heracles speaks from on high.

<sup>239</sup> *Bibl.* II 7. 7. Imitated by Zenob. I 33 (*Paroemiogr. Gr.* I 13). Lucian, *Hermot.* 7 represents his death as a separation of the human and divine parts of his nature, that which he owed (says Ov. *M.* IX 251-255) to his human mother and his divine father, respectively.

<sup>240</sup> *Acts* 1. 9. But H. J. Rose (*Harv. Theol. Rev.* XXXI (1938), 124) thinks the parallel is not significant.

<sup>241</sup> *John* 20. 1. Paul does not mention the empty tomb or the experience of the women (Lake, *op. cit.* 190).

<sup>242</sup> *Matt.* 28. 1.

<sup>243</sup> *Mark* 16. 1; *Luke* 24. 1-3; 24. 10.

<sup>244</sup> *Luke* 24. 12; *Acts* 10. 39-41.

<sup>245</sup> *John* 20. 2-8; cf. *Luke* 24. 24.

<sup>246</sup> Cf. *Deut.* 17. 6; 19. 15; *Matt.* 18. 16; *II Cor.* 13. 1.

is here obvious.<sup>247</sup> The Jew cited by Celsus<sup>248</sup> alleges that Jesus was seen after his Resurrection only by one woman and his own boon companions (*θιασώταις*), but Origen insists that it was by two women and by many others. Further, the introduction into the story of a mysterious young man in white,<sup>249</sup> of an angel,<sup>250</sup> or of two angels,<sup>251</sup> who explain more precisely the absence of the body of Jesus, seems due, first, to a desire more fully to stress the truth of the disappearance,<sup>252</sup> and, secondly, to introduce a supernatural element into what had been by some explained as merely human molestation of the tomb.<sup>253</sup>

During the period between the Resurrection and the Ascension supernatural disappearance is not lacking. In the beautiful account, found in full form only in Luke,<sup>254</sup> of the two disciples, Simon and Cleopas, on the journey to Emmaus,<sup>255</sup> the identity of the stranger who joined and conversed with them was concealed because their eyes were holden (*ἐκρατοῦντο*)<sup>256</sup> that they should not know him, but at the moment when they finally recognized him

<sup>247</sup> Cf. the report of the watchmen in *Matt.* 28. 11.

<sup>248</sup> Orig. *C. Cels.* II 70.

<sup>249</sup> *Mark* 16. 5-7 (the earliest form). Some have thought the young man was Jesus himself; cf. Lake, *op. cit.* 186.

<sup>250</sup> *Matt.* 28. 2-7; *Gospel of Peter*, 13. H. J. Rose (*Harv. Theol. Rev.* XXXI (1938), 140) suggests the following reasoning in the formation of the tradition: Jesus was not dead, therefore his body was not in the tomb, therefore someone must have found the tomb empty; there had been a miracle, therefore a supernatural agency had been operative, therefore the presence of angels was assumed. *Id.*, 141: "The details, as given in our authorities, are the most natural results possible of the inevitable attempt to form a mental picture of what had happened." Cf. also n. 224 supra.

<sup>251</sup> *Luke* 24. 4-7; 24. 23; *John* 20. 12-13. These angels were in the *Ascension of Isaiah* identified with Michael and Gabriel; Lake, *op. cit.* 185.

<sup>252</sup> Tert. *Adv. Marc.* IV 43, stresses the two angels at the tomb, the number required for valid testimony.

<sup>253</sup> *Matt.* 27. 64; 28. 13-15 gives clear indications of this latter belief on the part of the Jews. Is it significant that this view is especially recognized in a gospel intended particularly for Jewish readers?

<sup>254</sup> Yet cf. *Mark* 16. 12-13. Lake, *op. cit.* 219, remarks that Luke belonged to a strongly anti-Docetic group.

<sup>255</sup> *Luke* 24. 13-31.

<sup>256</sup> *Luke* 24. 16.

he vanished out of their sight.<sup>257</sup> The number of the witnesses is here again significant, even though Mark<sup>258</sup> admits that the other disciples disbelieved their account of the incident. Augustine<sup>259</sup> explains their failure to recognize Jesus as due to the same type of *ἀπαστία* as that with which the Syrians were smitten when ensnared by Elisha and brought captive into Samaria.<sup>260</sup> In the appearance of Jesus to the eleven disciples, as told in the Synoptic Gospels,<sup>261</sup> he comes suddenly and without warning; in Matthew nothing is said of his departure or of the Ascension; in Mark<sup>262</sup> and Luke<sup>263</sup> he is parted from them and carried up into heaven.<sup>264</sup> The Fourth Gospel describes three appearances of Jesus after the Resurrection,<sup>265</sup> but in no case is there any allusion to his vanishing or to the Ascension. The Book of Acts, however, specifically describes<sup>266</sup> the Ascension into the clouds<sup>267</sup>—an account perhaps influenced by the ascension of Elijah in *II Kings*, 2. 11–12—, and here again, as at the empty tomb, appear two

<sup>257</sup> *Luke* 24. 31; cf. *Orig. C. Cels.* II 68.

<sup>258</sup> 16. 13. <sup>259</sup> *Quaest. in Hept.* I 43.

<sup>260</sup> *II Kings* 6. 18; cf. *Gen.* 19. 11.

<sup>261</sup> *Matt.* 28. 16–20; *Mark* 16. 14–18; *Luke* 24. 33–49. Rose (*op. cit.*, 141, n. 104) remarks that the accounts of the epiphanies between the Resurrection and the Ascension fluctuate between reports of a ghost and those of a man of flesh and blood.

<sup>262</sup> 16. 19.

<sup>263</sup> 24. 50–51. The words *ἀνεφέρετο εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν* are absent from the Western Text. Lake (*op. cit.* 234) would place the change from flesh to spirit at the Resurrection, according to Paul, but at the Ascension, according to Luke.

<sup>264</sup> Paul appears in *I Thess.* 4. 17, to expect a similar translation of living Christians at the last trump.

<sup>265</sup> *John* 20. 19–25; 20. 26–31; 21. 1–25 (especially 21.14). In *Acts* 1. 3, the period between Resurrection and Ascension is forty days; in Paul the two seem to coincide (Lake, *The Beginnings of Christianity*, V (1933), 18), as in the *Epistle of Barnabas*, 15. 9 (called to my notice by Professor Hatch).

<sup>266</sup> 1. 2–11, with two men in white raiment partly in the position of witnesses.

<sup>267</sup> [Lact.] *De Mort. Persec.* 2. 3, says *circumvolvit eum procella nubis*. For other patristic views see Lake, *op. cit.*, 19–20. Very considerable likenesses to the Transfiguration, Resurrection, and Ascension are to be seen in the story of the ascension of Raphael in *Tobit* 12. 16–22, where see the note of D. C. Simpson in R. H. Charles's edition of the *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha*, I (1913), 234.

mysterious men in white apparel, explaining the significance of his departure.<sup>268</sup>

Whether Jesus was considered divine because of the possession of miraculous powers—including the faculty of invisibility—or was believed to possess such powers because he was considered divine<sup>269</sup> is hardly a question which can be decided by such studies as the present. Or, as Pfister<sup>270</sup> puts the problem for classical antiquity, does legend develop from cult or cult from legend? From the same Biblical data the Fundamentalist and the Modernist and the Sceptic will answer these questions in quite different ways. It may, however, be not unfairly observed that the Crucifixion in itself, as distinguished from the Transfiguration and the Ascension, contains, in its essential features, little that is miraculous,<sup>271</sup> such elements appearing after the

<sup>268</sup> Disappearances of disciples and followers of Jesus include the rescues from prison of the apostles (*Acts* 5. 19–23) and of Peter by himself (*Acts* 12. 7–10; 12. 18)—these both belonging in the large class of supernaturally opened doors, for which see O. Weinreich in *Genethliacon W. Schmid . . . dargebracht*, Stuttgart, 1929, 200–452—, and the vanishing of Philip from the eunuch (*Acts* 8. 39–40). Procop. *De Aedif.* I 4. 8, tells of the bodies of Andrew, Luke, and Timothy, which had previously been invisible, coming into sight at Constantinople. The numerous cases in later hagiography I have not attempted to collect, though noteworthy are that of the Assumption of Mary, which seems to be probably an analogy from the Ascension of Jesus, and to date from the fifth century (Pfister in *Arch. f. Religionswiss.* XXXIV (1937), 56–57) or even earlier (cf. Hönn, *op. cit.*, 32, n. 110; Rose in *Harv. Theol. Rev.* XXXI (1938), 124; also n. 101 *supra*), and that of St. Thecla (cf. n. 79 *supra*), whose translation may be the outgrowth of a lack of any grave associated with her (S. Guyer in *Woch. f. kl. Philol.* XXVI (1909), 963). Among later saints and martyrs the principle seems not to be lacking.

<sup>269</sup> E.g., Lake, *The Hist. Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ* (1907), 195, thinks the empty tomb no evidence for resurrection but a deduction from belief in the Resurrection. On p. 241 he notes that the emptiness of the tomb was inferred by the Galilean disciples from the Resurrection, but the Resurrection was inferred by the women from the empty tomb, or rather from the declaration of the young man there.

<sup>270</sup> *Woch. f. kl. Philol.* XXVIII (1911), 84. He believes that legend usually arises from cult, though he would make allowance for some cases as due to reasoning by analogy.

<sup>271</sup> The darkness, earthquake, and opening tombs seem a later addition,

death of Jesus, in the presence of the empty tomb, where no relic of his physical body could become the object of cultus, and when there must have been many opportunities and powerful motives for emphasizing his divinity by the ascription to him of what were generally considered superhuman attributes. That one of these attributes was the power of supernatural appearance and disappearance, a faculty alleged to have been the property of many unusual personages of his own and other cultural traditions, would probably be admitted by adherents of any school of thought.

Gods, heroes—or, in Christian parlance, saints—, and men we have seen represented as either permanently or temporarily endowed with the faculty of invisibility. In the case of human beings this power may be either vouchsafed by superhuman agencies, as a tribute to human merit or human need, or deliberately achieved by natural means by those covetous of divine prerogatives, or sought by magical jugglery and theurgy. While the results of these three methods may appear superficially identical, the motives informing them and the credibility of the accounts concerning them are obviously quite distinct. For the accurate interpretation of any one instance of invisibility it should also be constantly born in mind that those whose vanishing has become a matter of tradition may, in many instances, have been themselves quite innocent of any such intention, the traditions having arisen from subsequent narration, first at the instance of admiring and well-meaning friends, and later through dissemination by a public delighting in the dramatic, the unexpected, and the marvellous, and not overcritical in its application of logical or scientific criteria of truth. Hence, as with other forms of the miraculous, the superficial ascription of more than human powers is no sufficient evidence against an underlying historicity. For example, no one doubts the historic character of Alexander the Great or of the Roman Emperors, though we may fairly doubt particular incidents about them which ancient writers, relying upon popular tradition, may have reported. Finally,

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not at all essential to the original stratum of the story. Only Matthew knows the earthquake and opened tombs.

may we not modify a well-known aphorism, and safely venture the assertion that the ascription of miraculous powers has generally been the unconscious tribute which inferiority has paid to excellence?<sup>272</sup>

<sup>272</sup> I have not here thought it needful to collect instances of the mysterious disappearance of brute animals (cf. n. 71 supra), such as those sacrificed at the source of the Jordan River (Euseb. *H. E.* VII 17. 1), of a lion described by Damascius (*Vit. Isid. ap. Phot. Bibl.* 242, p. 348 Bekk.), or of the snake brought from Epidaurus to the Insula Tiberina at Rome ([*Acro*] in Hor. *Serm.* I 3. 27; cf. n. 92 supra). Nor do I deal with invisible weapons (J. A. MacCulloch in J. Hastings, *Encycl. of Relig. and Ethics*, VII (1915), 406, n. 3), nor yet with the employment of invisible ink (e.g., Plin. *N. H.* XXVI 62; Hippol. *Philosophum.* IV 28; Cedren., *Hist. Compend.*, pp. 280-281 (*Patr. Gr.* CXXII 12); W. Süß in *Philol.* LXXVIII (1923), 142-175).

In the preparation of this paper I have received very helpful suggestions at several points from Professor W. H. P. Hatch.

# THE TRUE TRAGEDY

ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PLATO

By HELMUT KUHN

## II\*

### v—*The Philosophical Drama*

THE tragic view of life was undermined by tragedy itself.


Plato, in his turn, cannot be accused of having slighted the type of experience to which both "ordinary talk" (*ἰδιὰ λεγόμενον*)<sup>1</sup> and poetry used to have recourse. He tried to establish his 'truest tragedy' in the teeth of those facts on which common-sense pessimism drew. The best evidence for this is found in the *Republic*. I therefore propose to take my departure from the examination of a difficulty offered by the interpretation of this dialogue.

It will be helpful to preface the argument proper by a graphic and deliberately one-sided sketch of the structure of the *Republic*.<sup>2</sup> If we disregard the relatively independent first book and look upon the rest as on a play of the blessedness of the just and the misery of the unrighteous, a compositional scheme of admirable

\* NOTE—The first part of this article appeared in *H.S.C.P.* Vol. LII (1941).

<sup>1</sup> *Rep.* 363e.

<sup>2</sup> The following diagram may serve as an illustration:



symmetry is discovered. It compares with certain Baroque paintings: in the middle of the picture a vast luminous prospect into the transcendental world opens up, flanked to the right and left by human scenes shrouded in terrestrial dawn; mediating gestures emerge from the twilight, fingers pointing and eyes gazing at the dazzling apparition in the back-ground. In an analogous way, the large middle portion of the dialogue is occupied by a picture of the Happy City Beyond where the just has found a worthy employment, his life-time being divided between a rapturous contemplation of the eternal Forms and his duties as a ruler. In contrast to this transcendental middle scene, but also to each other, the two wings, prelude and postlude, exhibit the just treading this earth of ours, the one showing him as a sufferer, persecuted and crucified, the other as living at peace with the world, honored by his fellow-men, blessed with riches, and awaiting an even greater happiness for the time to come. Two structural links mediate between the super-sensible center and the 'worldly' side-pieces. The first narrates the growth of the Best City out of the matrix of human needs, the other its gradual relapse into the chaos of passions. Each of the two mediating parts is followed by a refutation of the poet's rival attempt to stage the play of sorrow and pleasure. The poet, blind to the light that radiated from the Idea of the Good, is an incompetent mediator. Very appropriately the criticism of poetry is linked with the problem of education (*παιδεία*). As in the Baroque picture the dusk of the peripheral region is shot through with rays of transcendental light, so the mediation between crude appearance and form, throughout the Platonic dialogue, is omnipresent as *paideia*, that is, the planting and nursing of the Blessed City in the individual soul. This by way of anticipation; and we turn now to a closer study of Plato's argument.

After the preliminaries of the first book, Socrates, in the second book, sets out by dividing goods into three classes: first, goods desirable in themselves; second, goods desirable in themselves and for their consequences; thirdly, goods desirable for their consequences only. Most commentators take this to be a fair statement of the design of the whole dialogue. Socrates points

out that justice belongs in the second group by proving first that it is a good in itself. The bulk of the dialogue is devoted to this task. As late as in the tenth book,<sup>3</sup> Socrates declares the first part of the argument closed and, after an explicit reference to the program laid down in the second book, proceeds to restore to justice "its rewards and prizes." In other words, the main part of the dialogue secures for justice a place among the goods of the first class which are desirable in themselves. Only a comparatively brief closing section makes it clear that, because of its results, justice should rather be raised to the highest, that is, the second class. In both sections the persisting negative contention is that justice should not be classed with the goods of the third type, the goods which, neutral or undesirable in themselves, are striven after only for the sake of their consequences. And this impugned notion is presented as the typical view of the poets.

The difficulties begin with the distinction between the good itself and its "consequences" ( $\tauὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα$ ). In the following discussion consequence appears to be equivalent to punishment and reward. Happiness, much against the expectations of the modern reader, is not counted as a consequence of justice but as its inherent quality. Plato's contention that justice should be willed for its own sake has a twofold aspect. First, justice carries its reward in itself. The just is necessarily happy. This virtue in its perfect shape is given to those only who are blessed with the vision of the eternal Forms. For common-sense the forbidding austerity of Plato's view does not consist in that it demands morality at the price of happiness but in that it implies an idea of happiness exalted above common comprehension and emancipated from the ordinary conditions of enjoyment. Second, this justice has to be willed in the right way, with a view to attaining its own goodness (and that means, the happiness involved in its possession), not as a means to some further end or good (for an enjoyment not inherent in justice). In a passage of the *Theaetetus*,<sup>4</sup> where Plato recapitulates these ideas, he insists again on the importance of the right motive. At the same time he admits that it is not easy to convince people that they should

<sup>3</sup> 612b.<sup>4</sup> 176b-d.

avoid wrongdoing from fear of the true penalty, the misery inherent in injustice, instead of being deterred by external punishments such as flogging and death. Accordingly the attack against the traditional wisdom of the poets is carried forward on a dual front. They are accused of failing both through a subversive pessimism and through shallow optimism. Representing the just as unhappy (the 'moral disproportion' in tragedy), they divest justice of its inherent excellence and thereby encourage vice. Then again they praise the external and adventitious results of justice, as Homer sings of the crops borne by the fields under the just ruler,<sup>5</sup> thus recommending virtue in a misleading way. In both cases the charge is that the poets, along with the multitude, class justice with the goods of the third type, those desirable, if desirable at all, only for the sake of their results.

In a recent paper on the opening paragraphs of the second book of the *Republic* Socrates is charged with making a false statement of the point at issue.<sup>6</sup> The critic points out that Glauco and Adimantus, taking up Thrasymachus' cause, do not actually consider justice a good of the third class. What they recommend as beneficial by its results is the reputation of justice, whereas justice, in this view, is no good at all, but rather an evil to be endured by those who are not strong enough to avoid it.

The reply to this will be that the goods of the third class are, by definition, only relatively good. They cease being good, once their beneficial result—the source of their goodness—is obtainable in a pleasanter or less troublesome way. To take one of Plato's examples, a money-making pursuit is a good only for him who has no private fortune. In the case of justice a substitute offers itself, productive of the same desirable result but to be acquired with less trouble, *viz.*, the semblance or reputation of justice. The placing of justice along with the money-making pursuit under the third class is at variance with the nature of justice. Hence it is not surprising that justice, pressed into the wrong division, is suffering a sea-change into its own contrary.

<sup>5</sup> *Rep.* 363bc; *Odyssey* XIX, 109–114.

<sup>6</sup> M. B. Foster, "A Mistake of Plato's in the *Republic*," *Mind*, vol. XLVI (1937), pp. 386–93.

The wavering to and fro between the recommendation of a crooked demeanor as truly just on the one hand, and the praise of injustice as superior to justice on the other, is a salient feature of sophistry throughout Plato's work.

The real crux, however, in the Platonic triad of goods has not yet been touched upon. Plato's insistence on a correct classification of justice is a device with the purpose of yielding a criterion by which true justice may be distinguished from its counterfeited image. The semblance of justice only, not justice itself, can be placed in the third class of the table of goods. The educators and poets who exalt the results of justice misplace their praise. They take a hollow appearance for reality. To forestall such confusion the rule is decided upon by Socrates and his interlocutors to confine the following discussion to justice alone and to set aside the rewards. A test case is suggested by Glauco. Suppose justice 'stripped bare' is incarnate in a man who enjoys none of the benefits of seeming just. Instead, he is generally believed to be unjust and, as a consequence, he will be chained, tortured, and finally crucified. Over against him is set the picture of the unjust who, by shrewdly upholding a reputation of justice, succeeds in securing for himself all the fruits of justice such as wealth, fame, and power. If Socrates is right, the just life of the first, though destitute of the wordly appanage of happiness, is preferable to the second; and that means, it is happier than that of the highly successful malefactor. For Plato, who had witnessed the fate suffered by Socrates at the hands of his fellow-citizens, the idea of the just sufferer could not well be a mere figment for the sake of the argument. The test case is crucial for his philosophy. Unless he is able to maintain the paradox of a happiness impregnable to the onslaught of the wicked world, his crucified martyr becomes the hero of a tragedy to whom he will have to concede the human privilege of complaint and moaning. This would be the end of the Platonic opposition to the "moral disproportion" in tragic poetry and the collapse of his "truest tragedy."

However, no Greek version of the Book of Job follows. No attempt is made to make plausible the happiness of the solitary

just man antagonizing a hostile world. Instead the model of the best city is set up as the image of justice 'writ large,' and this city is no less bound up with a system of rewards and punishments than any other political community. So the *al fresco* picture of justice includes its consequences. Nevertheless, when the idea of the division of goods is resumed in the tenth book, Socrates claims to have fulfilled "his obligations to the argument, putting aside the rewards and glories of justice."<sup>7</sup> Then, strictly adhering to the earlier stipulation, he "restores appearance to justice" and awards it the palm of that second victory which secures it a place in the second and fairest class of goods. On this Socratic arbitration Jowett makes the following remark: "That he [Plato] falls into some degree of inconsistency, when in the tenth book he claims to have got rid of the rewards and honors of justice, may be admitted; for he has left those which exist in the perfect State."<sup>8</sup> R. L. Nettleship, comparing the problem raised in the second book and the subsequent development of the ideal state, notes that, at first sight, there seems to be "scarcely any connection" between the question and the answer that Plato proceeds to give to it.<sup>9</sup> W. C. Greene expresses his doubt concerning the consistency of Plato's argument even more bluntly. Strictly, he writes, "the Socrates of the *Republic* side-steps, and never really answers the objections of Glauco and Adimantus. He does not say, 'Be good, and you will be happy,' but, 'Be good, and you will not care whether you are happy or not.' Blessedness takes the place of happiness. Then faith takes up the work of reason, and the rewards of righteousness are reckoned in. The spirit of the last part of the *Republic* is not unlike that of the last part of the Book of Job, and is similarly inconsistent with the earlier argument."<sup>10</sup>

The problem largely hinges on the precise meaning of the term 'consequences' or 'rewards.' Rewards, in this connection, are

<sup>7</sup> 612ab, tr. Jowett.

<sup>8</sup> *The Dialogues of Plato*, vol. I, *The Republic, Analysis*, New York, 1914, p. 41.

<sup>9</sup> *Lectures on the Republic of Plato*, ed. by Lord Charnwood, London, 1929, p. 67.

<sup>10</sup> "The Spirit of Comedy in Plato," *H.S.C.P.* XXXI (1920), pp. 103-104.

considered those beneficial results which may be obtained by the mere "semblance" or "seeming" ( $\delta\delta\xi\alpha$ ) instead of by justice itself. It is the elastic and many-stranded meaning of *doxa* which is responsible for the ambiguity of the notion of "consequences." With emphasis (a) on the 'subjective' pole, *doxa* means 'that which seems to men,' the opinions actually held, and publicly accepted. Viewed (b) from the 'objective' pole, i.e., seen in relation to 'that which seems,' it means appearance. Appearance both manifests and veils reality, and as these two functions are variously blended, we obtain an ascending scale of types of appearance from illusory semblance to manifestation. In other words, appearance embraces images of varying remoteness from the prototypical reality. As the two polar aspects of *doxa* are never separated, the variation on the objective side entails corresponding types of public opinion. The latter may be based either on a remote image of reality or on its faithful likeness. In the first case, it is perverted and corrupted, in the second truthful. *Doxa*, 'public opinion,' imparts its own ambiguity to the rewards obtainable through it. There is a great difference between the rewards given to its favorites by a corrupt public opinion (even a gangster may rise to renown and power), and the prize which an enlightened people awards to its benefactors. Glauco and Adimantus are troubled by the corruptness of public opinion; hence their insistence on a clean severance of justice from its rewards, of the reality of virtue from its semblance.

Socrates fulfills his promise to exhibit justice "stripped bare." But he modifies the meaning of this trope, bringing it close to the idea of 'naked' in the eschatological myth of the *Gorgias* where it means: freed from the body, laid bare to the inspection by the supreme judge.<sup>11</sup> He reveals justice as being one with knowledge, and the consummation of knowledge as a beatific vision granted to the solitary soul. So the goodness of justice is shown to be anchored in a region beyond fluctuating *doxa* and appearance. But this does not yet solve the problem of the second book. We are not only intellectual soul. We are also body, and we

<sup>11</sup> 523de.

depend on the society of which we are members. To prove his point, Socrates would have to ascertain that no worldly tribulations will ever be allowed to disturb the supersensible happiness of the just. In point of fact, Socrates does nothing of the sort. Instead of widening the gap between the reality of justice and the realm of *doxa* and then telling us: Behold, the beatitude of the just stands firm amidst the fury of well armed iniquity, he chooses a very different approach. He points out that justice is among those goods "that are productive in their own nature";<sup>12</sup> it engenders its social body. The Best State is the image and magnified externalization of the justice that resides in the soul. But it is an uncorrupted image. Socrates' blessed city cannot dispense with opinions (*doxai*), and it must enforce these opinions by rewards and punishments. But the *doxa* is ultimately, in the mind of the rulers, based on knowledge. The glory of justice is not concealed within the walls of the Best State but it radiates from virtue itself.

On the strength of this argument we may hope to defend Socrates' claim in the tenth book.<sup>13</sup> He observed the spirit though not the letter of his undertaking to put aside the rewards. Those rewards namely which threaten to falsify the appraisal of justice are bound up with the corrupted *doxa*. They alone lend themselves to misuse in the service of unjust purposes. But there is no harm in reckoning in the truthful *doxa* and its natural accompaniments. In the ideal city the rewards are the effluence of justice itself. They are what they are because of the justice in the minds of the rulers, and this justice is beyond reward. So, when Socrates, in the tenth book, tells us that he now will restore to justice its rewards (as if rewards had not been amply granted before), this is merely another mode of saying: herewith we turn from the ideal model of justice to the justice in this world of ours. It is characteristic of this world that the name and glory of justice is tarnished, tampered with by forgers and

<sup>12</sup> I follow Paul Shorey's rendering of *γόνιμα* (*Loeb Library*) *Rep.* 367d, recently defended by M. B. Foster, *loc. cit.* pp. 392-393. The widely accepted translation is "genuine."

<sup>13</sup> 612b.

misused to cover injustice; and here alone Glauco's problem arises and is relevant.

However, the chief difficulty is not yet removed. We have now before us the project of an ideal city, being, at the same time, the enlarged image of justice. Within this picture, which fills the larger portion of the dialogue, the rewards of justice, because of their specific meaning, may be regarded as exempt from the rule of exclusion decided upon in the second book. Each of the two side-pieces framing the ideal world in the center gives a portrayal of justice in the actual world. But the two lateral parts of the triptych strangely contradict each other. In Adimantus' and Glauco's world, iniquity masked as virtue triumphs, and the just suffers torture and death at the hands of the children of this world. In sharp contrast to this gloomy view, Socrates, in the tenth book, opens a reassuring prospect. In the long run, he tells us, justice will pay. The gods will not neglect him who, by the practice of virtue, becomes as like themselves as man may. His fellow-men also will honor him, he will hold office in his city and take a wife from what family he pleases. His antagonist, the shrewdly camouflaged scoundrel, will be found out in the end, and he will have to endure those cruel punishments, which, according to Glauco, might be awaiting the just. Does Plato mean to say that the first view is fantastic and the second true? There is no trace of a proof to that effect. Moreover, the unmitigated optimism of the second view is incompatible with what actually happened to Socrates. The middle part of the dialogue offered no direct answer to Glauco's question. The direct reply is in the tenth book, and it expresses much confidence but gives hardly any reasons. Presented in a story-telling rather than in an argumentative mood, it does not match the gravity of the question.

To find a way out it may be well to determine the relationship between the ideal city and the actuality of the political world. The perfect state is not merely a supersensible entity in the realm of Forms—an entity which, one fine day, when a king has been converted to philosophy or a philosopher has risen to royal power, may descend from heaven to earth. As the true city or

the city as such it is the basis of all actual cities, the "waking reality"<sup>14</sup> reflected in the visible Athens or Sparta as in a dream. The analysis of the decadence of the Best State in the eighth book uncovers the nexus between ideality and actuality under the form of a historical report. The lesson to be gathered from this report is that the worst constitution is intelligible only with reference to the best from which it is a degraded descendant. It owes whatever vitality it possesses to the lingering remnants of the eternal model. Even that evil *Eros*, who frantically drives the declining city into final self-destruction, is the heinous caricature of the divine guide toward wisdom. Lust, lurid and insatiable, mimics the boundless striving of Love.

Deliberately and wisely Plato placed the ideal state between two contrasting aspects of actuality. Political life, he seems to tell us, is both a perversion and a reflection of the ideal, or rather, it is a fluctuation between these poles. A state of affairs which raises the knave to power and destroys the just is not beyond the pale of possibility. But it marks an extreme bordering on non-being. If the average state is a dream compared with the Best State, this is the hallucination of a dreamer in delirium. Is it worth while wasting on it our imagination and carrying the moral casuistry to the outer confines of possibility?

Yes, it is, we shall feel inclined to reply. Remote though it be from intelligible Reality, the possibility of a situation such as is anticipated by Glauco may be fatal to Socrates' thesis. Diminished reality, in this connection, by no means implies improbability. Also, the actuality of justice in the tenth book is not offered as an alternative aspect but rather as the truth refuting the faulty view in the second book. As things in this world go, you may be misjudged, persecuted, and killed, Glauco said to the just. Be quiet, Socrates reassures him, the gods will watch over you and not let you suffer any harm. But so fleeting is the actuality of life, that the comforting view is no better warranted than the disconsolate. So our old problem returns. Did Plato actually blink the issue? It seems possible to show that he did not.

<sup>14</sup> *Rep.* 520c.

Can the just, confronted with the supreme trial as imagined by Glauco, maintain both his justice and his happiness? In the sixth book Plato discusses the danger of corruption to which the philosophical nature is exposed in a time of disintegration, and the question arises as to whether the philosopher, under these circumstances, can preserve his integrity. The answer to this question answers also our problem. It reads: "He cannot, unless some divine chance comes to the rescue" (*έὰν μή τις αὐτῷ βοηθήσει θεῶν τύχη*).<sup>15</sup> In the extreme predicament salvation may be hoped for as not impossible, but incalculable like a stroke of good luck. Why, then, the optimism of the postlude that glosses over the awful fact that a miracle is required to make justice survive in the world? The answer which I propose to submit takes us back to the starting-point and main objective of our inquiry.

We distinguished between the central part of the dialogue depicting the ideal city and two side-pieces which frame it. But there is a frame within the frame, or rather, there are two intermediate pieces linking center and side-pieces. These are the treatments of poetry in the second and third books, and in the tenth book. The breaking up of this discussion into two halves is as natural and convincing as the location of the two parts within the dialogue. Poetry is a hybrid creation. The poetic replica of life implies an estimate of the relationship between merit and happiness. But this estimate is not based on a knowledge of the nature of happiness. The poet's creation holds a middle position between an unaccountable wisdom and ignorance. The place of the criticism of poetry in the *Republic* indicates the nature of the poetical work. After the investigation has passed beyond the review of actuality carried through in the light of the perverted *doxa* (Book II), and before it soars to the vision of the Best State and to the Forms as the only ground of true knowledge, we traverse the sphere within which the most impressive reflection on life has been developed, that of poetry. The poetic

<sup>15</sup> *Rep.* 492a; cf. 492e-493a, and the notion of a "divine φύσις" 366c. See also E. G. Berry, *The History and Development of the Concept of Θεῖα Μοῖρα and Θεῖα Τύχη down to and including Plato* (Dissertation, University of Chicago), Chicago, 1940, pp. 68-69.

creations are tested and found wanting. Again, as we descend from the contemplation of the transcendental model, the downward path to the actual world takes us through the Arcadian fields and an occasion is offered for the final refutation of the rival claimant to wisdom.

In the first part of Plato's criticism of poetry (Book III) the unworthy ideas held by the poets concerning the godhead are subjected to a scathing criticism. But when he then comes to the problem of an appropriate representation of human affairs, Socrates abruptly abandons the track. We could not try to answer this question, he remarks, without anticipating the result of the proposed inquiry. The question as to whether the just life is happy by itself or whether the converse is true would have to be decided in advance.<sup>16</sup> James Adam notes that the postponed topic, *viz.* the adequate poetical representation of *human* affairs, "is nowhere specifically and expressly resumed in the *Republic*." A little earlier, when the poets took punishment for their erroneous theology, we had been put off with a similarly vague reference to that which is to follow. Socrates had told us that we must be content with giving the general type and outline of the true notion of divinity instead of setting up a mythology. "For, my dear Adimantus, we are not poets, I and you, *at the moment*, but founders of a city."<sup>17</sup> Does that mean that they will become poets in the sequel, after their city is completed, and that, on this occasion, Socrates' other promise will be fulfilled and that we shall be informed how poetry should worthily deal with human affairs?

Socrates does become a poet and he makes good his two promises in the tenth book of the *Republic*. The transition from justice itself to its rewards is a passage from a dialectical to a poetic treatment. Of a sudden, tone and vocabulary change and Plato offers a specimen of salutary poetry, the counterpart to the harmful which he has just condemned,<sup>18</sup> the "truest tragedy" as

<sup>16</sup> 392bc.

<sup>17</sup> 378e-79a.

<sup>18</sup> Bernard Bosanquet (*A Companion to Plato's Republic*, New York, 1895, p. 410), commenting on the closing section of the dialogue, notes: "The imagery of the myth follows strangely upon Plato's criticism of poetic imagination." If we supersede "strangely" by "naturally," the remark becomes significant.

set over against the false, the germs of which are found in Glauco's speech in the second book. This admitted, the alleged discrepancies vanish. For Plato, poetry is 'praise,' the public acknowledgment of some excellence by a man capable of selecting and fitting together suitable words into an appropriate pattern. In the passage under analysis Plato, with a graceful play, shifts from discussing the rewards of justice to actually granting them under the form of a poetical panegyric; or rather, he fuses these two things and combines them into a novel encomium. For the encomiast, all is well with the world, with justice richly rewarded and the wicked meeting his condign punishment. But this gay vision is not designed to refute the tragic possibility envisaged by Glauco at the outset of the argument. Plato might even admit that, as far as probability is concerned, Glauco's view is more 'realistic,' that is, closer to average actuality. He knows full well that among the things that occur to men "the good are much fewer than the evil."<sup>19</sup> But with regard to the sphere of incessant phenomenal flux, with no foothold for genuine knowledge, the uncertain truth which we may hope to attain is not to be established solely as an accord between statement and average experience, dim and fluctuating as it is. Usefulness, in the noblest sense of the word, must be taken into account as a subsidiary criterion. A poet who would elaborate into a tragedy the situation suggested by Glauco would produce an image as remote from reality as the groan of the suffering just is from real misery, or the triumph of the criminal from true happiness. He would fall into the cardinal error which Plato urges us to avoid concerning all those matters in which good and evil are uncertain: he would make us take them hard, while "no human affairs are of great importance."<sup>20</sup>

Plato's poetry, a substitute for dialectic in the field of the indemonstrable, is free from this blemish. In accordance with Plato's own demand, it bears impressed upon it "the image of the good."<sup>21</sup> It is a praise of the praiseworthy, an encomium in honor of the gods and those who are like them as far as is possible

<sup>19</sup> *Rep.* 379c.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* 604bc.

<sup>21</sup> 401b; cf. 607a.

to men.<sup>22</sup> It even rises superior to the objection that deprecates any kind of speech simply because it is not deed.<sup>23</sup> There is truth in the remark that he who has knowledge of justice, wisdom, courage, and the other virtues will be more zealous in the doing than in the representing of them, that he will desire to leave beautiful deeds as memorials rather than verses, to be the hero whose praises are sung rather than the poet who sings them.<sup>24</sup> But the praise chanted by Plato is a memorial recalling to his hearers something which they are badly in need of remembering. It is conducive to deeds; in fact, it may be described as an allegory on the human deed.

We called the picture of the world in the poetical finale of the *Republic* "optimistic." This expression must now be rectified. There is no glossing over the gravity of the human situation. Perhaps never before has so tremendous a weight of responsibility been put squarely upon the shoulders of man as it is done here by Plato. In the first passages of the encomium an avenue is briefly indicated through which misery may penetrate into the life of the just. He may suffer evils necessitated by sin in a previous incarnation. The implications of this remark are presently developed in an eschatological myth of orphic provenience. The myth of Er, as it is called, culminates in an act of choice—"that greatest choice both for life and beyond it"—which is the picking of the right pattern of life. Under the form of a mythic theodicy, untranslatable into dogmatic terms, the alternative of the second book is taken up on the level of Platonic poetry. The discussion of the problem as to whether the just life is happy and, therefore, preferable to the unjust life under any circumstances, is represented as the deliberation of the soul in the lower world—a process of thought resulting in the choice of a life for the following reincarnation. The myth infinitely enhances both the risk involved and the prospective gain by enlarging the temporal horizon from the few decades of a human lifetime

<sup>22</sup> 607a.

<sup>23</sup> For the deed-speech antithesis, cf. Leo Strauss, "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon," *Social Research*, vol. VI, 4 (1939), p. 519.

<sup>24</sup> *Rep.* 599b.

into an aeon. The Great Choice is made the pivot not only of a single life but of a circle of births. The encomium on the blessed life of the just together with the myth of Er form the model of a poetic incantation inculcating that "adamantine belief"<sup>25</sup> which we need in the hour of trial.

Aristotle restores the possibility of tragedy in a sense in which it is denied by Plato. The righteous, after a long and successful life, may still be overtaken by disaster like Priam. In order to be happy we need, in addition to virtue, some "equipment" (*χορηγία*, an Attic stage term) dependent on uncontrollable circumstances.<sup>26</sup> Plato negates the inference—the alleged unhappiness of the just—not the possible configuration of events which form its basis. He even grants us a glimpse of such a configuration, the crucifixion of the just. But he disdains to abide by this terrifying vision and to try to vanquish the tragic dread on its own ground. If we were to accept a battle-field where, according to Platonic principles, no real decision can be reached, we should be defeated before the first blow was struck. Plato's own poetry, the play of true happiness and true misery, is not without its dread. The dreadful, however, does not lurk in the contingencies of life but in the ignorance and forgetfulness of the soul.

In the *Symposium* the contest between the tragedian and the philosopher is concluded and judged when Alcibiades takes some of the ribands with which he had just adorned the fair Agathon in order to crown the "marvellous head" of Socrates.<sup>27</sup> The rival

<sup>25</sup> *Rep.* 618e.      <sup>26</sup> *Eth. Nic.* 1100a 5-9; 1101a 6-8.

<sup>27</sup> 213c. Only after completion of this paper did I become acquainted with Gerhard Krüger's interpretation of the *Symposium* (*Einsicht und Leidenschaft. Das Wesen des platonischen Denkens*, Frankfurt a. M., 1939). This book, though of wider scope and different philosophical intention, in many respects confirms my own thesis. Professor Krüger convincingly interprets Aristophanes' speech in the *Symposium* as "tragic comedy," Agathon's as "comic tragedy," Alcibiades' praise of Socrates as *σαρπικόν δράμα*. The Socratic tragedy, rooted as it is in an adequate idea of the finitude of man, encompasses and surpasses both tragedy (in the traditional sense of the word) and comedy. "Aristophanes und Agathon sind ihm [Socrates] jetzt in gleicher Weise unterlegen; wenn Agathon als letzter einschläft, so kommt darin nur nocheinmal zum Ausdruck, dass er als Tragiker der eigentliche Rivale des Philosophen war" (p. 308).

of the tragic poets even claims the death-song of the swan of Apollo as a symbol of his own music. But he ironically reverses its meaning. Not a "dirge," he insists, is intoned by the prophetic bird (not a *θανάσιμος γέρος* as Aeschylus believed);<sup>28</sup> nor is it true that, as people slanderously affirm, other birds such as the nightingale or the swallow or the hoopoe ever tune a lay of sorrow. No bird sings when cold or hungry or suffering some other pain. It is a joyful prophecy which the dying swan leaves with us as his divinely inspired message. Hardly a more thoroughgoing repudiation of the tragic lament could be imagined. However, we must remember that this boldly anti-tragic affirmation precedes the crisis in the dialogue *Phaedo*: Simmias and Cebes are about to raise their objections to the idea of the indestructibility of the soul and, for a brief while, the anguish of mortality will fill the minds of those present with uneasiness. Plato's poetry, scornful though it is of plaintive notes, has its roots in the same ambiguity of life from which tragedy sprang. But it defeats sorrow not by voicing it but by charming it away and submerging it in an imagery which, in a human way, anticipates a divine perfection.

The problem of suffering and evil stirs in the mind and will not let it settle down within the confines of any definite form of expression. It made the tragedian reach out beyond his poetic conception toward a philosophical appeasement of his conflicts, and it prompted Plato to crown his discursive thought with a superstructure of images composing a novel tragedy.

#### vi—*The Emancipation of the Individual*

We consider tragedy and Platonic philosophy as consecutive stages in a process of clarification and humanization. The ungainly forms of demoniacal powers, surrounded by immemorial fear, gradually fade away, and the vision of a reign of supreme wisdom and justice takes shape. The evils of this world, however, are not to be exorcized along with their alleged originators. They persist and require a fresh explanation. As the blame for the human failure cannot be laid any more at the door of jealous

<sup>28</sup> *Ag.* 1445; *cf. Phaedo* 84e-85b.

gods, vindictive demons, or Fate, man has to blame himself. Associated with the development of a theodicy is the growth of the self-consciousness of man as a free and responsible agent. With respect also to this second trend, Plato will be seen to advance beyond tragedy in the direction in which tragedy points. Again we take our departure from a concrete problem of interpretation.

In the *Prometheus Bound* the rebel god, unburdening his mind before the sympathetic chorus of the Oceanids, boasts of the benefits bestowed by him on man:

ΠΡ. θνητούς γ' ἔπαντα μὴ προδέρκεσθαι μόρον.  
ΧΟ. τὸ ποῖον εὐρών τῆσδε φάρμακον νόσου;  
ΠΡ. τυφλὰς ἐν αύτοῖς ἐλπίδας κατέκισα.  
ΧΟ. μέγ' ὡφέλημα τοῦτ' ἐδωρήσω βροτοῖς. (248–251).

(*Pr.* I stayed mortals from foreseeing their fate. *Cho.* What remedy didst thou find for that disease? *Pr.* Blind hopes I implanted in them. *Cho.* A great good hast thou given to man.) It will not do to take these lines merely as a modification of the well-known *motif* from the story of Pandora and to assert, with Professor George Thomson, that “there is no difficulty: Prometheus is the giver of hope, as of fire.”<sup>29</sup> The hopes are qualified as “blind,” and the blindness which they impart is such as to hide death from human sight. To determine the meaning of this gift, we have to see it as a part of Prometheus’ ‘philanthropic’ achievement as a whole.

Prometheus’ work is threefold. First he protected mankind against Zeus who planned its extermination. Then he bestowed on it “blind hopes.” Finally he added the gift of fire which is both the symbol and the actual source of all human arts. The Promethean salvation does not yield an unalloyed bliss. In each of its three aspects it is revealed as a blessing intermingled with a

<sup>29</sup> In his annotated edition of *P. V.*, 1932, Ulrich v. Wilamowitz recognizes the problem but then evades it by taking recourse to a genetic hypothesis. In his view the ancient poet thoughtlessly echoes ideas not his own, thereby gratifying the modern philologist who is bent on discovering numerous “Nachklänge älterer und verschiedener Konzeptionen” (*Aischylos. Interpretationen*, Berlin, 1904, p. 149).

deficiency, or even a curse. Man owes to Prometheus the survival of his race. But we take too human a view of the matter—little appropriate in dealing with a play about gods—if we believe that the preservation of mankind is a sheer boon. Prometheus lives on the boundary of two worlds, being at home in neither of them. As a Titan he belongs in Cronos' doomed aeon, the past age of lawlessness and violence. At the same time, the secret of the new age of reason had been entrusted to him, he had become a deserter from the Titanic cause and Zeus' counsellor, and even now, after he has turned a rebel and the bitter enemy of the Olympians, the power left to him in his captivity consists in a secret knowledge. He alone knows the circumstances which may put an end to the reign of Zeus. The dual character of the donor reflects on his donations. The work inspired by his excessive love for humanity is a grandiose makeshift. He made us denizens of a world in which we have no birthright. The deed that seems to redound to his honor may be viewed as his indictment and, by the same token, as a justification of Zeus. Zeus intended to create a new mankind out of a nobler stuff. He is not responsible for our misery, a misery which, thanks to Prometheus, is neither conducive to our extinction nor devoid of a gloomy grandeur. The mutinous god transfigured man in his own image.<sup>30</sup>

A similar observation holds good for the third gift, fire and the arts springing from it. These arts comprise civilization in its entirety. They range from the basic human capacity, that of making an adequate use of the natural tools, the sense-organs, to divination and augury contrived to give man some measure of control over the future. But there is an obvious gap in the proud list of arts the authorship of which is claimed by Prometheus. The art of rulership and legislation, of preëminent importance to the fifth century mind, is not mentioned. This omission can hardly be fortuitous or insignificant, especially as

<sup>30</sup> The idea that, at one level of the many-stranded symbolism of the play, Prometheus symbolizes man, is convincingly set forth by David Grene, "Prometheus Bound," *Classical Philology*, XXXV (1940), pp. 22–38. Mr. Grene, however, seems to overlook the element of theodicy rightly emphasized by K. Bapp in his article on Prometheus in Roscher, *Lexikon der Mythologie*, p. 3063.

it has its counterpart in Plato's version of the myth in *Protagoras*. Here the political art, lying beyond Prometheus' reach, has to be granted by Zeus himself who endows the human mind with two fundamentals, reverence and right (*αιδώς καὶ δίκη*).<sup>31</sup> Missing among the Promethean arts in Aeschylus is also that knowledge which links the divine and the human, the art of religious service and sacrifice, hardly separable, for the Athenian of the fifth century, from the political art. The civilization that Prometheus founded enabled mankind to live an autonomous life in spite of Zeus and the Olympians. Their science was a weapon for self-defence, a practical, not a religious or speculative knowledge.

Out of these considerations a precise meaning accrues to the "blind hopes." This gift may be viewed as the triumph of the Promethean art that raises man to mastery over his life, making evident, at the same time, the limitations of this art. Man, awakened to a knowledge which is essentially foreknowledge, cannot help foreseeing his own inescapable destruction. This is the "malady" to which the Oceanids refer, the irrefragable barrier set to the human artificer's skill, as the chorus in *Antigone* sings. "He has devices for whatever comes to him from the future. How to charm away death, that alone he knows not."<sup>32</sup> Prometheus, the "great sophist"<sup>33</sup> did the thing unheard of hitherto. He invented for his protégés the incantation that "charms away death." It was not given to him to destroy death. But he plucked out its sting, the fear of death. He hid its horrifying aspect behind a curtain of vain hopes. This blessing resembles a fraud. It leaves man, despite the glory of his arts, "emprisoned, a purblind race, in unavailing, dreamlike impotence."<sup>34</sup>

The above interpretation is at best a "likely account." Any further step in the twilight of our fragmentary knowledge of the *Prometheia* leads into sheer speculation. Numerous questions are pressing upon us. In the *Vinctus* Prometheus is, among other things, a magnified image of man. Did the purified character of Prometheus in the *Firebearer* entail a similarly ennobled idea

<sup>31</sup> *Protagoras* 322c.

<sup>32</sup> 360–361; I follow Schneidewin in reading ἐπάστεραι for ἐπάξεραι.

<sup>33</sup> 62.      <sup>34</sup> 546–550.

of human life? Is it not reasonable to assume that the reconciliation of Zeus and Prometheus involved the integration of man in the Olympian world? And should we not picture this integration as a free and pious acceptance of Zeus' rule, taking the place of the defiant self-sufficiency of the artist-man in the *Vinctus*? Would not man, under the new dispensation, renounce one of the Promethean gifts, the deceptive hopes, and learn how to face death? Assuming all this to be answered in the affirmative, an ultimate question arises: Would this disillusion furnish to men a better remedy for their "sickness unto death," perhaps by opening a road to the solution envisaged by Aeschylus, to the "knowledge acquired through affliction"? And will this tragic wisdom finally be crowned by "confident hopes"<sup>35</sup> that do not lie?

It is time to cut short a hazardous line of thought and to resume the main thread of our argument. The idea of Prometheus taking from men the prescience of death has no parallel in the tradition of the Prometheus myth except one place in Plato's *Gorgias*.<sup>36</sup> We therefore have good reasons to believe that Plato borrowed from the tragedian. Transplanted into an entirely different set of ideas the identical element of the story takes on a new meaning. The "transvaluation" through which it goes in its passage from Aeschylus to Plato may be viewed as symbolic of the relationship between the tragedian and the philosopher.

Prometheus is allotted a minor rôle in the eschatological myth at the end of the *Gorgias*. A subaltern in his relations to Zeus, he becomes instrumental in the reform of the Last Judgment. Up to this time, men had been judged in their bodies by living judges and at a previously announced date. As many errors occurred in this kind of jurisdiction, Zeus decided to alter the procedure. From now on the soul was to be tried naked, not veiled by the body, and the judges likewise were to officiate as souls unimpeded by the mortal frame. First, Zeus said, "men must be stopped knowing in advance their death; for they foresee it now. An order has already been given to Prometheus to put an end to that." The idea of the foreknowledge of death is here

<sup>35</sup> P. V. 536-537.

<sup>36</sup> 523d.

narrowed down to a knowledge of the fore-ordained date of death. Death itself, according to the Orphic scheme of thought, is viewed not as "doom," but as the liberation of the soul from the body, baring the soul to inspection by a supreme judge. Henceforth man, caught by death unawares, will have to present himself to the judge as he is, not as he wishes to appear. There will be no cheap eleventh-hour conversion any more. The genuine nakedness of the soul is secured by Prometheus who, under the orders of Zeus, strips it of an injurious foresight. The idea of a trial of the naked soul, both in the myth of Er and in the eschatology of the *Gorgias*, is the poetic reflection of the act round which the Platonic dialogues center, the choice of a pattern of life. The trial is to the choice as (in Orphism) the posthumous judgment is to the initiation of the votary during his lifetime. The trial of the soul stripped bare uncovers the decision reached by the soul all by itself; and this decision, according to the *Gorgias*, is the "preferential choice" between the "philosophical" and the "rhetorical" type of life.<sup>37</sup> It may even be said that the questioning of the dialogue itself, for which, figuratively speaking, the participants have to undress as for a wrestling match,<sup>38</sup> is a premonition of the trial in the world beyond. For it is in the nature of the dialectical test that the one who argues is tested along with his arguments.

Prometheus in the Platonic version of the myth does an important thing. By removing an unfitting knowledge he restores the freedom and responsibility of the human agent. In Aeschylus the identical feature of the myth is linked with the same problem but in an inverse fashion. According to our tentative interpretation, the Aeschylean Prometheus, by means of delusive hopes, bars a foresight which, however painful, is the only road to a liberating knowledge; and we may fancy how, at a later stage of the trilogy, he complies with Zeus' order bidding him to restore the prescience of death. If our surmise is correct, Plato has taken a special pleasure in turning upside down the tragedian's conception, a feat by no means unlike him. For our present purpose, the difference between the two renditions may be looked

<sup>37</sup> 500c.<sup>38</sup> *Theaetetus* 162b.

upon as a cryptogram to be deciphered by the following argument. Either version of the story indicates a corresponding type of the consciousness of freedom. In tragedy the self-consciousness of the responsible agent is gained in the face of suffering and destruction, in Plato it results from a recognition of the moral issue that reduces suffering and death to relative unimportance. Our thesis is that these two types of consciousness are consecutive stages of an evolutionary process. As the symbol designed to foreshadow the thesis involves more than one uncertain factor, the sceptical reader is asked to suspend his judgment. Dubious as an example, the case of Prometheus may still be valid as a symbolic case.

To speak of the growth of the consciousness of freedom in the Hellenic mind seems a modernism. There is no equivalent to the modern term of freedom or liberty in the Greek vocabulary. Yet it may be justifiable occasionally to use the modern word for simplicity's sake, though only in places where an unequivocal meaning is secured by the context. If Greek terms are requested, the notions of "voluntary" (*ἐκών*) and "choice" (*αἱρήσις*) may be named as the focal points of the inquiry. The problem itself, apart from its verbal expression, may be briefly characterized as follows. To act means to make a choice between the possibilities offered by a situation. No enlightenment is required to develop a consciousness of this elementary truth. It is inherent in every primitive report. "Agamemnon suffered the Greeks to immolate his daughter at the altar of Artemis." The meaning of the word "suffered" implies the possibility of a refusal on Agamemnon's part to comply with the oracle. But there are degrees differentiating this kind of self-consciousness of the agent. Agamemnon may be seen acting, without more ado, in accordance with what presents itself as the stern demand of the hour. Again he may hesitate, paternal affection struggling in his breast with his responsibility as an army leader, he may even try to question the truthfulness of the oracle, and the final decision will come to him as the solution of a problem. In a third case, his decision may be viewed as the turning-point in his life, the making or undoing of his character. By deciding one way or the

other, he may either reaffirm or abolish a bloody rite, intertwined, in the present situation, with an hereditary curse. Thus we obtain a scale of intensity or depth, ranging from the shallow consciousness of the chronicler who sees human actions cropping up like buds in springtime, to the profundity of the Jewish mystic who said: "The world was made for the sake of choice alone, and for the sake of him who chooseth."<sup>39</sup> On this scale we propose to mark the loci of the tragic agent and of the Platonic dialectician respectively. It is the intensification of this consciousness which is commonly referred to as the maturation of the consciousness of personality, or as the growth of self-consciousness, or, finally, with an expression made famous by Hegel, as the development of the consciousness of freedom; and I see no objection to employing these and similar terms as fits the occasion.

The problem just outlined and the idea of a theodicy overlap but are not identical. Homer, for example, limits the causality of the gods in order to exonerate them. We are told that the offender, impelled by reckless audacity, made himself guilty beyond his allotted part. So he shares responsibility for the disaster which was to overtake him.<sup>40</sup> Again we read that "these men has the Moira of the gods overcome *and* their own cruel deeds."<sup>41</sup> This juxtaposition and mutual limitation of human and divine causality that recurs in tragedy becomes important as an indication of a type of moral self-consciousness only if it is discovered and appraised in conjunction with other symptoms. Our problem does not coincide with that of a 'free will' either. The latter grows articulate only if the feeling of responsibility is antagonized by a radical fatalism or a philosophical determinism. But this condition is absent throughout the classic Greek era. The authentic evidence for the intellectual process we are interested in is to be sought in the self-expression of the agent in poetry.

Professor Gilbert Norwood comments on the defiant grandeur

<sup>39</sup> R. Nachman von Bratzlav, *Chassidische Bücher*, Berlin, 1928, p. 33.

<sup>40</sup> *Od.* I, 33-34.

<sup>41</sup> *Od.* 22, 413; cf. W. C. Greene, "Fate, Good, and Evil in Early Greek Poetry," *H.S.C.P.* XLVI (1935), p. 9.

of the tragic hero as follows. Some powerful emotion in the hero "creates drama by the magnificent pathetic staunchness wherewith the will, taking its direction from the emotion so aroused, presses on ruthlessly in its attempt to satisfy this impulse. Nothing seems so dear to him as a purpose which flouts cold reason and preachments on expediency, showing him unbroken throughout."<sup>42</sup> I propose to use these pregnant words as a text illustrative of the point I am going to make. To begin with, we ponder the "magnificent pathetic staunchness" of the will ruthlessly pressing on—a trait that hardly any reader of Greek tragedy will have failed to notice. We should stress "will" in contradistinction to instinct or urge. The actions of the hero are emphatically *willed* with a lucid consciousness of their implications and consequences. "Willing, willing I trespassed," Prometheus exclaims.<sup>43</sup> This consciousness involves a foresight of suffering. Prometheus foresaw his punishment, though not its full extent. Antigone anticipates death as the penalty for her deed.<sup>44</sup> The relentless will is allied with, or, as in *Oedipus Rex*, transfigured into, the dauntlessness with which the hero faces an awful truth. Greek tragedy is acquainted with the idea of a knowledge that is sorrow.<sup>45</sup> As the hero wills his deed with all its results, he wills also his suffering. The voluntary submission to pain grows in some cases, especially in *Prometheus*, and in Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* and *Electra*, into a sinister zeal, almost a craving for suffering. A tremendous emotional tension discharges itself in two polar expressions: in action and complaint. The unflinching will, far from being enfeebled by the lavishly flowing lament, seems to feed on a seething emotion in which fear and horror are intermingled with hope.

There is no perversity in the all but joyful embracing of pain, rather a feeling of expiation attached to that of suffering. But even this assertion comes close to overdrawing the picture. The tangible fact that makes us sense something like a 'will to suffering' is that an awareness of guilt, in some cases, is involved in the consciousness of the agent. This guilt, manifold though its ap-

<sup>42</sup> *Greek Tragedy*, 2nd ed., London, 1928, p. 178.

<sup>43</sup> 266.

<sup>44</sup> 72.

<sup>45</sup> Aesch. *Suppl.* 453.

pearance be, invariably conforms to a basic pattern. The transgression is ultimately caused by overweening pride, *hybris*. But, strangely enough, offence and greatness in the hero spring from the same root. The impassioned intensity for which we admire him is itself *hybris*.

The tragic hero is scornful of expediency. In Sophocles' *Electra* the contrast between the right championed by the protagonist on the one hand, and a merely selfish usefulness or harmfulness on the other, between  $\delta\kappa\eta$  and  $\beta\lambda\alpha\beta\eta$ ,<sup>46</sup> is worked out with a dialectical incisiveness that anticipates the Socratic distinctions. But on the whole, the order flouted by the hero is not a mere utilitarian convention. The foil against which we perceive the measurelessness of the heroic will is a world of undisputed sacredness. This world, comprising both nature and political life, is presided over by a law of measure and balance. Within its distributive order each being, according to its allotted place and rank, has strictly to limit itself to its own sphere under pain of incurring the penalty of destruction. By exterminating the transgressor the world restores its equipoise which the insolent encroachment was allowed temporarily to upset. This universe, imaginatively present in Homer, condensed into a formula by Anaximander and theoretically developed by the Ionians from Thales down to Heraclitus, traceable in Herodotus, and vigorously alive in Solon, in its grand simplicity the epitome of ancient Hellenic wisdom, is still acknowledged and honored in tragedy. The unworthiness of those who arrogate to themselves the rôle of its spokesman, as the immature Zeus in *Prometheus Bound*, or Agamemnon and Menelaus in *Ajax*, does not impeach its sanctity. It is recognized by the hero in the very act of transgression. Prometheus, in the sombre and triumphant line recently referred to, exclaims that he voluntarily "failed." Even in the rage of his rebellion he dares not cast a doubt on the legitimacy of the reign of Zeus, the avatar of the universe of measure and balance. There may be an overtone of bitter contempt when, in lines famous for wedding tragic grandiloquence to philosophic vision, Ajax evokes the image of cosmic forces submitting to appointed

<sup>46</sup> 1042.

dignitaries and moving in the fore-ordained alternation of contraries, the picture of the world which he is resolved to leave.<sup>47</sup> Yet his scorn is tempered by a recognition of the reality of this world. He unregretfully parts with it, but he does not negate it. Similarly Sophocles' Electra knows full well that she violates the law of womanly reserve and decorum. As the circumstances of her life are marked by "awfulness" (*τὸ δεινόν*), she is driven into awful deeds, and she is determined to do them unwaveringly.<sup>48</sup> Moderation and devout restraint would be out of place in the extremity of her distress.<sup>49</sup> But to Electra's mind, these virtues, though suspended, continue to be virtues, and to lack them continues to be sin.

The consciousness of the tragic agent comprises guilt as well as suffering. His willingness to become guilty gives a note of defiance and, thereby, poignancy to his language. The tragic defiance is as free from the voluptuousness of wrongdoing as is the tragic suffering from a morbid delight in pain. The hero who wills and accepts his guilt does so with a view to an achievement greater than the guilt. It is not light-hearted audacity that makes him infringe upon the boundaries of wise self-restraint but magnanimity in the service of a compelling goal. Hence, though he recognizes his guilt, he will feel himself wronged; and the injustice done to him will be a part of the sorrowful lot which by his actions he agrees to accept. These are irreconcilable contradictions, pointedly expressed in Antigone's word of the "holy crime."<sup>50</sup> The unbending firmness of the heroic will would not impress us as it does, unless it were gained from a tumult of conflicting motives, with right and wrong hopelessly entangled. The unity of the inflexible will emerges out of a divided conscious-

<sup>47</sup> 646-77. This is not the place to review the controversy which has been occasioned by the ambiguity of these lines and in which Welcker, Ulrich von Wilamowitz, Tycho von Wilamowitz, and R. C. Jebb have participated as protagonists. For a conspectus see Wolfgang Schadewaldt, "Sophokles: Ajas und Antigone," *Neue Wege zur Antike* VIII (1929), pp. 70-82. The above exposition follows Professor Karl Reinhardt, whose interpretation of the controversial lines seems to me to carry off the palm (*Sophokles*, Frankfurt a.M., 1933, pp. 34-39).

<sup>48</sup> *Electra* 221-225.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* 307-309.

<sup>50</sup> *Antigone* 74.

ness; or, as we put it at an earlier place, the hero moves in metaphysical darkness. This accounts for the emotionalism of tragedy. The emotion that would subside if the envisaged aim were such as to allay the misgivings of the troubled intellect is incessantly stirred by a persisting uncertainty. The keynote of the tragic emotion is fear or rather dread. In it the anticipation of suffering is blended with the religious shudder at the violation of sacred restrictions. We are faced with a final sublimation of the idea of *hybris*. According to an ancient belief the accomplishments of human civilisation such as the walling of the city, the digging of a well, or the bridging of a river, encroach upon demonic spheres of sovereignty and have to be atoned for by sacrifice. The poetical expression of the tragic dread may be viewed as the spiritualized atonement for a supreme act of human self-assertion. This act does not impinge upon some single limitation, but it shows human greatness outgrowing the world of limitations as a whole, affirming itself in counteraction to this world.

The configuration of beliefs and ideas in the tragic poem is not translatable into a philosophical scheme of thought. It is surcharged with antinomies and gives but little light on their meaning. But tragedy is struggling towards intellectual clarity. Its beauty is a document of the victorious passage to a more illuminated type of consciousness. The ancient tragedians were poets but also thinkers. As poets, to talk the language of an artificial distinction, they expressed an antinomic state of mind, as thinkers they tried to solve the antinomies. Therefore we could speak of tragedy passing beyond itself toward philosophy. As far as can be judged from the extant plays, Aeschylus' scheme of the dramatic trilogy is determined by this self-transcendence of the tragic within tragedy. The progress of the plot lifts us finally to an harmonious reality, with the Furies transfigured into demons of fertility and the shadows of the tragic conflict receding far to the background of the picture. In a less rational fashion Sophocles, in some of his plays, relieves us from a vision of impenetrable tragic gloom by a luminous apparition. We think of the *deus ex machina* in the *Philoctetes*, or of Theseus in the *Oedipus at Colonus*, the ideal king foreshadowing Plato's portrait

of the philosopher-king. Compared with this type of solution, the happy end in *Electra* and the appeasing intervention of Odysseus in the *Ajax* appear dramatic devices inadequately answering a profound need.

Every voluntary act results from a choice between possibilities. The tragic action, as emphatically willed, is instinct with an enhanced consciousness of choice, a consciousness that normally springs from a conflict of motives. The potential conflict is responsible for the tension persisting throughout the chain of actions by which the tragic character unfolds. The insoluble problem under which he labors puts a strain on him that may verge on insanity. In some particularly revealing cases the potential conflict is actualized in a crisis, in the situation of choice proper. The will is at a momentary standstill. In the face of alternative courses of action, each equally beleaguered with terror and guilt, a decision must be reached and that initial act of the will is performed which then will be affirmed and reaffirmed in the consciousness of voluntariness: "I willed it, the deed is mine. I deny not." The anxiety of this brief pause, of the moment, as it were, of an extreme contraction of the will before it is launched in an as yet undetermined direction, is voiced in the question: "What shall I do?" ( $\tau\iota\delta\rho\alpha\sigma\omega$ ).<sup>51</sup> The depth of the perplexity equals the energy of the will that breaks the deadlock and travels toward its goal. The classic example of this dialectical situation—utter perplexity issuing in determination—is found in Orestes' hesitation before he commits matricide in the *Choephoroi*. Minor instances are in the *Suppliants* and *The Seven against Thebes*.<sup>52</sup> A reflex of the original choice may be recognized in the choice urged on Ismene by Antigone, and on Chrysanthemis by Electra. Translated into the past tense it is central in the *Persians*: time and again we are reminded of the wrong decision made by Xerxes.<sup>53</sup> The staunchness of the heroic will in ancient tragedy throughout appears a dialectic counter-stroke warding off a baffling experience, the antithesis to a thesis, fraught with paralysing antinomies.

<sup>51</sup> *Choeph.* 899.

<sup>52</sup> *Suppl.* 379; *Seven* 1057.

<sup>53</sup> *Persians* 372–373, 454, 553, 749, 782, 808.

The admirable grandeur and unity of the tragic characters are not the result of a subtle psychology. In this the ancient authors are far outstripped by their modern followers. The greatness of the Greek tragic character ultimately consists in the courage with which he decides to be what he is or what he has to be. His independence may well be described by the epithet that the chorus, with shudder and reproach, applies to Antigone: he is "autonomous" (*αὐτόνομος*),<sup>54</sup> living after a law of his own choosing. He is solitary. Free he may be called if we take this word in the sense accruing to it from this analysis; and then tragedy may be called the document of a new freedom. This freedom does not exclude divine coöperation or compulsion by Fate. For Orestes the murder of his mother is his deed and, at the same time, Apollo's.<sup>55</sup> "Your deeds force me to do this," Electra says to Clytemnestra.<sup>56</sup> The consciousness of freedom is not only compatible with that of suffering coërcion, it even awakens and grows under the pressure of compelling counter-forces. This is hardly paradoxical. The feeling of certainty accompanying a manifestation of our freedom is not seldom expressed by the words: "I must." Once more: freedom here is taken to mean the conscious act of self-affirmation.

To Professor Snell who called attention to deliberation and decision as an element in tragedy the objection has been made that the alleged achievement of tragedy is already found in Homer.<sup>57</sup> Perplexity in front of alternative courses of action, a prolonged hesitation and deliberation finally cut short by the prevailing motive—this is a situation frequently recurring in Homer. I shall presently try to refute this objection, to which, by the way, it is hard not to listen with sympathy. Somehow it seems always wrong to look at Homer—the leader of the tragedians, as Plato called him—with a view to finding out what is not, or not yet, in him; seeing that all the grandeur of the tragic

<sup>54</sup> *Antigone* 821.

<sup>55</sup> *Choeph.* 436–437.

<sup>56</sup> *Electra* 619–620.

<sup>57</sup> Bruno Snell, "Aischylos und das Handeln im Drama," *Philologus, Supplementband XX*, 1 (1928). The objector referred to is Erwin Wolff who reviewed Snell's book in *Gnomon*, V (1929), pp. 386–400; cf. Professor Snell's reply *Philologus*, LXXXV (1930), pp. 141–158.

characters is not only foreshadowed but also surpassed in the song of the wrath of Achilles. To view the Homeric epic, a thing so eminently "being," as an element in a process of "becoming" borders on sacrilege.

With this proviso in mind, we seek to gauge the distance separating the epic psychology of deliberation from the consciousness of freedom in tragedy by examining a typical scene in the Iliad.<sup>58</sup> Odysseus finds himself alone, with a host of Trojan warriors surging against him. "Alas, what befalls me!" ( $\tau\iota\pi\acute{a}\theta\omega$  ;), he exclaims. Then his "sense" ( $\theta\nu\mu\acute{o}s$ ) assumes individuality and speaks as though it were Odysseus himself: "A great evil would it be to flee frightened by the number of the enemies. But it would be worse if, alone as I am, I should be made a prisoner." A second later, however, Odysseus has recovered his true self, and he talks and acts again as the valiant swordsman living up to the code of honor of his caste. The acute predicament creates a conflict but not a problem. The epic hero maintains his self by conforming to a pattern of behavior that is predetermined for him by his world. The tragic hero gains his self in reaching beyond the world of fixed moral norms. The epic hero lives up to an heroic standard; the resolve of the tragic hero is incommensurate to all conventional standards. The question of the first is chiefly concerned with the perplexing data of the situation: "What befalls me?" The latter's question "What shall I do?" reveals an antinomy which is not to be solved in terms of any predetermined scheme of behavior. The deed responding to the second, more radical question has to come from a center of spontaneity which is not subjected to a traditional conception of life. It is an appeal to the consciousness of freedom.

Nothing could be farther from the truth than to think of Aeschylus or Sophocles as revolutionists. The tradition that depicts them as law-abiding and devout citizens should not be tampered with. But it is equally wrong to understand tragedy as an instrument of moral-political education.<sup>59</sup> The belief in

<sup>58</sup> XI, 403-12. Cf. Christian Voigt, *Überlegung und Entscheidung. Studien zur Selbstauffassung des Menschen bei Homer*, Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1934.

<sup>59</sup> A deterring example is Wolfgang Schadewaldt's above-quoted essay.

the *polis* is one with the belief in the cosmos as an all-embracing order of balance, distribution and retribution, with the morality of restraint and temperance, and with the traditional forms of worship. This bedrock on which the archaic Grecian society was built is still unshaken in tragedy, but it is dangerously exposed to the impact of a torrential current of feeling springing up in the emancipated individual. Figuratively speaking, the precarious co-existence of rock and current rendered tragedy possible. It is no chance that the message of the ancient order is regularly attributed to the antagonists, and that means, on the whole, to the less likable characters: to Hermes in the *Prometheus Bound*, to Ismene and Creon in the *Antigone*, to Agamemnon and Menelaus in the *Ajax*. It is not by chance either that in the one case (the *Ajax*) in which the profession of prudential wisdom and its cosmological background is put into the mouth of the protagonist, a tacit repudiation of their direct meaning is implied in his words. It is equally significant that the tragic chorus, the privileged mouthpiece of the popular belief, is seldom free from compromising weakness; its wisdom, often authentic and profound, at times smacks of cowardice. After the play is over and the emotions which it aroused have ebbed down, the lasting image engraved in the mind is that of the hero asserting himself in utter loneliness. Such is the singularity of his fate that he appears solitary even when a god is his help-mate (Apollo cannot allay the uproar in Orestes' tortured mind), or when he acts in the service of his native city, as Eteocles in the *Seven against Thebes*. The source of his strength is not within the precincts of that world which is visibly manifested in the *polis*. It is in the mind of the hero. The union of new freedom and ancient loyalty out of which the tragic character grew reminds us of how the flowering of the civic spirit during and after the Persian wars was strangely associated with the rise of the emancipated individual. The soldier citizen dutifully dying at Marathon, and Themistocles ending his career as King Artaxerxes' friend, are complementary figures in the political drama.

Three questions may be viewed as landmarks that denote stages in the growth of the consciousness of freedom: in Homer,

the question "What happens to me?" ( $\tau\iota\pi\acute{a}\theta\omega;$ ); in tragedy, the question "What shall I do?" ( $\tau\iota\delta\rho\acute{a}\sigma\omega;$ ); and the Socratic-Platonic question "What is good?" ( $\tau\iota\acute{a}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu;$ ). The consciousness of freedom in tragedy leads up to the philosophical freedom manifested in the choice of the best pattern of life. The autonomy of the tragic hero, freed by a catastrophe from the sanctified order of the world and its standards, paves the way for the philosopher who seeks the standard of all standards, the Good as the ultimate basis of all order, political and natural.

The process under consideration is not to be thought of as limited to a department of life. The genetic line leading from tragedy to Plato is only one thread in a complex texture, and the endeavor to make as strong a case for tragedy as the facts will permit should not blind us to the coöperating factors. Three among them may briefly be mentioned: Ionian cosmology, Orphism, and the Sophistic Movement.

The cosmologist's consciousness of his own personality reflects his conception of the world. It expresses a freedom in front of and above the cosmos. The philosopher sees himself in his relation to the "many" as he conceives nature, the rule of all change, in relation to its changing aspects. The many perceive only the thing that exists; the one who knows apprehends at the same time the destruction by which this thing atones for its existence, according to a universal law of equity. The many perceive the contraries like hot and cold, day and night. The knower is aware of the ratio that governs their alternation. The vision of the cosmos as a unity of multiple components and the proud "ego" as enunciated by Heraclitus are twin conceptions. Likewise his idea of the profundity of the soul which it is impossible to plumb answers to nature "that loves to hide."<sup>60</sup>

The Orphic votary looked forward to being welcomed by the gods of the Underworld with an apotheosis: "Happy and blessed one, thou shalt be god instead of mortal."<sup>61</sup> He hoped that his soul, now enchained in the painful circle of births, might be

<sup>60</sup> Hermann Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*<sup>5</sup>, Berlin, 1934-1937, I, 150, 161, 178 (22 B 1, 45, 123).

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.* I, 16 (1 B 18).

released from mortality to enter upon its true life, which is not of this world. For him the place of man in the natural and political universe has ceased to coincide with the center of gravity of the human existence. A few gold-plates have come down to us designed to guide the soul from its former dwelling-place to its future destination. The itinerary engraved upon them symbolizes the decision of the soul placed on the parting line between salvation and perdition. The soul will come to a fork from which lead two roads, and it is directed to take the right-hand road and to avoid the road to the left. The religious background of this symbolism has at least one feature in common with Aeschylus' thought. The Orphic devotee, desirous of travelling the right-hand road to eternal bliss, must prepare for his journey by a holy life. By purging his dual nature from its Titanic ingredient, he must try to restore to purity the godlike substance in him. An allegorical myth explains that this substance once was dispersed and defiled when the Divine Child was torn in pieces and devoured by the Titans. Then the Titans, fresh from crime, were burned up by Zeus' thunderbolt, and out of the ashes mankind arose. A liberation from the bonds of the Titanic heritage is the hope held out for mankind by Aeschylus too, though he conceived of this deliverance in a different vein. He was familiar with the Orphic idea of a posthumous retribution;<sup>62</sup> and a line from his lost play *Telephus* which Plato quotes may indicate that he used the road-symbol.<sup>63</sup> Plato, following the example of the Orphics, of Aeschylus, and of Parmenides<sup>64</sup> and Prodicus, further developed the symbol of the road. In the eschatological myth of the *Gorgias* two roads are mentioned, the one leading to the Blessed Islands, the other to Tartarus.<sup>65</sup> Similarly in the myth of Er the road that, at the behest of the judges, is to be taken by the just, leads to the right and upwards, whereas the left-

<sup>62</sup> *Suppl.* 226–231; *Eum.* 273–275.

<sup>63</sup> *Phaedo* 108a.

<sup>64</sup> H. Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*<sup>6</sup>, Berlin, 1934–1937, Vol. I, pp. 228–235 (28 B 1, 2, 6, 7).

<sup>65</sup> 524a.

hand path assigned to the offenders takes them down to the places of punishment.<sup>66</sup>

While the Orphic faith provided the individual with an anchorage *beyond* this world, thereby securing him a new freedom *within* it, the Sophists, itinerant lecturers ranging from quack to free thinker, produced the uprooted individual. They made the discovery that language and reasoning power may be used as instruments subserving any purpose to which the individual cares to turn it. The "Twin Propositions" (*δισσοὶ λόγοι*) typically express the sophistic pragmatism: in the arsenal of the master fencer equally strong reasons are stored in support of contradictory theses that may be advanced alternately as it suits the occasion. But in one case at least the sophistic liking for dichotomy and antithesis issued in an important contribution to the development under consideration. One of the "worthy sophists," "the excellent Prodicus" as Plato called him,<sup>67</sup> created the classic literary symbol of the freedom of will, the fable of Hercules arguing with Vice and Virtue.<sup>68</sup> The idea of the two roads, the one easy and convenient, the other forbiddingly rough, is borrowed from Hesiod.<sup>69</sup> But Hesiod's bare metaphor is remoulded into a vivid drama of hesitation and decision. There is an anticipation of Plato in Prodicus' story also in that it exhibits vice allied with false semblance. Purity and veracity are the adornments of Virtue, while Vice, painted and bedecked with spurious glitter, tries to beguile Hercules by false promises. However, the case of Prodicus is a good example of the difficulty that obstructs any attempt neatly to separate the skeins of the causal tissue. Sophocles is said to have staged a contention between Pleasure and Virtue, the one impersonated by Aphrodite, the other by Athene.<sup>70</sup> So it is possible that a tragedy was among Prodicus' models.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>66</sup> *Rep.* 614c; cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *Orpheus and the Greek Religion*, London, 1935, p. 176. See also Otfrid Becker, "Das Bild des Weges im frühgriechischen Denken," *Hermes*, Einzelschriften 4 (1937), esp. pp. 59, 131-133.

<sup>67</sup> *Banquet* 177b.

<sup>68</sup> Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, II, 1, 21-34.

<sup>69</sup> *Opera et Dies*, 287-292.

<sup>70</sup> *Fr.* 334; Athenaeus, XV, 687c.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Erwin Panofsky, *Hercules am Scheidewege*, Leipzig, Berlin, 1930, pp. 42-49.

The Socratic-Platonic philosophy is a rational method of guiding the human choice. The philosophical appeal finds the would-be disciple either walking light-heartedly but with his mind secretly beset by doubts, or lingering in perplexity and not knowing where to turn; and it bids him to stop and to reflect. First it makes it clear to him that the decision which he must reach is all-important. Compared with it all other preoccupations appear trivial, for it alone is concerned with the well-being of that which we really are, our soul. The word 'soul' is uttered with a novel accent of gravity. You must weigh these questions very carefully, Socrates admonishes his interlocutor, "for our inquiry is concerned with the greatest of questions—a good and an evil life."<sup>72</sup> It is unnecessary to accumulate examples of this Socratic appeal. Every one acquainted with Plato's work knows that they constitute an ever recurring feature of his Socratic dialogues. They are absent with Socrates himself from the *Laws*. Evidently they would be out of place in the discourses of three old men who, just as Cephalus in the *Republic*, have travelled well beyond the parting of the roads. They have already made their choice. The *dramatis personae* are different from what they were, but the interest of the inquiry is unaltered. The ideal city which the Athenian builds up is, in an even more outspoken way than the constitution drafted in the *Republic*, a device to induce the right choice in the minds of the citizens. We have already studied the "incantations" invented by Plato to promote this aim. Finally, in the tenth book, we learn that only the general plan according to which all human souls, virtuous or wicked, are ordered toward the achievement of a universal good is divinely ordained. But it is left to the will (*θούλησις*) of the individual to determine his particular quality and thereby his place within this order (904c)—a somewhat extenuated companion-piece to the Great Choice in the myth of Er. The Platonic investigations as a whole, including the esoteric dialectic of the *Sophist*, *Philebus*, *Parmenides*, and the speculation on nature in the *Timaeus* and the tenth book of the *Laws*, ultimately subserve a single purpose. They aim to give the student "capacity and

<sup>72</sup> *Rep.* 578c.

knowledge to discern the good and evil in life, and always and everywhere to choose the better according to his ability."<sup>73</sup> The germinal term itself of the Socratic-Platonic philosophy, dialectic (*διαλέγεσθαι*), has a natural kinship to the idea of preferring or choosing something (*προαιρεῖσθαι*). This is brought out nicely by Xenophon punning on the middle and transitive form of the verb. Those engaged in dialectic, (*διαλέγεσθαι*), he says, separate and select (*διαλέγειν*) the objects according to genera with a view to preferring the good and avoiding the evil; and they do so "in word and deed" (*λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ*).<sup>74</sup> This may truly be called "Platonism in a nutshell."<sup>75</sup>

A second truth is brought home by Plato to the man hesitating at a junction of his path. Whatever the result of his deliberation may finally be, it will be all of his own doing. There will be no coöperating god to share responsibility with him, nor a fatal necessity to exonerate him. He will be what he chooses to become. Again a myth comes in to reinforce an idea dear to Plato. It magnifies the gravity of the choice by connecting it with the Orphic doctrine of transmigration, and thus it deprives us of a last subterfuge. We are made responsible even for those circumstances of our life which may seem to force us into iniquity. By our wrongdoing in a former existence we blunted our discernment, and our soul was filled with forgetfulness when summoned to the Great Choice.

In the third place, that most momentous decision by which we choose our own self is associated with the gravest danger.<sup>76</sup> Our weal and woe is at stake. We face the possibility of our utter undoing brought about by ourselves. The virtue that has to do with the right assessment of dangers is courage. Hence the wisdom guiding us in our choice will be tantamount to genuine courage. At this juncture the Platonic philosopher parts company with the tragic hero. Plato does not grudge the tragic hero a title to some sort of courage, but he humorously hints at

<sup>73</sup> *Rep.* 618c, tr. A. D. Lindsay.

<sup>74</sup> *Mem.* V, 5, 11-12

<sup>75</sup> Julius Stenzel, "Das Problem der Willensfreiheit im Platonismus," *Die Antike*, vol. IV (1928), pp. 300-302.

<sup>76</sup> *Rep.* 578c.

its deficiency. As he depicts the souls choosing their several lives for the imminent re-incarnation, Plato tells us that Ajax refused to become a man again, because he remembered the injustice done to him by the judgment concerning Achilles' armor. So he took the life of a lion. Then it was Agamemnon's turn to pick a lot. He too, with the remembrance of his suffering still fresh in his mind, abhorred the human race and took in exchange the life of an eagle.<sup>77</sup> With gentle irony Plato renounces any attempt to convert the tragic protagonists to philosophy and to make them confess that the just life is necessarily a happy life, and that suffering injustice is preferable to doing it. They insist on viewing their lives as tragedies. They are in the class of the lovers of victory, not of wisdom.<sup>78</sup> The two royal animals, the lion and the eagle, designate the middle part of the soul ( $\theta\mu\delta\sigma$ ) instead of the ruling part ( $\nu\omega\sigma$ ) as the seat of their virtue.

We shall not ask what "the good" is, unless we are ignorant of it. It may be worth while stressing this truism. The ignorance of the good, or rather the consciousness of this ignorance, is by no means a normal condition. When Hector took leave from his baby son and prayed he might become like his father, he believed he knew what the good is; and so did Ajax when Sophocles made him repeat this formula in a kindred situation. The man at the parting of the roads, not knowing which is the right one, will feel bewilderment and distress. Socrates who, in himself and others, furthered this frame of mind, took a great risk with his friends. It appears that the consciousness of freedom is to be gained only on the brink of that abyss which is uncovered by the nihilism of the more radical among the Sophists. The process of growth in which we are interested is also the growth of a perplexity. The perplexity of the tragic experience is expressed in the paradox of the "holy crime." An antimony in the pattern of life forces the agent out of the shelter of an harmonious and meaningful world, consecrated by tradition, and to act as a solitary self in "metaphysical darkness." When Plato sets the stage for his "truest tragedy," the perplexity has deepened.

<sup>77</sup> *Rep.* 620b.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.* 581c.

The antinomical situation urges upon the mind the question how the standard of goodness can be known. Behind this query the suspicion lurks that perhaps there is no such standard at all. When Athens, on a charge of impiety, brought Socrates to trial and put to death him whom Plato describes as "the justest man of that day,"<sup>79</sup> it became obvious that the city had forfeited its ancient title to moral and religious authority. It was now incumbent upon the individual to answer the question of right and wrong.

The *locus classicus* illustrating the birth of the philosophical question from a dangerous freedom is a digression in the seventh book of the *Republic*.<sup>80</sup> Refuting a current objection to philosophy, Plato explains the reasons for the reputation of lawlessness attached to dialectic. He begins by telling the well-known parable of the foundling. A child was brought up by a wealthy and distinguished family, and as the boy grew to manhood, flatterers thronged around him. But he ignored them and faithfully held to those whom he believed to be his father and mother. One day it happened that he learnt the truth about his origin. Hereupon his solicitude and reverence for his foster-parents slackened, and he began to disobey them and to lend a more willing ear to the adulations of his false friends. Finally he yielded to the temptations of a life of amusement. The meaning of the simile is expounded as follows. The foster-parents signify the beliefs concerning the just and the fair on which we have been brought up and which we have been taught to honor like father and mother.<sup>81</sup> Then the question stirs: what is actually 'good'? what is fair? As the answers offered by the traditional beliefs do not stand the test of a dialectical examination, an incipient doubt cast on their authenticity ultimately leads to the discovery that they are substituted. We find our natural status to be that of a foundling. There are no genuine paternal beliefs, and seeing

<sup>79</sup> *Letter VII*, 324e; cf. *Phaedo* 118, and *Gorgias* 521d.

<sup>80</sup> 537e-539a.

<sup>81</sup> These beliefs may be associated with "the manners and practices of our fathers" the disintegration of which is noted by Plato in the seventh letter (325d).

that our former reverence was misplaced, we may fall an easy prey to the enticements of the "flattering life." Once we have tasted the precarious freedom of the human situation, our salvation depends on the discovery of our indubitable origin and home, revealed to the dialectician in the "true principles."<sup>82</sup>

The discussion of "choice" in Plato must be concluded by the remark that, in a sense, this notion is obliterated as well as posited in his philosophy. I may choose a pattern of life; but the choice must be made in the light of a knowledge which, in its turn, can only be grasped, not chosen. The act of choice is transitional by its nature, and it corresponds, in the scheme of Plato's world, to a transitional or rather intermediate type of reality, the soul. The soul, unlike reason (*νοῦς*), is generated, but it is "the eldest of all things that are generated."<sup>83</sup> The soul may unite itself with reason,<sup>84</sup> thus becoming the cause of the good and fair and just. As, however, the soul may as well fail to do so, it is also the cause of the opposites, the evil, the ugly, and the unjust.<sup>85</sup> Envisaging the notion of soul, we at once are

<sup>82</sup> The commentaries which I have consulted (Bosanquet, Adam, Jowett, Nettleship) confine themselves to considering our passage from the point of view of the immediate purpose which it subserves in the context of the seventh book, namely the setting up of an educational programme. Telling the story of the foundling, Plato wishes to convey a lesson: do not let immature people dabble in philosophy! I believe that here, as in other parts of Plato's works, two levels of meaning are joined. It is the less obvious of the two that I have tried to set forth.

<sup>83</sup> *Laws*, XII, 967d.

<sup>84</sup> *Laws* X, 897b: *νοῦν μὲν προσλαβοῦσα*.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.* 896d. The above interpretation is at variance with John Burnet's view; he believes that the Platonic souls "are what we call gods, if there are many, or God, if there is only one which is the best of all" (*Greek Philosophy*, Part I, London, 1914, p. 335). In the same way Professor Taylor considers the soul in *Laws*, X an ultimate principle and identifies the Demiurge in the *Timaeus* with the "best *ψυχή*" (A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, Oxford 1928, p. 82). F. Solmsen, in a recent publication, again endorses this opinion (*Plato's Theology*, Ithaca, N. Y., 1942, pp. 131-146). However, the objections raised by R. Hackforth seem to me well founded ("Plato's Theism," *Classical Quarterly*, XXX (1936), 4-9, esp. 4). It should be noted that Plato, in the two parallel enumerations of the faculties of the soul, lists *δόξα* (which can be both true and false) but omits *ἐπιστήμη* (*Laws*, X, 896c, 897a). Solmsen (*op. cit.* 148, n. 34) tries to minimize this evidence.

led to conceive of a plurality, or at least of two, one soul the author of good, the other of evil.<sup>86</sup> But after a particular soul has wholly submitted to reason (as, for example, the perfectly intelligent World-Soul in the *Timaeus*), it will not swerve from its regular course. Its action will be either necessitated by knowledge or identical with it. No room for decision as a separate manifestation of the will is left, and we shall have to agree that "nobody sins voluntarily." Prometheus' violent assertion to the contrary will be countered by the statement that he is under a very common illusion. He has not yet attained to that full knowledge which, according to Aeschylus, is the fruit of suffering. He does not really act "voluntarily"; and with this qualification Aeschylus himself might accede to the Socratic paradox. Choice is submerged in complete knowledge.

However, the philosophical discourse addresses itself to those who are engaged in the pursuit of knowledge but have not yet attained it. In order to start and to develop the quest for truth, the life-process must outrun the process of knowledge. Before we know we must dare to know. The aspect of philosophy as a process of approximation throws into prominence the act of choice. Here Plato's pragmatism takes its origin. Views are advocated which, though beyond the pale of the logically ascertainable, recommend themselves as conducive to the right decision. In the *Phaedo* and *Philebus* the acceptance of views of this type (the one concerning the posthumous life of the soul, the other affirming the idea of a rational universe) is described as a venture, but as one worth making.<sup>87</sup> A gulf separates the beginning of the dialectical process from its goal, the perplexity issuing in the Socratic question from the fruition of knowledge in the contemplative life. To bridge this gulf Plato the poet stages his "truest tragedy."

Socrates' problem "what is the good?" initiates a quest for the life worth living. In words reminiscent of tragedy he makes it clear that life as it has been lived so far is a thing of no account, 'life unlivable,' *βίος οὐ βιωτός*.<sup>88</sup> Even that Athenian who was

<sup>86</sup> *Laws*, X, 896e.

<sup>87</sup> *Phaedo*, 114d; *Phil.* 29a.

<sup>88</sup> *Apology*, 38a; cf. *Oed. Col.* 1693.

more richly than any one else endowed with all the things that, in his own opinion and in that of his fellow-citizens, gave substance to life, with genius, beauty, youth, nobility, wealth, and renown, even Alcibiades, when he met Socrates, was constrained to confess that his life was not worth the name of a life.<sup>89</sup> In their appraisal of good and evil in the world of ordinary experience, Socrates-Plato see the odds heavily weighed against the good. In order to make the good triumph and to restore to life value and significance, Plato had to open a new sphere for the self to maintain itself in the face of a tragic reality. This life beyond life, discovered or rather rediscovered by Plato, is the life of contemplation. As the self-assertion of the tragic hero takes him beyond the world of measure and equipoise, so the Platonic transcendence constitutes an even more radical breach with the past. In tragedy the heroic self-affirmation beyond the sphere of prudent humility is still felt as a crime, though a glorious one. The tragedian may, in unison with Pindar, still reiterate in good faith the ancient warning: "Remember that mortal thoughts alone befit the mortal."<sup>90</sup> The philosopher has cast off such fear and boldly summons us to immortalize ourselves by thinking the immortal.<sup>91</sup>

W. B. Yeats imagines Gate-keepers sitting at the entrance from the trivial daily mind to that age-long memoried self which is the abode of Images. Through their dramatic power the Gate-keepers bring our souls to crisis, and they scorn, the poet writes, a life of contemplation more than any possible life, "unless it be but a name for the worst crisis of all." If we lack a Vision of Evil, we shall not earn contemplation, "for it is only when the intellect has wrought the whole of life to drama, to crisis, that we may live for contemplation and yet keep our intensity."<sup>92</sup> The contemplative life as conceived by Plato need not fear the

<sup>89</sup> *Banquet*, 216a.

<sup>90</sup> Pindar, *Pyth.* 3, 106–110; Sophocles, *fr.* 351: θυητὰ φρονεῖν χρὴ θυητὴν φίσιν. Cf. *Trach.* 473; Euripides, *Alc.* 799; *Trag. adesp.* 308; Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1394b, 25.

<sup>91</sup> Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1177b 22: ἀθανατίζειν χρὴ τοφ' θσον ἐνδέχεται.

<sup>92</sup> *Autobiography*, New York, 1938, pp. 234–235.

scorn of the Gate-keepers nor the test of legitimacy suggested by Yeats.

vii—*The Emancipation of the Individual and the Cosmos*

The concluding argument by which I propose to round off this essay may seem to increase the liabilities which I have contracted by venturing more than once beyond the pale of the demonstrable and submitting what I consider probable solutions. But the following observations will, I hope, lay bare certain implications and presuppositions of my whole enterprise and thus help towards consolidating some of the more dubious gains. If the path we had to take is so hazardous that an occasional slipping seems inevitable, it may be well to ascertain that, after all, it leads somewhere; in non-figurative speech, that the manifold observations subserve a unified view of the matter in hand.

A loss is implied in the self-discovery of the individual. The growth of self-conscious freedom is rendered possible by a simultaneous disintegration of that comprehensive order in which the individual was originally submerged. A break in this order and the awareness of a maladjustment become a stimulant of emancipation. "What is 'order' in this connection?" it will be asked. It is nearly though not quite the thing dubbed environment by the Pragmatists. "World" may be the best term for it. The Hellenic "world" has become flesh and blood in the city-state, though it is not exhausted by its political materialization. The order permeating the body politic is viewed by the Greeks as informing likewise the revolution of the stars, the alternation of the seasons, growth and decay in the vegetable and animal kingdom. Instead of noting a transference of moral notions into nature, we had better say that a problematic dichotomy, which we are too prone to fix dogmatically, is as yet not prominent in the archaic mind. The key-words describing its world, such as justice (*δικη*), harmony (*ἀρμονία*), order (*τάξις*), the one and the many, the like and the contrary, straddle the line of demarcation separating human society from nature.<sup>93</sup> The flowering of the

<sup>93</sup> R. Mondolfo, *Problema umano e problema cosmico nella formazione della filosofia greca*. Memoria presentata alla R. Accademia di Bologna, 1934.

civic life and the fertility of the soil are regarded as exhibiting one and the same 'cosmos' (*κόσμος*), to use this pregnant word which still today bears the impress received by early Greek thought.<sup>94</sup> This conception of an integral universe, the general pattern underlying Homer's poems,<sup>95</sup> supplied the warp worked out into a conceptual tissue by the Ionians and Eleatics, with fresh observations of nature, the logic of the contraries, and other devices as a woof. The characteristic creation of this early Greek speculation is hardly science, as Professor Burnet would have it, but cosmology and ontology.<sup>96</sup>

Words, according to an ancient Greek view, reveal "that which is." The Sophists brought into relief another aspect of speech. For them it is essentially a tool for directing other people's minds, for *ψυχαγωγία*. The instrumental notion of language is the fruit of a novel interest in society and human intercourse. The philosophy of the Sophists, as far as they had any, seems to have been of a preliminary and, at the same time, negative character. They exercised their wit in pulling down the edifice of the ancient 'world' that encumbered the new intellectual freedom. Protagoras did so by developing radical inferences drawn from Heraclitus' and Anaxagoras' doctrines into a self-negation of cosmological thought—a procedure to be gleaned from Plato's report in the *Theaetetus*. A parallel document is Gorgias' *On Being and Non-Being*, which shows the Eleatic ontology pushed

<sup>94</sup> "Was wir beim 'Staat' empfinden und denken, ein grosses geordnetes Ganze, das unabhängig dem Einzelnen gegenüber und über ihm steht, das empfand und dachte der Grieche bei *κόσμος*, mehr als bei *πόλις* and *πολιτεία*, die vielmehr für die *πολιταὶ* eingerichtet und ihren Zwecken dienstbar erscheinen," R. Hirzel, *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Rechtsidee bei den Griechen* (Leipzig, 1907), p. 283, note.

<sup>95</sup> See the searching analysis of "Homer's truth" in Kurt Riezler, *Parthenides*, Frankfurt a. M., 1934, pp. 15-22.

<sup>96</sup> John Burnet in *Early Greek Philosophy*, 4th ed., London, 1930, calls Thales "the first man of science" (p. 40), and asserts that "the Milesians wholly ignored traditional beliefs" (p. 80). The one-sidedness of this view has been amply shown by the works of F. M. Cornford (*From Religion to Philosophy*, New York, 1912), P.-M. Schuhl (*Essai sur la formation de la pensée grecque*, Paris, 1934), and others.

to the extreme of self-annihilation.<sup>97</sup> In order to make the word serviceable as an instrument in the hands of the autonomous individual, it had to be cut loose from an objective meaning, that is, from objects which have to be revealed as what they are. The measure of the being or non-being of the things, Protagoras believed, should not be sought in themselves or in the context in which they belong, the world. The individual arrogated to himself the dignity of a universal measure.

Can tragedy be regarded as another document of a tendency towards "acomism"? We prepared an answer in the affirmative, when we discussed the ambiguous homage paid by Aeschylus and Sophocles to the cosmos, its political incarnation in the city, and its moral code with the master precept of moderation. The ancient world is as yet held sacred. But we feel that it is drifting, as it were, in the backwater of tradition, while the fresh current of life rushes on. It is a dignified foil, against which a new greatness is being set off, a thesis upheld for the sake of the antithesis. In the mind of the hearer, the hero carries the day, not the world that makes him suffer. This view of the matter may be supported by a further argument.

Nature in a broad sense, that is, the non-human world, holds a considerable place in the tragic poems. I propose to single out two chief types of poetry of nature in tragedy, the first attributed to the chorus, the second to the protagonist. An example of the first is found in the *Seven against Thebes*. Near the end of the play the chorus composed of Theban women bewails the fate of the two brothers who fulfilled the doom of their accursed house by mutual fratricide. As the complaint reaches its culmination, the surrounding world chimes in: "The city groans, the turrets groan, the man-loving plain groans."<sup>98</sup> In a similar vein the Oceanids in *Prometheus Bound* believe their sympathetic suffering shared by the universe and all its inhabitants. Like a wildfire their lament spreads over the globe. The fountains of the rivers join in, the waves of the sea and the abyss of the earth. All tiers

<sup>97</sup> See Guido Calogero, *Studi sull' Eleatismo*, Rome, 1932, especially Ch. IV, pp. 157-222.

<sup>98</sup> 899-902.

of being ring with moan around Prometheus who alone keeps silent in the agony of his torture.<sup>99</sup> Thus nature is called in to magnify the voice of the chorus discharging its emotion. Nothing short of the universe will do as a sounding-board to vibrate in the rhythm of the tragic pathos.

In the second place, we find an evocation of nature in the protagonist's monologues, usually marking a crisis in his career or preceding his end. Before Zeus' thunderbolt hurls him into the Tartarus, Prometheus summons the "Ether in whose orbit the light of the world revolves" as a witness of his unjust suffering.<sup>100</sup> Ajax bids a last farewell to the sun, to the sacred fields of his homeland and the neighborly Athens, to the rivers, brooks, and fountains of the Trojan plain that witnessed his exploits.<sup>101</sup> Antigone addresses her complaint to the grave, "her bridal chamber and everlasting deep-hollowed prison,"<sup>102</sup> Philoctetes makes his appeal to his bow, to the rocks, promontories, and to the animals inhabiting his lonesome abode,<sup>103</sup> Deianira to her bridal bed.<sup>104</sup> Words extorted by a supreme distress are likely to reveal that which lies at the bottom of the heart. People who long ago had abandoned their mother-tongue are said to have recovered it in their agony. The Orphic devotee, in the anxiety of his heart, may have addressed himself to the lord Dionysus, as the devout Catholic calls on the Holy Virgin. So we might well expect to find in the pathetic evocations of tragedy indications of an ultimate belief, perhaps even of a definite ritual pattern. But this expectation proves illusory. No profession of a definable faith, no traces of a religious formula are discernible. Only the devout attachment to the native soil, evident above all in the popularity of the countless local cults of nymphs all over the Hellenic land, links the tragic farewell, in a very general way, to the religious background.<sup>105</sup> The absence, however, of specific traditional elements suggests an important observation.

<sup>99</sup> 406-435.

<sup>100</sup> 1092-1094.

<sup>101</sup> 856-864; cf. 412-427.

<sup>102</sup> 891-892.

<sup>103</sup> 1128, 936-940.

<sup>104</sup> 920-921.

<sup>105</sup> Before the Battle of Plataea, the oracle advised the Athenians to sacrifice not only to the great Olympians but also to Pan and the Sphragitidian Nymphs. The fact recalls Philoctetes bidding farewell to the Nymphs of Lemnos (1454).

In the two types of representation or rather evocation of nature which I distinguished, inanimate things, brought in contact with the tragic emotion, flare up with a life not their own. Estranged from their ordinary status, they renounce any self-sustained reality and exist only through, and for the sake of, the human pathos.<sup>106</sup> In the cases of the first type, the chorus engages fellow-mourners to take up and multiply its sympathetic lament. As Orpheus moved trees and animals by his song, so the chorus, in the trance of its emotion, hears the turrets, the fountains, and the rocks strike in and carry the profusive moan to the confines of the world. Similarly the hero, lifted above human communication to the height of a singular fate, needs responsive partners to unburden his mind, receptacles, as it were, for the overflowing passion. So he calls by their names the things familiar and dear to him, those which compose his 'world.' But this is not an objective divine universe but a subjective and personal world, a unique halo ecstatically lit up for a moment and unveiling the deep attachments of the individual mind, its sentimental home. Its pathos is the central fire from which all light proceeds: as it goes out, the responsive scenery with its rivers and fields, with the implements of war and of domestic life, sinks back into nothingness.

This is the way of poetry, it will be remarked. It is the poet's privilege to commit the "pathetic fallacy" by humanizing inanimate objects and thus making us feel at home among them. Very well; but as a dividing line between man and non-human nature is not an unequivocal datum of experience, we should be careful to distinguish between various kinds of 'anthropomorphism.' The term may also be applied to Solon for whom a natural catastrophe and the overthrow of liberty by a tyrant illustrate one and the same truth, founded in the nature of the cosmos.<sup>107</sup> Evidently this type of animation, rationalized and backed by a persisting belief, is very different from that which

<sup>106</sup> W. Schadewaldt, *Monolog und Selbstgespräch. Untersuchungen zur Formgeschichte der griechischen Tragödie*, Berlin, 1926, p. 68.

<sup>107</sup> Werner Jaeger, "Solons Eunomie," *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie, Philosophisch-historische Klasse* IX (1926), pp. 80-81.

occurs in tragedy. The living cosmos has faded away from the mind of the tragedian to such a degree that he feels free to use nature as an echo of the individual emotion. The tragic hero is truly an individual, alone with himself. Even the cosmic space opening up around him to receive his complaint is a symbol of his tragic solitude and freedom. The disintegration of the belief in the cosmos released nature for an interpretation in the language of human pathos in much the same way as, *mutatis mutandis*, the decline of the teleological metaphysics in the eighteenth century released nature for a response to that romantic yearning which made the poet discern in the murmur of wood and river "the still, sad music of humanity."

The tragic pathos dragging the universe into its frantic eddy and the 'world-less' Socratic thought may now be seen linked with each other. Cicero's classic statement describes well the turning-point in the development of Greek philosophy. "Socrates autem primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo, et in urbibus collocavit, et in domus etiam introduxit, et coegit de vita et moribus, rebusque bonis et malis quaerere."<sup>108</sup> The "heaven" from which philosophy was called down by Socrates, was the cosmos as studied by the ancient thinkers. The novelty of his enterprise consisted not so much in that he reflected on questions of conduct (others did this before him), but in that the human problem was his sole concern and that he hoped to find an answer in the human mind by itself, apart from nature. The fields and trees had a great deal to teach to the Ionians but nothing to him.<sup>109</sup> The amazement felt by the older type of mind at his procedure is expressed in the well-known story about the oriental visitor who, when he heard that Socrates speculated on human life, laughed and said, nobody could ever understand the human things being ignorant of the divine,<sup>110</sup> meaning by "divine things" (*τὰ θεῖα*) the heaven or the universe. Whereupon Socrates-Plato may be fancied replying: "The divine things, in your

<sup>108</sup> *Tuscul. Quaest.* V, 10.

<sup>109</sup> *Phaedrus*, 230d.

<sup>110</sup> Aristoxenus, fr. 31, Mueller, *Fragm. Hist. Graec.* II, 281.

opinion, are the perfectly good things, are they not? But how will you recognize them, if you don't know what the good is?"<sup>111</sup>

It is sufficiently well known to what degree, with regard to our problem, Plato was and remained a Socratic. The cosmos, in the dialogues of the early and middle period, is either altogether absent; or it is presented in a mythic garb, providing a

<sup>111</sup> Professor Fritz Saxl, in his work on *Mithras* (Berlin, 1931), speaks of the magnificent, almost terrifying achievement of Greek classicism through which the artistic imagination was made to focus on the image of Man alone. He writes: "Die Fülle des Kosmos, wie sie die ägyptische, überhaupt die vorklassische Kunst zur Darstellung gebracht hatte, existiert von da an künstlerisch nicht mehr. Die assyrischen Künstler schildern die Löwenjagd, sie schildern die Bäume, unter denen der König ruht, die Stadt, die er belagert, Flüsse die sein Heer überquert, das Dickicht, in dem der Grosskönig jagt—dieser Reichtum ist der Menschheit verloren gegangen, als die klassische Kunst das bloss Menschliche zum Haupt-Thema der bildenden Kunst erhob" (pp. 48-49). The analogy between the artistic and the intellectual development may be carried further. The antagonism of forces out of which the human agent finally rises to his splendid isolation holds a dominant place in the representations of Greek sculpture. Professor Cornford has pointed that out in regard to the Parthenon. The contest of Athena and Poseidon, the latter impersonating the unbridled strength of barbaric nature, "was figured on the western pediment of the Parthenon, which looks towards Salamis. . . . The theme of civilised freedom triumphant over barbarism and tyranny was repeated in other sculptures of the Parthenon: the battles of Greeks and Amazons, of Lapiths and Centaurs, and, on the metopes of the eastern front, the battle of Gods and Giants. Here Athena stood in the centre beside her father Zeus, who blasted his enemies with the thunderbolt in [a] victory of superior force." (*Plato's Cosmology*, New York, 1937, p. 362) If we follow again Saxl's guidance and give a closer attention to the famous second metope of the Parthenon, we find the left knee of the Lapith pressing against the flank of the sinking Centaur, one hand clutching the enemy's throat, the other lifted for a deadly stroke. There are oriental analogues to this composition. (Cf. W. H. Ward, *The Seal Cylinders of Western Asia*, Washington, 1910, No. 184.) But whereas the Asiatic seal cylinders show man and vanquished animal in juxtaposition, combined into a heraldic pattern, the Greek artist formed the moment of action into a living, balanced group. Thus, from the point of view of our historical analysis, the relief assumes a symbolic significance. After a life-and-death battle the man who is fully man slays the man still half submerged in subhuman nature. But very soon, the cosmos returned, re-asserting itself in the Hellenistic landscape, in the symbolism of the Mithras reliefs and of religious art in general, and in bucolic poetry.

suitable scenery for the posthumous career of the soul—another proof for the non-existence of a binding conception of the universe in the mind of the writer. Then a new cosmology is foreshadowed in the *Sophist*<sup>112</sup> and the *Philebus*.<sup>113</sup> In both cases we are confronted with an alternative. A rational universe created and presided over by an intellect is contrasted with one arisen at random and governed by chance. No demonstration is offered for the sole truth of the first view, but it is made clear that not to decide in its favor would be an impiety. In the *Timaeus* and the tenth book of the *Laws*, a new cosmology is finally built up with new conceptual instruments, offered as a “likely account” and still a stage for the human drama rather than a self-sufficient reality.<sup>114</sup>

<sup>112</sup> 265c.

<sup>113</sup> 28d.

<sup>114</sup> An indirect confirmation of the view advocated in these pages may be gained from an analysis of Boethius' *De Consolazione Philosophiae*. We consider this great book a work of authentic Platonism modified under the influence of the Christian idea of God, with unmistakable though less important admixtures of Aristotelian and Stoic thought; but essentially a unit, drawing, as Usener has shown, on the ancient tradition of the *προτρεπτικὸς εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν*. (Wilhelm Usener, *Anecdoton Holderi. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Roms in ostgotischer Zeit*, Leipzig, 1877. The unity of Boethius' book, treated for some time as a sorry patch-work, was successfully vindicated by E. K. Rand, “On the Composition of Boethius' *Consolatio Philosophiae*,” *H.S.C.P.* XV (1904), pp. 1–28). The problem of human suffering is developed into an elaborate theodicy; and a very concrete suffering, the misery of the author languishing in prison, forms the point of departure. The Muses alone have stayed with him as faithful comforters. But they are harshly arraigned by the true physician, Dame Philosophy, who now makes her appearance in the cell. Instead of liberating the prisoner from his illness, she charges, the sisters have fed it with sweet poison, fostered the lush growth of passions and thus killed the seed of reason. Philosophy chasing off the Muses, especially singling out for pillory the “raving Muse” (I, pr. 5, 29) and the “clamor of tragedies” (II, pr. 2, 31), but herself repeatedly condescending to the ways of these “little stage harlots” (*scaenicae meretriculae*, I, pr. 1, 24) and sweetening her teaching with metre and melody—this is a perfect likeness of Plato's philosophy competing with tragic poetry. Philosophy begins the cure by administering to the patient her “gentler remedy.” Without transcending the sphere of relative and short-lived goods, Fortuna's realm, the divine teacher points out the order and coherence which reign even here. If only we accept Fortuna's rules and refrain from asking of her the one thing she is incapable of granting—a durable

Aristotle, in a measure, reverts to the pre-Socratic outlook. In his philosophy man finds himself reintegrated in the cosmos.

happiness—we shall be grateful in the remembrance of her gifts rather than pained at their inevitable loss. This order of the realm of Fortuna is associated by Boethius with the order of the natural cosmos: both obey the inexorable law of rhythmic alternation. It is characteristic of the rôle assigned by the writer to the metrical parts that this idea is expressed in verse rather than in prose. Throughout the *Consolatio* the cosmos, as a metaphysical foil and a physical likeness, is largely relegated to the poetical interludes—a relic, we may assume, of the Platonic notion of physics as a “likely account.” The one prose sentence in the second book which forcibly expresses the idea of Fortuna as a natural or cosmic law, reads: “*Ius est mari nunc strato aequore blandiri, nunc procellis ac fluctibus inhorrescere. Nos ad constantiam nostris moribus alienam inexpleta hominum cupiditas alligabit?*” (II, pr. 2, 20–23). This remark, which takes us way back to archaic Greek thought with its “legal cosmology,” is immediately followed by a reference to the Croesus story in Herodotus and by another to Zeus’ two jars in Homer. But we should not forget that all this is put into Fortuna’s mouth. It imparts only a relative truth.

A mind nursed on Plato’s thought cannot well acquiesce in the naturalistic philosophy of cosmic rhythm and the eternal recurrence. How violently the prisoner first reacts to it, is seen from one of the statelier poems in Book I (6), a faint echo of Ajax’ soliloquy in Sophocles (*Ajax*, 646–677, cf. p. 62 of this paper), with nearly the same references to the lawful alternation of day and night, summer and winter, storm and calm. In the tragedy the cleavage between man and nature is veiled by a feigned compliance, while in Boethius it is made explicit. Nature imperturbably revolves in her grooves. Why, he argues, is human life allowed to get out of joint? This is the moment of the mind’s utmost estrangement in Boethius’ philosophical drama, and Philosophy will soon refer to the lines expressing it as an utterance of the *Musa saeviens*. In other words, it is the tragic view of life which is voiced here, the antagonist position gradually to be overcome by an array of philosophical demonstrations.

Hereupon, after suggesting that it is man’s business to re-insert himself into an order from which he was torn away by his own doing, the guide confronts the sufferer with a choice familiar to the reader of Plato’s *Sophist* (265c) and the *Philebus* (28d): “*Mundum temerariis agi fortuitisque casibus putas, an ullum credis ei regimen inesse rationis?*” (I, pr. 6, 4–6). As the belief in the rationality of the universe is unshaken in the pupil’s mind, Philosophy has a safe foundation upon which to rear her edifice. While her teaching rises from the relative and changeable goods to the sovereign good that is one with God she also leaves beneath us the self-sufficient cosmos, or rather she transfigures it into a creation ruled by the Creator. Man’s insatiable cupidity, an outcast and a destructive power in the world of total periodicity, is now given its legitimate object. The First Cause of the swelling and ebbing tides of life is itself at rest: “*Tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis*” (III, m. 9, 27).

The story of the mind that disengages itself from the world to gain its liberty and then rebuilds the world in its own image has come full orbit. The antithesis tragedy *versus* philosophy is resolved, tragedy is assigned its rightful place within the reconstructed cosmos, and the arguments of the Platonic indictment are, one by one, turned into an apologetic. The celebrated doctrine of catharsis seals the certificate of naturalization in the world tendered to tragedy by Aristotle. There is only one world, we are told, this visible world of ours. There is for us as individuals only one life, this earthly life. Enmeshed as we are in the contingencies of our bodily existence, intellectual beatitude is meted out to us intermittently only and in small portions, a precarious possession. Still in the extremity of old age, on the threshold of death, our felicity may be snatched away by fate. Due to our intellect we are capable of conceiving a perfect happiness, not of achieving it. For the disciple of Plato the restoration of the natural cosmos as the ultimate reality was an act of acquiescence, or even of tragic resignation. That is why Aristotle was in a position to readmit tragedy into his 'Best City.' His greatest Christian pupil sensed behind this naturalistic resignation of the master and those who acceded to it the "anguish" of the mind that sees itself debarred from the attainment of its own natural end: *In quo satis appareat quantum angustiam patiebantur hinc inde eorum praeclara ingenia.*<sup>115</sup>

That, in the last analysis, nothing is settled by the Aristotelian endorsement of tragedy as an institution is shown by the renewal of the discussion in Christian thought. The cosmos, now definitively divested of its self-sufficient divinity, must be content with the derivative splendor of a divine creation. *Nos Deum colimus, non caelum et terram*, writes St. Augustine.<sup>116</sup> Along with the doctrine of the Eternal Life, which exceeds the Platonic assertion of a transcendental beatitude in boldness and determination, the Platonic hostility against tragedy is resuscitated. The scathing criticism of tragic poetry in the *Republic* is matched by the even more ferocious attacks in the *Confessions* and the

<sup>115</sup> St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, 48.

<sup>116</sup> *Civ. Dei*, VII, 29.

*City of God*; and Plato's "truest tragedy" is given a Christian companion-piece in St. Augustine's vision of the World's History as "an exquisite poem" which God, to adorn the course of the ages, has set off with antitheses.<sup>117</sup>

But Christian philosophy is more than a recapitulation of the Platonic position. The voice of suffering, muffled in Plato's "truest tragedy," is heard again in a supernatural drama of salvation, and there is reason for the believer "to glory in tribulations." From the unclouded serenity that reigned in the cell of the dying Socrates, sadness and moaning were banished. The Christian *imitatio Dei* includes a human participation in "the passions of the passionless" (*τοῖς τοῦ ἀπαθοῦ πάθεσιν*), in the "drama," as Gregory Nazianzenus calls it, "wonderfully constructed for our advantage":<sup>118</sup> *Compatimur ut et conglomericemur*. And again, in the depths of sorrow and perplexity, a new region of human liberty is explored. Man is apprized of a suffering which is not simply inflicted upon him but chosen, willed, and suffered in a supreme affirmation of his freedom. Does this mean that the problem with which the tragedians and Plato wrestled is solved, gathered up once for all in a comprehensive view of life and world? An affirmative answer can be given only in the sense that the solution establishes the problem as a mystery. The truth of Aeschylus' *πάθει μάθος* is made to shine in the light of a deeper insight.

<sup>117</sup> *Civ. Dei*, XI, 18; cf. XIV, 9, where St. Paul is spoken of as the *athleta Christi*, acting and suffering on "the theatre of this world."

<sup>118</sup> δραματουργεῖται καὶ πλέκεται θαυμαστῶς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν. *Theological Orations* IV, 5-6 (ed. A. J. Mason, Cambridge Patristic Texts, 1899, p. 115).

## CORINTHIACA

By STERLING Dow

**A**THENS and Sparta are part of our cultural tradition, Thebes had its day in the sun, other Greek cities are famous for various reasons. Not so Corinth. After the tyrants had been expelled, and after archaic art had run its course, Corinth continued to be large, wealthy, and powerful, yet from the Persian Wars onward she appears to have lacked any major distinction. Doubtless this is due, at least in part, to our ignorance: Corinth got less than her share of attention in the historical and literary tradition. Unhappily, the dearth of such records is matched by a curious paucity of inscriptions as well. Indeed the paucity of inscriptions, after 40-odd years of excavations, is a circumstance which may well be regarded as a major fact.

But more can be learned than has been learned from the inscriptions already published.<sup>1</sup> A list of citizens drawn up

<sup>1</sup> The inscriptions discovered at Corinth through 1927 (apart from a smaller group discovered in special excavations) were collected by B. D. Meritt in *Corinth, Results of Excavations*, VIII, 1: *Greek Inscriptions*, Cambridge, Mass., 1931, the numbering of which is followed by the bold-face numbers in the present article. In a review (*Gnomon*, IX [1933], 415-418) which provided extensive new texts for nos. 14 and 15, W. Peek criticized less happily the fulness of publication accorded to many small fragments. For an example he selected no. 112, a stuccoed building block, one of a series, bearing a letter of monumental size and a trace of a second such letter, which Peek disregarded. Meritt had adopted K. K. Smith's plausible conjecture that the inscription was part of the dedication of a Corinthian building. As such it has a certain value, and no one who knows Corinth would feel that too much space had been given it. On the contrary, K. K. Smith's original publications, which are usually fuller, can still be consulted with profit; the references are all in *Cor.* VIII 1.

The first paper of the present series, "Corinthiaca: I. The Month Phoinikaios," was concerned almost wholly with the archaic period. It was published in *Am. Journ. Archaeol.* XLVI (1942), 69-72.

I should like to record here my obligation to Professor Richard Stillwell, who first interested me in Corinth and under whose direction I excavated at that pleasant site.


under tribal rubrics had merely been identified; it ought to be examined as closely as possible for hints as to the major divisions of the citizen body and as to their past development. Only one inscription of the second half of the fifth century remains to us: at least we can ascertain its nature. The decrees, taken text by text, one at a time, are paltry; but their precise number can be ascertained and they can be approximately dated. Their very scarcity—there are exactly six—surely tells something about Corinth: the comparison may not be a fair one in every respect, but it is a fact that from Athens over a thousand decrees survive. In short, we have for the history of Corinth only a few mutilated figures, as it were, from a great lost mosaic, a mosaic which moreover in terms of our present study (i.e. of inscriptions) apparently never was complete to begin with. There is the more reason, it seems to me, for examining closely each preserved bit in order to explore all its likely relations to the others, in the hope somehow of glimpsing the pattern of the whole, even though there is little hope of ever knowing a tithe as much, say, as Aristotle did when he wrote his book on Corinth.<sup>2</sup>

## II. A LIST OF NAMES UNDER RUBRICS

*Cor.* VIII 1, no. 11. The only clue to the date is the lettering: letters of moderate size, deeply and nicely cut, the ends of strokes sometimes broadened a little but no true serifs, many strokes made with the point not the edge of the chisel. There is no material for comparisons at Corinth, but certainly this lettering is of the fourth century B.C., probably of the latter half as Meritt said. The text consists of a list of men's names, each with its patronymic, arranged in groups. Each such group of names is headed by a three-letter rubric, consisting of two letters, a short dash used as an interpunct, and a third letter. Four such rubrics are preserved, as follows:

ΣΙ-Γ  
ΛΕ-Ε  
ΛΕ-Γ  
ΚΥ-Φ

<sup>2</sup> Diogenes Laertius I 99.



*Corinth VIII 1, no. 11: the Reverse Side of a Squeeze. (For a Photograph of the Stone, see *Cor.* VIII 1, p. 11.)*



Of the third letter in the last rubric Meritt remarks, "The digamma is worthy of attention," but nothing has been made of it or of the other third letters.

Conceivably they are numerals, the values being  $\Gamma = 80$ ,  $E = 5$ , and  $F = 6$ ; the date is no objection, since it has been demonstrated beyond doubt that the alphabetic system existed as early as the fifth century B.C., and since, if the alphabetic system *were* employed here, the number 6 could not be represented in any other way save by a digamma.<sup>3</sup> This explanation, however, yields no plausible meaning for the list as a whole.

It will be noted that the first three third letters form the sequence  $\Gamma$ ,  $E$ ,  $\Gamma$ , and that the last letter, "digamma," lacks only a stroke to become  $E$ . No other letter on the preserved fragment lacks a stroke, and the inscription is carefully cut; but Greek inscriptions, even the most careful in appearance, notoriously were left without strokes which often are important.<sup>4</sup> In the present instance, there was room for the lowest stroke. The 'middle' stroke is short, as in epsilon, but a single earlier example of a title probably archaic shows clearly that in fourth century Corinth digamma need not have two horizontal strokes of equal length ( $F$ ).<sup>5</sup> It will be noted that the second and third rubrics both begin  $\Lambda E$ . Both  $\Lambda E$ 's must stand for the same thing: i.e. the group of men is divided in two, the first part being designated  $\Lambda E-E$ , and the second part  $\Lambda E-\Gamma$ . Since the first preserved rubric,  $\Sigma I-\Gamma$ , likewise ends in  $\Gamma$ , the inference is that the  $\Sigma I$ -group also was divided into a missing [E] section, listed first, and the preserved  $\Gamma$  section, listed second.

<sup>3</sup> I owe this statement to a letter from the authority on numerals, M. N. Tod (see his summarizing article in *Brit. Sch. Ann.* XXXVII [1936/7: published 1940]), who has written me helpfully on these and other numeral problems at Corinth, and who agrees with the view adopted *infra* in the next paragraph.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. *Cor.* VIII 1, no. 3, line 5 (*infra*.) The most remarkable example, though not from Corinth, is the Salaminioi inscription published by W. S. Ferguson in *Hesperia* VII (1938), 1-74.

<sup>5</sup> An inscription in large letters was found in the theater, KOPFAN. The date is apparently early fourth century (*Am. Journ. Archaeol.* XXXIII [1929] 521). In view of the sloping nu, the period can hardly be later.

It can hardly be a coincidence that the rubric of the first KY-section can be read KY-*<E>*. After it would come a [KY-Γ] now missing. The list of rubrics, thus extended, would read as follows:—

[ΣΙ-Ε]  
 ΣΙ-Γ  
 ΛΕ-Ε  
 ΛΕ-Γ  
 KY-*<E>*  
 [KY-Γ]

The various groups consisting each of a rubric and name(s) are separated by blank spaces. It is interesting to observe—what has not hitherto been observed—that these gaps are not arbitrary in height, but each gap consists of precisely the space requisite for three lines plus four interspaces. This was originally the height of all the gaps, including the gap after the group of names headed ΛΕ-Γ; but in the first space of this particular gap there was entered later the name *Xápios Δε[---]*, which is inscribed, as Meritt noted, by a different hand, and somewhat crudely; the length of chisel used is also different. The forms of the letters, especially the chi, are not as exact as those of the letters in other lines. A small gap was left before the patronymic. The cutting of the letters is thin and shallow: it may be inferred that this entry was made after the stele had been erected. Obviously it was contemplated that additions might need to be made to the list, not more than three names to each group; and one such addition, *Xápios Δε[---]*, was in fact made.

A revised text of the whole may now be given (p. 94).

#### THE BLOCK

The cuttings<sup>1</sup> and history of the fragment need to be clarified, since if the anathyrosis *were* part of the original treatment of the block, the block must have come from a fairly large monument, presumably an inscribed wall. The anathyrosis is on the (preserved left)

<sup>1</sup> Messrs. B. H. Hill and Richard Stillwell kindly examined the cuttings with me. What follows is based on their comments.

side but at the back edge only, hence the block was not necessarily a building block originally, but doubtless an independent stele. The original side was quite flat, as normally in a stele. There were two periods of re-use, presumably both in Roman times. First the preserved side was cut back in a narrow band at the front edge; the block was then laid on its front (inscribed) face, to serve as a step, the preserved side and of course the (uninscribed) back being exposed. This is proved by slight footwear on the back at the preserved edge. Subsequently, again for use as a step, the block was turned around and the preserved side was set in against the step backers. In order to make this joint, another band was trimmed on the preserved side, leaving only a comparatively narrow band of the original side at the back edge (the 'anathyrosis' of *Cor.* VIII, 1, p. 12). The inscribed face was still down. In this position the back received footwear so heavy as to hollow it out along the lost back edge; part of the hollow is preserved. The conclusion is that the original block was never much wider than at present (0.30 m., to which add enough stone to complete line 8, and to provide a goodly margin on the right, = total width *ca.* 0.45 m.). The possibility must be admitted that originally it was twice as wide, but that it was sawed lengthwise in Roman times so as to make two step-blocks from the one stele. Precisely this happened to a now famous stele in Athens: W. B. Dinsmoor, *Archons of Athens*, Cambridge, Mass., 1931, p. 3. The very generous and unusual preserved margin strongly suggests, however, that the stele was wide enough for only the one column of text with its ample margins.

#### NOTES ON THE TEXT

Lines 3-5. Sufficient stone is preserved to show that these lines were left blank.

Line 6. The interpunct and pi are mostly preserved. Preceding the interpunct, there is room only for one full letter and an iota; in fact the lower stroke of the iota shows clearly in second place. Upsilon is excluded: the tribe is not  $\Delta v(\mu\grave{a}v\epsilon\varsigma)$ . The first letter is represented by a stroke which slopes a little down toward the right, and this lower (right) end is marked by a deepening of the stroke. The deepening is *not* caused by a *deep* oblique stroke, as of delta, cutting in from above, since the deepening does not extend upward to the (very near) edge of the break; but a *shallow* oblique stroke is not to be excluded. Unluckily no preserved letter has a horizontal lower stroke thus deepened at the right end. The mason did often broaden the end of a stroke, and deepen it a little, producing a swallow-tail effect, somewhat as in *Cor.* VIII 1, no. 222 (which however is by a different mason). This ornamental ending, and the slope of the stroke,

	[. I-E]
	[name(s)]
	vacat
	vacat
5	vacat
	 I-Γ
	Καφισόδωρος Ἀριστο[---]
	Φιλοχάρης Φιλοσθέ[nous]
	Δαμοθέρρης Θρασύλλο[v]
10	Ἀρχιτέλης Ἀρχίλλου
	Λαμπρέας Νικοξένου
	vacat
	vacat
	vacat
15	ΛΕ-Ε
	Δαμαίνετος Δαμωνί[δου]
	vacat
	vacat
	vacat
20	ΛΕ-Γ
	Ἐχεμένης Ἐχε[----]
	Θεύμναστος [-----]
	Χάρισος Ὁ Δε[----]
	vacat
25	vacat
	ΚΥ- <span style="font-family: serif;">&lt;Ε&gt;</span>
	Ἀριστογε[--- -----]
	Ἄσ[----- -----]
	[other names?]
30	[vacat]
	[vacat]
	[vacat]
	[ΚΥ-Γ]
	[κτλ.]

Text of *Corinth* VIII 1, no. 11

favor the reading sigma, though in other sigmas the sloping stroke curves a little. Meritt read Δ (without comment) but the slope of the stroke is definitely greater than in two other deltas where the bottom stroke slopes a little. Delta is barely admissible.

Line 7. Any letter other than omicron would show in the space preserved after tau.

Line 8. Meritt's restoration seems inevitable. The name Φιλοσθένης is new to Greek.

Line 9. Δαμοθέρρης is a name new to Greek in that form. Δαμοθέρσης is known.

Line 16. Meritt reads Δαμωνίο[ν], but this name is otherwise unknown, and I can detect no letter after the iota. Tod's suggestion, Δαμωνί[δου], accords with the spacing and is doubtless correct. Both Δαμωνίδας and Δαμωνίδης appear in Pape-Benseler, *Wörterbuch*, but not in Bechtel, *Hist. gr. Pers.*

Line 22. The first letter of the patronymic, not read before, is apparently Γ, Ε, or Ζ.

Line 27. 'Αριστογέ[νης], Meritt; 'Αριστογε[ίτων] is also possible.

Line 28. These traces have not been read before.

To the erudition of Hiller von Gaertringen we owe the explanation of the first two letters of each rubric. For the fourth preserved rubric, KY, he cited Hesychius II, p. 555 Schmidt: Κυνόφαλοι: Κορίνθιοι, φυλή (*Phil. Woch.* LII [1932], col. 362). Thus the first two letters of each rubric are evidently the first two letters of the name of a Corinthian tribe. There need be no doubt that the list is a list of citizens: only citizens, surely, could be listed under tribal rubrics. Mr. Tod (*per litt.*) remarks the aristocratic tone of the names. As even in Athens, new names are not surprising: the classical Greeks seem to have striven to find, i.e. to make, new names, whereas the Hellenistic Greeks tended to take the names of famous men, or to form names from the names of deities.

The interpretation of the list as a whole is necessarily a matter largely of conjecture. The facts given are: that varying small numbers of citizens are entered under tribal headings; that further additions to the list, to the extent of exactly three names under each rubric, were allowed for; and that at least one such addition was in fact made. Clearly the list is not a list of officials, since officials ought to be at least approximately equally distributed

among the tribes, and late entries would not be expected. Late entries would also be out of place in a list of *epheboi*: the roll of *epheboi* would surely be available in complete form by the time their period of service was drawing to a close, or had ended.<sup>6</sup> A more plausible notion is that the list is a list of (voluntary) contributors to a fund. The theory would be that the amount asked for may have been large, the purpose unpopular, or the times hard; that to encourage gifts, spaces were left, three under each rubric, and the stele was then erected so that everyone could see who had contributed and who had not; that in the preserved portion, one such tardy subscriber is recorded, Charisos son of De----; and that the distribution of donors among tribes remained uneven, as might easily happen.<sup>7</sup> For some years this theory seemed to me the only plausible theory, even though, as we shall see, E and Γ in the rubrics could hardly mean 100 drachmai and 50 drachmai. In trying to settle the matter, we shall probably not go wrong in consulting Athenian practice. Just as Athenian literature, the Attic dialect, and the forms of Athenian decrees had become or were becoming universal models, so Athenian editorial and clerical practice may well have had wide influence; in a later period, a letter-cutter who had worked, or was to work, in Athens, also worked in Corinth (*infra*, no. 5). Now in the fourth century the Athenians set up few lists of subscribers,<sup>8</sup> and in no period, so far as we know, did they arrange

<sup>6</sup> No one of the numerous surviving Athenian lists of *epheboi* earlier than the time of Augustus makes any provision, so far as I know, for late entries.

<sup>7</sup> In *IG. II<sup>2</sup> 2336*, the list of Athenian subscribers to the first enneēteric Delian Pythaīs (new text in *HSCP LI* [1940], 111-124), line 52 was left blank presumably in the hope of coercing the *archon basileus* into paying his 100 drachmai. The date of this, however, is *ca.* 100 B.C., and there is only the one gap in a list of some 275 lines; though to be sure several late payments are recorded out of their proper years. The real difference is that the Athenian list, being arranged by magistrates, is not really a list of voluntary contributions but (as I shall try to show elsewhere) a set of liturgies.

<sup>8</sup> We have two, *IG. II<sup>2</sup> 2329* and *2330*. *IG. II<sup>2</sup> 417* of *post a. 330* is a list of citizens paying normally 50 drachmai each (three pay 100, one pays 39) as a liturgy. The names are arranged under tribal rubrics, two names for each tribe, except Hippothontis, which has one.

contributors by tribes, nor, apart from the instance mentioned in foot-note 7, did they attempt to force contributions by leaving blank spaces. These facts may not settle the matter for good and all, but they create a presumption that the Corinthian list was not a list of subscribers.

The only remaining possibility worth considering is that no. 11 is a list of fallen. Lists of fallen were frequently set up, and were arranged by tribes, in Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries. Formerly, however, it had seemed to me that lists of fallen would be tolerably complete when they were set up, and that additions of as many as three names under each rubric would never be contemplated. Measurement of *IG I<sup>2</sup> 943* dispelled this doubt: if the Athenians could contemplate as many as two additions to each (very short) tribal list, there seems to be no reason why the Corinthians should not have made provision for three. It appears in fact that in every respect *IG I<sup>2</sup> 943* is a closely parallel document: note the small numbers of fallen; late additions present but few; and the irregular distribution among tribes. We may put it down as tolerably certain that *Cor. VIII 1*, no. 11 is a list of fallen.

The purpose of the third letter of each rubric is more difficult to make out. Since the rubric E takes precedence over Γ, the E-group is the more important. (The preserved fragment has fewer names under E, but this may be an accident.) It seems reasonable to assume that the third letter of each rubric designated something perfectly familiar to casual readers in contemporary Corinth. The third letters must have been in regular use, just as the first two must have been used often to designate the tribes. On this reasoning, and until some better explanation is offered, it is tempting to go further and to urge that the third letters are integral parts of the designations of the tribes.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> For these reasons, π(ολῖται) and έ(φηβοι) are eliminated (cf. the list from Tegea, *IG. V. 2. 36*, of men listed under tribal rubrics each of which is followed by lesser rubrics πολῖται and μέτουκοι). J. Whatmough has suggested to me that two different classes of adult citizens come in question, Γ standing for some form of πᾶς (i.e. citizens with full rights; cf. the πεντακοσιομέδιμνοι at Athens)

A closer examination of what is known about the tribes is therefore the next step. The passage from Hesychius, *Κυνόφαλοι: Κορίνθιοι, φυλή*, is treated by T. Kock among the unassigned fragments in his *Com. Att. Frag.*, III 638, no. 1360: “κυνόφαλοι Is. Voss. κυνόφαλλοι Mein., Corinthiaceae tribus nomen a comico poeta ridicule fictum esse ad libidines Corinthiorum inridendas statuens. sed pro φυλή Nauckius Φιλήμων Aristoph. Byz. 238 n. 4, ad Philemonis *Corinthiam* glossam referens, ‘Πίνθων φλύακι M. Schmidt. ιθύφαλλοι Naber. Mnem. VIII 434. res prorsus incerta.’” Yet another emendation, *κυνόφιλοι*, is mentioned by Ch. Lécrivain in Daremberg-Saglio, *Dict. Ant.*, s.v., note.

The inscription proves that Hesychius was right in thinking that the name of a Corinthian tribe began *Ku-*; there is no need to assume any connection with comedy. Usually it has been supposed that people called “Wearers of Dogskin Caps” were

and *E* standing for those of a lower census or limited rights. There is nothing to confirm and certainly nothing to disprove this suggestion.

‘Acrophonic’ numerals—*έ*(*κατὸν δραχμαῖ*) and *π*(*εντήκοντα δραχμαῖ*)—are not absolutely to be excluded. The former sum would probably have been represented, Mr. Tod informs me, by *H* or possibly by *Θ*, which in the fourth century still survived in the Argolic area; *E* (= 100) is found however at Chios, Nisos, and Mytilene. But it is unlikely that the third letters represent numbers; we have already dismissed the hypothesis that the list is of contributors.

The only comparative matter thus far offered to explain the rubrics was offered by R. G. Kent (*AJA* XXXVI 369), who suggested that “perhaps [the abbreviated rubric headings] are of the same nature as the sigla which accompany the names of the boundary commissioners in the Heraclean Tables (*IG. XIV* 645; *SGDI* 4629; Buck, *Gr. Dialects* No. 74).” The tables are dated currently to the end of the fourth century B.C. In them the names of all but a few of the numerous persons mentioned are designated first by two letters. Of these groups of two letters, eight are preserved; there is no reason to suppose that we have the original number, or anything like it. Each group of two letters will make the beginning of a Greek word, and doubtless they are all abbreviations: *AI*, *AΛ*, *AΣ*, *CE* (= *FE*), *FA* (= ‘*A*’), *KN*, *ME* and *ΠE*. The second designation is by various common nouns, spelled out in full: *ἀνθεμα*, *βότρυς*, etc. These second symbols are taken as applying to subdivisions (families?) of the first class (tribes?), the one denoted by abbreviations. However similar to the rubrics at Corinth, these Heraclean symbols give no helpful clue.

peasants,<sup>10</sup> perhaps victims of the Dorian conquest,<sup>11</sup> in any case a fourth tribe added to the three old Dorian tribes.<sup>12</sup> From *Cor.* VIII 1, no. 11 we now see that the Κν-tribe was not added as a fourth tribe to three tribes which kept the old Dorian names, since the rubrics will not fit the Dorian tribal names; and the question next arises whether the Κν-name was opprobrious. There can be no doubt that words compounded from κύων generally were terms of insult: *κυνοβλάψ*, *κυνοθαρσής*, *κυνόφρων*, and so on; but it should be noted that the connotation of κύων was not always unfavorable, since representations of dogs appear on vases as shield devices and therefore were probably used on actual shields.<sup>13</sup> The emended form Κυνόφυλοι would have to be regarded in the light of these facts—if we were driven to make an emendation.

The unemended form Κυνόφαλοι has always been translated “Wearers of Dogskin Caps.” If this is correct, then the word must, even when allowances are made, be opprobrious. But the translation is open to question. The word φάλος never means “cap,” but always means “helmet,” or rather some part (“horn,” “boss,” or “ornament”) of a helmet: its use is confined to epic. One of the regular words for helmet is κυνέη, which meant the skin used in making a helmet (or rather the cap worn under a helmet ?) but in the main it had ceased to have its literal meaning already in Homer.<sup>14</sup> Some antiquarian may discover precisely what Κυνόφαλοι denotes: its connotations, so far from being

<sup>10</sup> J. Oehler, *PWK*, s.v. J. G. O'Neill's statement, *Ancient Corinth*, Baltimore, 1930, I 95 shows the need for study: “serfs called variously cynophali or cynophyli . . . play no part in the subsequent history of the city.”

<sup>11</sup> K. F. Hermann-V. Thumser, *Staatsaltertümer*,<sup>8</sup> I, p. 128.

<sup>12</sup> T. Lenschau, *Philologus*, 91 (1936/7), p. 386, unaware of Hiller's review.

<sup>13</sup> G. H. Chase, “The Shield Devices of the Greeks,” *HSCP* XIII (1902), pp. 103 (list of nine representations of dogs on shields, but none of them on a vase made in Corinth), and 79 (relation in general of representations on vases to actual usage). Yet it should be noted that even the impossible emendation Ιθύφαλλοι could be defended on the basis of one Corinthian vase (*op. cit.*, p. 114, no. CLXXV).

<sup>14</sup> Articles “galea” in Dar.-Sag. by S. Reinach, §§ I and (on “Corinthian” helmets) XXVI; “κυνέη” by Lamer in *PWK*, Halbband 22, cols. 2499–2503 (on φάλος); Liddell-Scott-Jones, *Lexicon*,<sup>8</sup> s.v.

peasant, may well be military and Homeric. The Κυνόφαλοι may have been a tribe which retained an old-fashioned type of helmet, possibly with a dog supporting the crest.<sup>15</sup> Against any favorable interpretation of the word, however, must be set certain derogatory names of tribes cited by Hermann-Thumser (*loc. cit.*); and Athenaeus XIV 657d, where the wearing of a dogskin cap is definitely spoken of as degrading.

Conceivably we ought to follow this kind of reasoning further. If so, I suggest the emendation *Kυνο* <κέ> φαλοι, which is somewhat less natural palaeographically, but yields better sense than any of the emendations thus far proposed. Literary references attest familiarity later with the notion and the word; and it is particularly interesting that many early plastic vases made at Corinth have the form of apes (W. C. McDermott, *The Ape in Antiquity*, Baltimore, 1938, p. 261, nos. 410ff.; *et passim*).

If however the name Κυνόφαλοι was not derogatory, then no close comparison should be made between the tribes of Corinth and the Τάται, Ονεάται and Χοιρεάται of Sikyon instituted by Kleisthenes (Herodotus V 68), and there is no *necessity* to seek opprobrious names, or animal names of any sort, to fill out the rubrics Σι- (or Δι-) and Λε-. For the latter, the only likely alternatives are compounds from λέων or λευκός.<sup>16</sup> A kind of sanctity was often thought to inhere in objects which were white, as I hope to show elsewhere. In favor of a tribe named from the lion are five shield-devices on vases made in Corinth.<sup>17</sup> But like the

<sup>15</sup> Cf. the sphinx and horses on the helmet of Athena Parthenos.

For another venerable body designated by respectable old head-gear, cf. the Δευκοραιντοι, an Old Attic Tritty (Hesperia, IV [1935], p. 21, line 36; W. S. Ferguson, *Classical Studies in Honor of E. Capps*, pp. 154-155; S. Dow, forthcoming study of the same inscription).

Chase lists two representations of helmets used as shield devices (*op. cit.*, p. 108), but neither is on a vase made at Corinth.

<sup>16</sup> The towns of Corinthia may not all be known. Among those known, none has a name in Κυ-, but if part of the rubrics are local, Λέ(χαιρος) and Σι(δοῦς) might be thought of.

<sup>17</sup> Several literary passages prove that at times whole armies bore on their shields a letter or other device symbolic of their city as a whole (Chase, *op. cit.*, pp. 72, 77). As to devices symbolizing tribes within a city, there is no literary evidence, but there can hardly be a doubt that tribes with animal names would

status of the Κυνόφαλοι, this matter remains obscure. In the remainder of this study, no argument is based on these speculations about the words themselves.

In his inclusive study of the Greek tribes, E. Szanto pointed out that Argos, Sikyon, and Troizen each either added a fourth

sometimes bear a representation of the animal on their shields, and that the commoner symbols of this sort would be represented as shield devices on vases made in the city; but vase painters would not of course feel themselves restricted to emblems in actual use.

The facts known for Corinth are approximately as follows. At least 26 different emblems appear on vases (Protocorinthian and Corinthian) made at Corinth (Chase, p. 80, notes 5 and 6: add the boar, lion's head, and rabbit). Obviously at times the vase painters merely depicted on the vases shield devices which were part of their regular repertoire of decorations for other parts of vases. Thus for instance flying birds are often precisely similar on shields and as filling ornaments. Flying birds were probably common as ornaments on all sorts of Corinthian objects at this period, including perhaps shields. Two kinds of birds should be distinguished on the representations at least of shields, since their significance is not necessarily the same: birds of prey (hawks or eagles) and large seed-eaters (pigeons?). Where a hawk and a pigeon appear on shields which are part of a row of shields, the inference is that the painter had in mind not so much actuality as a desire for variety. In fact none of the rows of hoplites has a row of identical shield devices. But it is significant also that some devices shown commonly on shields are rare or absent in other parts of the designs on the vases. This is particularly true of the bull's head, which appears as a shield device on 11 different vases, and may well have been in actual use as a shield device. If there was a lion-tribe, there may have been a bull-tribe. The lion's head appears as a shield device on four different vases. The other common devices are birds (in all on 11 different vases), gorgoneia (8), wave pattern (9), and swan (5). The occurrences of the swan suggest another emendation to Hesychius, κυκνόφαλοι, which might mean that the crests of the helmets were made of swans' feathers. For Corinth yet another device (add to foregoing) is a trident: B. V. Head, *Hist. Num.*<sup>2</sup>, p. 402.

For representations of vases with shield devices, see Humfry Payne, *Necrocorinthia* and *Protokorinthische Vasenmalerei* (Berlin, 1933: *Bilder Griechischer Vasen*), and K. F. Johansen, *Les Vases Sicyoniens* (Paris-Copenhagen, 1923). On shield devices (mostly Athenian), add to Chase's fundamental article, which catalogues 268 shield devices, C. T. Seltman, *Athens, its History and Coinage* (Cambridge, Eng., 1924), especially p. XVIII and n. 3, and p. 47, n. 5, with the reviews by E. S. G. R(obinson) in *Numismatic Chronicle*, 1924, pp. 329-341 and in *Classical Review*, XXXIX (1925), 124-125. On small votive shields at Corinth, see now *Hesperia*, XI (1942), 118-124, 157.

tribe to the three Dorian tribes already in existence, or created afresh four new tribes.<sup>18</sup> Corinth, however, though doubtless it started with the three Dorian tribes, came to have eight: Suidas, *s.v.* πάντα ὄκτω· — — οἱ δὲ ὅτι Ἀλήτης κατὰ χρησμὸν τὸν Κορινθίους συνοικίζων η' φυλὰς ἐποίησε τὸν πολίτας καὶ η' μέρη τὴν πόλιν. Szanto conjectured that Corinth, having begun with the three Dorian tribes, like the other Dorian states, presently changed to four; that subsequently, in a period of expansion, each of these four was divided, on a local basis (Suidas), to make eight. The natural basis for the division would be city and country, one half of each old tribe being located in the *ἄστυ*, one half in the *χώρα*.

On the preserved fragment four rubrics appear, each followed by a name or names. The possibility cannot be denied that

<sup>18</sup> *Sitzber. Wien. Akad. Wiss.*, 144 (1901, publ. 1902). Reprinted in, and cited here from, E. Szanto, *Ausgewählte Abhandlungen*, p. 230 and n. 30. This article, plus Wade-Gery's good synthetic chapters in the *Camb. Anc. Hist.*, III (especially pp. 554, 555 and 568 with notes); Hermann-Thumser, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-128; A. E. Zimmern, *Greek Commonwealth*,<sup>5</sup> p. 111 and n. 1; G. Glotz, *Greek City* (Eng. trans. 1929), p. 88 and n. 1; and Lenschau, *op. cit.*, pp. 386-387 will provide sufficient references to comparative material on tribes in other Peloponnesian cities. I have attempted no thorough study of these, but one or two suggestions may be offered. The most striking report is of course Herodotus' on Sikyon (V 68). That Kleisthenes named tribes Pigmen, Assmen, and Swinemens has been thought to be, and is, "childish": but surely Greek politics have had childish elements and aspects in every period—so have politics in other nations. J. B. Bury explained the opprobrious names as "a story [which arose] out of a word spoken [by Kleisthenes] in jest": I do not believe this, but in any case a joke which is taken in earnest for 60 years and more is tantamount to truth. It has been urged that Kleisthenes would not or could not have offended three-quarters of the population (Bury even said "the mass of Sicyonians"): but likely enough the Dorians, though they made up three-quarters of the tribes, made up less than three-quarters of the tribesmen. Probably in fact they were a minority. (A similar error was that of K. O. Müller, who thought that because there were eight tribes in Corinth, the Dorians made up three-eights of the population.) Early Greece offers several examples of opprobrious names borne by tribes (and modern political parties likewise). Altogether, until more substantial arguments are offered, it seems preferable to believe that Herodotus was right. Though not as weighty corroboration, one may add that both swine (boars) and mules are represented on Protocorinthian vases as shield devices (Chase, pp. 98 and 115).—Places named for animals are treated in Macan's note to Herodotus V 68. 3.

originally the inscription consisted of 16 such groups, i.e. that  $\Lambda\bar{E}-E$  represents one half of one of the eight tribes,  $\Lambda\bar{E}-\Gamma$  the other half of this same tribe,  $KY-E$  one half of another of the eight tribes, and so on. Such a list would require an inscribed area *ca.* 1.10 m. tall—an unusual but by no means impossible post-like stele. The alternative, requiring a shorter, more usual type of stele, is that  $\Lambda\bar{E}-E$  represents the whole of one of the eight tribes, and  $\Lambda\bar{E}-\Gamma$  the whole of another; and that  $\Lambda\bar{E}$  is the abbreviated name of one of the (hypothetical) four older tribes. The present list, in a word, fits Szanto's hypothesis exactly.

An advantage of this theory is that it implies for the rubric letters  $E$  and  $\Gamma$  meanings which must have been as familiar as the names themselves of the tribes. In speculating as to what  $E$  and  $\Gamma$  stood for, one is tempted by Szanto's further hypothesis that the division was into city and country tribes. An approximate analogy, though it proves little, would be the Kleisthenian trittyes of Attica, where one trittys of each tribe was within the general region (though not within the walls) of the  $\alpha\sigma\tau\nu$ , the other two outside. If so,  $E$  might stand for some such word as  $\epsilon\nu\tau\nu\sigma$  or  $\epsilon\nu\tau\omega\tau\nu\sigma$ , and  $\Gamma$  for some form of  $\pi\epsilon\pi\iota$ , vaguely like the Spartan *perioikoi*. The  $E$ -section comes first in each instance, as would be natural if the city tribe had precedence.

On this basis, we have to reckon with four (or three) stages in the organization of the citizens of Corinth. (1) The Dorian invaders originally were divided into the three Dorian tribes, Hylleis, Pamphylois, and Dymanes. These names are not attested as yet for Corinth itself, but their existence there is hardly doubtful.<sup>19</sup> The three Dorian tribes were of course not local, i.e. they were not segregated each within a limited area.

<sup>19</sup> At Corcyra the tribe Hylleis is apparently attested (all agree, but I am not sure) by an inscription, *IG IX* 1. 694: the Pamphylois and Dymanes are to be inferred. The tribe Hylleis "may be from Corinth; but in Corcyra we are near the Dorian home, and Hylleis and a city Hylle are reported on the mainland opposite" (Wade-Gery, *Camb. Anc. Hist.* II 538, n. 1). The colonists went forth organized as Kynophaloi, Le ---, Si ---, *et al.*, but settling on an island not very far from the [not at present exactly located] Dorian homeland, they were so stirred by the ancestral neighborhood [ancestral very remotely]

(2) The next step was the creation of a fourth tribe. The natural presumption is that, as elsewhere, this fourth tribe consisted of non-Dorians.<sup>20</sup> If so, the four tribes, like the preceding three, were not local.

The names of the three Dorian tribes *may* have been changed to the forms found in the present inscription at the very time when the fourth tribe was created. At the same time, the tribes *may* have been made local.

(3) It seems more likely, however, that the changes were not telescoped together. The creation of a fourth tribe had been a great event, and now the changing of the whole basis of the tribes from birth to locality was a second great reform.<sup>21</sup> When the fourth tribe was created, non-Dorians were admitted to citizenship; when the tribes were made local, non-Dorians mingled with Dorians in each and all of the tribes. A new set of tribe-names was therefore appropriate at this stage.

(4) The four tribes were divided to form eight. The four names were kept. To make eight names, two [localizing ?] terms were added to each of the four names. Each of the four tribes was thus cut into two pieces, i.e., the four tribes were already

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that they reverted to the ancestral tribe-names:—such would be the theory. It seems easier to take the Hylleis at Corcyra as proof that Corinth itself still had Dorian tribes in 734 B.C.

<sup>20</sup> References in n. 18, *supra*.

<sup>21</sup> One of the great changes attested for the organization of several states of early Greece was the change from non-local to local tribes. I suspect that this change was a fundamental reform which took place in most of the progressive cities of Greece; if so, it has been only partly realized by scholars (e.g., E. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* III 286–287). In Argos and elsewhere the motive seems to have been the reduction of the power of great families (M. P. Nilsson, *Greek Religion*, p. 246). For Tegea, see Szanto (*op. cit.*, p. 243–244), who thinks that the four local tribes there were created for administrative purposes. As in Corinth, the change in Sparta is obscure (G. Gilbert, *Greek Constitutional Antiquities* [Eng. trans.], pp. 40–42; Busolt-Swoboda, *Gr. Staatskunde*, p. 644; A. Andrewes, *Class. Quart.* XXIII [1938], 101 favors a date *ca.* 600 B.C.). In Athens sectionalism and the complication of interests vested in the phratries were undermined in 508 B.C. Local (?) tribes in Elis, reduced from 12 to eight, and other changes: Frazer *ad Pausanias*, V 9, 4–6; Szanto, *op. cit.*, pp. 248–249.

local. Otherwise eight names, all different, would have been selected.

The more solid epigraphical facts have led us to a considerable amount of theorizing. It may be observed, however, that the four stages thus dimly discernible fit the known historical facts. Suidas, quoted *supra*, dated the eight tribes to the reign of the mythical King Aletes. (1) We have seen reason to believe that when the colonies were sent out, i.e. under the Bakchiad aristocracy, the three Dorian tribes still existed. (2) Since the tyrants were at least partly non-Dorian, it is probable that the fourth, non-Dorian, tribe was created by them. (3) Again, since the tyranny rested at least partly on racial animus, it is not unlikely that after the tyrants were overthrown, an attempt was made to destroy racial animus by mingling Dorian and non-Dorian by making the tribes local. (4) The doubling of the tribes may well have resulted from a large increase in population. Surplus population in the eighth and seventh centuries was reduced by colonizing. When colonizing ended, a new period of growth began. The undertaking of the vast circuit wall with its extensions to the Gulf of Corinth, all of which the excavators date to "perhaps as early as 450 B.C.," shows that by that period the city had grown to a considerable size.<sup>22</sup> Krommyon, Kenchreai, and Lechaion *may* also have been populous, and possibly there were a few other towns (or "demes"?) of moderate size scattered about in Corinthia.<sup>23</sup> It is hard to believe, however, that anything like as many people lived outside the far-flung circuit walls as lived within them. Hence this division of the four tribes should antedate 450 (or at least 395) B.C.

<sup>22</sup> *Corinth* III 2, 125-127. Scranton (*Greek Walls*, pp. 85-87) would date the long walls in 395 B.C. This *may* be right (S. Dow, *Class. Week.* XXXV [1941/2], 106).

Pindar (*Ol.* XIII, opening lines) sings of a (personified) *Eιρούλα*, *Δικη*, and *Ειρήνη* in the Corinth of his day. Pindar is doubtless here, as elsewhere, euphemistic or hortatory, not literally exact; even so, Corinth can hardly have been torn by interneccine strife. Breaches had been healed.

<sup>23</sup> *Corinth* I 46-104, *passim*, discusses the known data, which tend to indicate that no one of the extra-city communities was large.

Be all this as it may, the eight tribes persisted. The oligarchy ruled through eight probouloi and a boule of 80 members,<sup>24</sup> which are obviously based on the eight tribes. The present list proves that the eight tribes were used in a later time for purposes unrelated to the probouloi and the boule. As in Athens and elsewhere, the tribes in Corinth may well have been the fundamental unitary divisions of the state.<sup>25</sup>

### III. VARIOUS INSCRIPTIONS OF THE GREEK PERIOD

For this section I have selected from my notes a few comments which bear on various aspects of "Greek" Corinth. The inscriptions, and the comments on them, have no relation to each other except that they all show how little remains, yet how some knowledge can still be gleaned. A copy of *Cor. VIII 1* at the reader's elbow may make the comments more intelligible.

**22.** With regard to this intriguing prohibition of trespass, K. K. Smith discusses at length the numeral for the fine |||||, whether it indicates eight drachmai or eight oboloi. His concluding arguments, favoring oboloi, are weak: the desire was not to fill out the line neatly, for the line is *not* filled; and that the smaller sum would avoid rousing suspicions about the little temple<sup>26</sup> seems unlikely when the whole text piques curiosity. The authority on acrophonic numerals, M. N. Tod, still favors drachmai:<sup>27</sup> trespass, as he writes, was a serious matter just here. A fine of eight drachmai may well have been serious anywhere in early Greece: Smith cites much later examples of larger fines, but a comparison equally near in time is with the earlier price of an ox (five drachmai) and of a sheep (one drachma)

<sup>24</sup> Nicolaus Damascenus, *F. Gr. Hist.*, 90 F 60. Argos also had a council of eighty, Thucydides V 47, cf. *Camb. Anc. Hist.* III 557. The post-tyrant constitution of Corinth is discussed best by G. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*<sup>2</sup> I 658, n. 1; and E. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*<sup>2</sup> III 579.

<sup>25</sup> *Cor. VIII 1*, no. 222 has been restored [---]pas φv[λās ? ---]. If correct, this gives a mention of the tribes later still, according to the style of lettering, than the present list.

<sup>26</sup> On what B. H. Hill has worked out here, and generally on the situation, see K. K. Smith, *Am. Journ. Archaeol.* XXII<sup>1</sup> (1919), 353-357; R. Carpenter, *Guide to the Excavations of Corinth*, Cambridge, Mass., ed. 3, 1936, pp. 55-61.

<sup>27</sup> *Brit. Sch. Ann.* XXVIII 142; other views are merely quoted in his admirable summary article on acrophonic numerals, *Brit. Sch. Ann.* XXXVII 238.

quoted by Demetrios of Phaleron from Solon's Code.<sup>28</sup> Whatever difficulties there may be in accepting these figures from Demetrios, there can be no doubt that a century after Solon eight drachmai or even eight oboloi was still a large fine for trespass. The lesser offenses of that sort specified in *IG*, I<sup>2</sup> 3/4 (the famous Hekatomedon inscription) of 485/4 B.C. are to be punished by fines of three oboloi. This comparative evidence should be kept in mind, even if no positive decision is possible in regard to the eight numerals in *Cor.* VIII 1 no. 22.

221. Published in the "Miscellaneous" section of *Cor.* VIII 1, this fragment of "white island" marble is dated, I think correctly, by its fine large letters in the latter part of the fifth century B.C. Very little remains of the text—unfortunately, since it is the only text which we possess to tell us what the Corinthians were inscribing on stone in that age. The text is given in *Cor.* VIII 1 as follows:

— — — δα — —  
— — — σ vacat  
— — — ετο — —  
— — — .\οσ — —  
5 — — — ροσ — —  
— — — Αη — —

Line 2 gives a clue to the interpretation; lines 4 and 5 also seem from the photograph (I have no squeeze) to have contained a blank space at the end. The irregular lengths of the lines, the preserved or restorable endings in sigma, and in fact all the preserved letters, show that the whole is a list of names. The text should read thus:

	[— — — —]δα[σ? ῳῳ]	Stoichedon
	[— — — —]σ ῳ[ῳῳ]	
	[— — — —]ετο[σ? ῳ]	
	[— — — —]ᾰοσ ῳ[ῳ]	
5	[— — — —]ροσ ῳ	
	[— — — —]Αη[σ ῳ]	

Line 1 or line 3 (or possibly both) might be headings in the plural. Patronymics, omitted here, were being used a century or so later (cf. no. 11). Conjecture as to the purpose of the list is almost useless, but there is a certain probability that an oligarchic government such as that of Corinth would be more likely to set up lists of men fallen in battle than any other kind of list (cf. no. 11, *supra*). In any case

<sup>28</sup> Plutarch *Solon* 23. 3 = *F. Gr. Hist.* 228 F 22. Additional comparative data on early prices are now supplied by D. A. Amyx, *Univ. Calif. Pubs. Class. Archaeol.* I (1941), 190, 192, *et passim*.

it is no surprise that the inscription did not turn out to be a decree, since, as we shall see, all the preserved decrees are much later.

235. As in the series of fine statue bases, nos. 23, 29 ff., the material is blue limestone, and one fragment was found near the Lechaion Road (the provenience of the other is unknown). The letters are larger than most of those in nos. 29 *et al.*, but there can hardly be a doubt that no. 235 is from a statue base and belongs with the rest of the blue limestone series.<sup>29</sup>

36. *Cor. VIII 1* gives 'Αγημο ----- without comment. A good squeeze, though it does not absolutely exclude omicron, shows a large trace which seems almost certainly to be part of omega. Read ΑΓΗΜΙ (= 'Αγήμω[ν]).<sup>30</sup> This name is particularly interesting to find in large letters on a building block in Corinth. Differing from some of their neighbors, the Corinthians sang a paian which declared 'Αγήμων to be the father of Alkyone; Diodorus (VII, frg. 7) lists him among the early kings of Corinth.<sup>31</sup> No inference can be drawn, I suppose, about the nature of the building. The date of the letters seems to be ante-146 B.C., perhaps late fourth century: but there are only five letters to judge by, and a final decision must wait until architectural data on the block are available; the mu with parallel sides might bespeak a Roman date.

225. With the aid of a squeeze read -ΓΟΣ. Ο Ε (Γ Ε - Ο Γ Ι Ο. This is probably the work of someone learning to carve letters: hence the repetition, the two meaningless horizontal strokes, and the (unsuccessful) effort to master curved shapes. Nearly every stroke shows an untrained hand.—There is another (unpublished) inscription cut in large characters on a poros block which is built into a wall of Peirene, under a door of a room on the west side; examination shows that this text also is 'nonsense.'

<sup>29</sup> To the bibliography on the two bases in this series signed by Lysippos, nos. 34 and 35, add Franklin P. Johnson, *Lysippos*, Durham, N. C., 1927, pp. 64-65, 70, 92.

<sup>30</sup> For the name cf. F. Bechtel, *Hist. gr. Pers.* 513, s.v.: 'Αγήμων ζυ ἄγημα wie Νοήμων ζυ νόημα, but agreement is not universal. More commonly the name is printed 'Αγήμων, and Liddell-Scott-Jones, *Lexicon*,<sup>8</sup> has: ἄγημα (from ἄγω, or perhaps Dor. for ἥγημα). In *Cor. VIII 1*, no. 14, face a, line 33, Klaffenbach (*Gnomon*, IX [1933], 416-417) proposed to restore ['Αγέ]μω[ν] 'Αγεστράτ[ον] Κ[----]. The reading is difficult: if it is correct, the ethnic might well be Κ[οπινθίος]. The patronymic, to which the son's name would normally be related, makes it likely that the son's name was understood in the family as 'Αγέμων and not 'Αγέμων.

<sup>31</sup> Athenaeus XV 52 (p. 696 f.). Roscher and PWK, s.v. "Alkyone" omit consideration of this version. On him as an early Corinthian king, see PWK, *Supplbd.* 4, cols. 1007 f.

21.<sup>32</sup> Line 16: NIK[-----]. The unusual horizontal grooves, whatever their meaning, set off this line; the upper groove is not intended to underline the letters above (line 15). The lower groove is not interrupted as in the drawing. Line 18: in the weathering, read φ (first letter). Line 24: a false stroke, and scratches, followed by Λ. —As Woodward and Peek pointed out, the date cannot be fourth century. Two hands, I think, cut the preserved text. Lines 1-13 seem to me earlier as well as different; the lettering of lines 14-26 probably dates from shortly before 146 B.C.

#### IV. THE DECREES

2. Preserving some symmetry, indent line 1 and read as follows:

[*vvv ἐπὶ Θ]ερσίλα v v Φοινικαίου vvvvvv*

An epsilon before the rho is clear from an indubitable trace of the lowest stroke: it confirms B. H. Hill's restoration of the name. Thus Hiller is shown to have been right in his conjecture (*IG*, V 2, Index, s.v. Θερσίλος) that the name from which the Θερσίλ<ε>ιον at Megalopolis is derived may have been spelled Θερσίλας and not as in Bechtel, *Hist. Gr. Personnamen*, p. 207, Θερσίλος. Line 3. To make the restored letters fill the space, restore [*έμ παντί*].

A date in the century *ca.* 250-146 B.C. is indicated by the lettering, by the use of blank spaces (one before ἔδοξε in line 6 should be added), and by [*ἐπὶ εὐνο]ίαι* (only the first iota need be dotted) in line 8 instead of *εὐνοίας ἔνεκα* (see K. K. Smith). The fact that the man honored is a citizen of Aigion, the capital of the Achaean League, presumably means that Corinth was not hostile at this time to the League. Corinth joined the League when Aratos freed the city from Antigonos in 243, deserted to Kleomenes in 225, was handed over to Antigonos Doson in 224, was reunited with the League in 196, and remained a member until the disaster in 146.<sup>33</sup> Thus for dating the present decree only the few months in 225 and 224 are positively excluded.

The title of the sole magistrate whose name is given to date the decree is not given. Restoring no. 8 to begin [*ἐπὶ γρ]αμμα[τέος -----*],

<sup>32</sup> The condition of the stone gives no help, but should be recorded. The original left side seems to be preserved, but is rough. The right side shows marks of the chisel, not the saw: hence the rest of the block was doubtless broken away by chiselling. The original thickness was probably not much greater. Smoothed areas at top, bottom, and back of right side are presumably postclassical.

<sup>33</sup> On the coinage of Corinth as a member of the League, see K. M. Edwards, *Corinth*, VI, pp. 3-4; *Hesperia* VI (1937), 244.

K. K. Smith (*Am. Journ. Archaeol.* XXIII 338) conjectured that the magistrate in no. 2 might be a secretary, but secretaries were not often named alone without a title, as if eponymous; and besides, no. 8 can be explained otherwise (*infra*). In Corcyra a *πρύτανις* was eponymous (O. Kern, *Inschr. v. Magnesia*, no. 44 *et al.*). The office may well have been copied from Corinth, since Diodorus (VII 9) says the Bakchiads elected an annual prytanis. In Corinth the office may have survived the tyranny or may have been revived after it (G. Busolt, *Hermes*, XXVIII [1893] 312-320).

3. Line 5. The name actually reads ΧΑΙΡΕΣΙΛΑΟΝ. Clearly no bar was ever inscribed in the first  $\Lambda$  to make it alpha, but no other alpha in the inscription is certainly without its bar; whether then the third  $\Lambda$  should be taken as alpha or lambda cannot be determined. K. K. Smith has *Χαιρεσίλαον* with references: Hiller (*Phil. Woch.* LII 362) writes "Χαιρέσιλλον nicht -λαον, also zu Bechtel HP 464 Χαιρεσί- zuzufügen, als Kurzname."

Smith dated the lettering, I think correctly, in the first half of the second century B.C.; but a date in the latter half of the third century is not excluded.

4. Line 2: the name has been read as Π[ε]ισον[λον] but the epsilon is perfectly clear and after it (see Smith's photograph) a rho is all but certain. Περσον[---] is a name hitherto unknown to Greek. Line 8: the name of the first dikast is Πανα[---]; the trace of the second alpha is indubitable.

Again the date depends on the lettering. Smith comments on the lettering that it is aligned according to the tops of the letters, which he says "look more like a bookhand." Consciously or not, this observation comes close to the mark, since undoubtedly the ultimate model for these thin strokes aligned at the tops is pen-and-ink writing on papyrus. A papyrus of similar style is now dated to about the middle of the third century by its editor, again on the basis of the script.<sup>34</sup>

Woodward (*Journ. Hell. Stud.* LII 143) and Peek (*Gnomon* IX 415) offer improved restorations with shorter lines. Smith's line of 87 letters presupposes a stele of excessive width, although the correct thickness is 0.095 m.

Apparently honoring Corinthian arbitrators, and employing the spelling δῆμος, the decree is not Corinthian.

5. A new line preceding line 'I': E[.] $\Lambda$  or E[.]A. The lettering is distinctive and careless: the middle horizontal strokes of alpha and of epsilon are regularly omitted; theta, omicron, and omega are often mere small half circles, i.e. the top half only is inscribed, with a dot

<sup>34</sup> W. Schubart, *Papyri Graecae Berolinenses (Tabulae in Usum Scholarum*, II), pl. 4, b, and p. IX.

underneath for theta and omicron—this dot being sometimes at one side, and in such instances it is always at the right side—; and rho is reduced to  $\bar{\rho}$ . Precisely these peculiarities, including the omicron with the dot at the right, and the rho, are seen in certain Athenian inscriptions of 169/8 (S. Dow, *Prytaneis [Hesperia, Suppl. I]*, no. 71) and later dates, down to 155/4 (*op. cit.*, no. 84). The other letters too are precisely similar. There can be no doubt that the same mason who was at work in Athens in the years 169/8–155/4 inscribed the present no. 5, which therefore dates from 154–146 or perhaps more likely from before 169. The “*kourí* intrusions” in the text (ἐαυτήν, ἀναθέμεν, Πειρήναι) noted by Smith may be due to this mason.

6. From the photograph read in line 1,  $\exists\sigma\alpha\tauο\bar{\tau}\bar{\nu}$ , and in line 4,  $\sigma\tau\bar{\nu}$  or  $\epsilon\tau\bar{\nu} \pi\rho\bar{\sigma} \mu$ . As Woodward (*Journ. Hell. Stud.*, LII [1932], 143) points out, this is another dikastic decree, like no. 4, hence probably not a decree of Corinth.

7. Letters as tall as 0.05 m. make Smith's assumption that this is a decree highly improbable (Woodward). The curved form of the monument is another good reason for excluding this inscription from the group of decrees. Too little remains to establish its true nature.

8. A hitherto unnoticed trace of the central akroterion is preserved, so placed that when the scheme of the pediment is restored, it appears that the lines of the inscription contained about 27–32 letters, with 28 as most probable. Parts of  $\Delta\bar{T}$  survive in a new line 3, inscribed in such a position as to show that, contrary to what lines 1–2 might suggest, the arrangement was not stoichedon. The broken-barred alphas and the mus with nearly parallel sides favor a date in the second century B.C. or a little earlier; but the few remaining letters appear to be earlier in form than those of the other decrees, and traces of red paint in the letters and the moulding (which is earlier than that of no. 2) likewise suggest an earlier date. The period soon after 243 B.C. is most likely, as will appear. Traces of incised guiding lines can be detected.

Smith seems not to have determined the position of the right edge accurately; also, he restored  $4\frac{1}{2}$  letters in line 1 and  $5\frac{1}{2}$  in line 2, although line 2 should have half a letter less than line 1. Actually the lines of the pediment, when prolonged, show that in line 1 as many as  $9\frac{1}{2}$  letters are missing. As in no. 2, line 1 *may* have been indented, but certainly line 2 must be restored with more than  $5\frac{1}{2}$  letters. The name of the month should be included, and the following scheme is preferable.

[ $\epsilon\pi\bar{\iota} - \frac{ca. 5}{ca. 3\frac{1}{2}} - \gamma\bar{\rho}$ ]  $\alpha\mu\mu\alpha$  [ $\tau\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\omega}$   $\mu\eta\bar{\nu}\bar{\delta}$   $- \frac{ca. 5\frac{1}{2}}{ca. 15\frac{1}{2}} - - -$ ]  
 [ $\frac{ca. 3\frac{1}{2}}{ca. 15\frac{1}{2}}$   $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\bar{\delta}\bar{\eta}$ ]  $\Theta\bar{\iota}\bar{\delta}\bar{\omega}$  [ $\tau\bar{\omega}$   $- - - - -$ ]  
 [- - - - -]  $\Delta\bar{T}$  [- - - - - - - - -]

An alternative is suggested by two decrees passed by the city of Epidaurus, *IG*, IV 1<sup>2</sup>. 60 (of 191 B.C.) and 61 (lacks date by year), which are dated first of all by naming the secretary of the Achaean League, to which no. 60 adds the name and title of the general of the League in that year. The scheme thus suggested preserves the spacing at the cost of an allowable but unlikely splitting of a syllable:

[ἐπὶ — <sup>ca. 5</sup> — γραμμα[τέος τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖσ στ]  
[ρατηγοῦ δὲ] Θιοδό[του, κτλ.]

There are other possibilities. Clearly no argument about the government of Corinth can be based on this fragment.

9. In any case, Roman in date; the height of the letters, *ca.* 0.03 m., opposes Smith's conjecture that this is a decree. An incised line above line 1 indicates that another (line or) lines are missing above.

Thus there survive only six identifiable decrees of Greek Corinth: nos. 2, 3, 5, 8; an unpublished decree discovered in Corinth in 1933; and O. Kern, *Magnesia*, no. 42. Four of them honor individuals, and the last-named accepts an invitation to a festival: the preserved phrases are vague, as often in such Greek decrees, and no keen feeling can be discerned in any of them: which does not mean that feeling was not there. Magnesia 42 is dated post-206 B.C. (Kern, *op. cit.*, 13). The lettering of the four decrees published in *Cor.* VIII 1 (viz. nos. 2, 3, 5, 8) indicates that all four date from the last century of the Greek city. No. 5 is almost certainly after 200 B.C.; no. 8 may well be a little earlier than 200 B.C. Macedonian domination (chiefly by Antigonus Gonatas, down to 243 B.C.) would not positively exclude meetings of an *ekklesia* to pass innocuous decrees, except perhaps no. 2; but legislative activity is far more likely in the ensuing periods of freedom. In short, we have two new and interesting data on Corinth: its surviving decrees number only six and all of them are late.

The principal fact which the decrees add to our knowledge of Corinth is that it had an *ekklesia*. The date when the *ekklesia* was established can only be conjectured, but undoubtedly its position was stronger after 243 than before. It may well be an ancient institution; some of the colonies have an assembly called the *ἀλια* (H. Collitz, *Gr. Dialektinschriften*, nos. 3199 ff.). Thucy-

dides (V 30. 5) speaks, I suppose not technically, of a regular *ἐύλλογος* at Corinth. The ekklesia may have become stronger in the fourth century, but an aristocracy seems really to have governed.<sup>35</sup> The period when the ekklesia was strongest would naturally be after 243, when the combined effect of freedom from Macedon and the desire to harmonize with the democratic Achaean cities would naturally promote a large assembly.<sup>36</sup> Presumably it was this body which voted to join Kleomenes in 225 B.C. in hope of social betterment, a hope still unsatisfied and lively in 150 B.C., and presumably it was the activity of this same assembly in the years *ca.* 243–146 which accounts for all our decrees.<sup>37</sup>

## V. THE PAUCITY OF INSCRIPTIONS FROM ANTE-146 B.C.

Some further light on Corinthian institutions is perhaps to be had from considering the relation of the number of extant decrees and other Greek inscriptions to the probable original number of inscriptions of all kinds set up at Corinth down to 146 B.C. The problem of why extant decrees are few is part of the problem of why extant Corinthian inscriptions of all kinds are few. Hitherto no real discussion of either problem has appeared.

<sup>35</sup> Lenschau in PWK, Supplbd. IV, col. 1029. In a good discussion of no. 2 (*AJA* XXIII 336–340), Smith quotes a sentence from Plutarch, *Timoleon* 2, which only proves that the Corinthians were strong in their expressions of dislike for tyrants: this does not mean (nor did Smith intend to imply) they had universal adult male citizen suffrage.

<sup>36</sup> *IG* IV 926 = Ditt., *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 471 records a settlement by Megarian judges of the boundaries between Corinth and Epidauros. All three cities were members of the League, and the inscription is dated 242/1–235/4. Evidently it seemed wise to all concerned that friction between two neighboring members should be obviated through the good offices of a third as soon as was feasible after Corinth joined the League.

<sup>37</sup> As to whether or not outright democracy existed after 243 B.C., it may be significant that the decrees read not *ἔδοξε τῷ δάμῳ* but *τῷ ἐκκλησίᾳ*.

Titles of officials give no help: cf. *supra*, and on *ἐκδοτήρ* (no. 2) cf. Smith *Am. Journ. Archaeol.* XXIII (1919) 335. The title *ταμίας* is restored at the end of no. 5 on the basis of persuasive parallels cited by Smith. The fact that it was unnecessary to qualify the simple title *ὁ ταμίας* as if only one treasurer might come in question, suggests that even in the Hellenistic period the executive officers were few.

It will be convenient first to set forth the facts about sculpture in stone which in some sense are part of the same picture. Up-to-date figures cannot be compiled, but a fair impression can perhaps be had from Franklin P. Johnson, *Corinth, IX, Sculpture: 1896-1923*, wherein are published 332 pieces, of which 13 may be disregarded here, since they are dated to the fourth century after Christ and later.<sup>38</sup> Among the remaining 319 pieces, Johnson states explicitly of only 15 that they are certainly or probably *ante-146 B.C.*<sup>39</sup> At most some 14 others, of which several are quite uncertain, can perhaps be added to this number.<sup>40</sup> Of this total of about 29, eleven are grave stelai, and ten are votive or sepulchral banquet reliefs. Thus there remain some eight statues in the round. All are fragments, pieces of heads, shoulders, hands, legs, and so on—about enough members to make up one complete statue. It might therefore be argued that a host of marble stelai could well have perished along with, and for the same causes as, a host of marble statues. Statues, however, have a value which stelai do not, and it is conceivable, even probable, that Mummius carried away a large proportion of the free-standing statues without including a single inscribed stele in his booty.<sup>41</sup> Such Greek statues and inscriptions as remained standing centuries later were certainly subject to attack by the Christians, but insofar as they smashed them up and did not burn them, scraps at least would remain. To prove this one can cite as examples the thousands of chips of statues, stelai, and even buildings found not only in the Athenian Agora, but also the scraps of smashed stone-work found at Corinth itself.<sup>42</sup> Among

<sup>38</sup> We may leave to one side also no. 1, which Johnson takes to be prehistoric, and no. 2, which appears to be Coptic (O. Broneer, *AJA* XL [1936], 204-209).

<sup>39</sup> Nos. 38, 83, 88, 93, 245, 246, 248, 249, 253-256, 267, 287, 288.

<sup>40</sup> Nos. 23 (+ 214), 51, 65, 257, 258, 260, 264, 266, 268-274. There are of course a score or two at least of undatable bits in Johnson's book, and many more in the collection at Corinth.

<sup>41</sup> The alleged catastrophic effects of the fire of 146 are an exaggeration, as I hope to show elsewhere.

<sup>42</sup> As at the temple of Asklepios and Hygieia, *AJA* XXXVII (1933), 435-436.

the scraps found at Corinth, many fragments of Greek statues are not datable as between ante-146 and post-46 B.C., but almost all inscriptions of ante-146 B.C. are usually identifiable and are conspicuously rare.<sup>43</sup>

The inscriptions in *Cor.* VIII 1 and VIII 2 may be dated approximately as follows<sup>44</sup>:

Greek period (ante-146 B.C.) . . . . .	67
Roman period (post-146 B.C.) . . . . .	494
In Greek . . . . .	103
In Latin . . . . .	389
Bilingual . . . . .	2
Byzantine period (post-ca. A.D. 400: all Greek) . . . . .	111
Scraps in Greek of either the Roman or Byzantine period	43

It is obvious from these figures that the burning of marble stelai for lime in the Byzantine period cannot be given as the sole explanation of the paucity of inscriptions of the Greek period, since otherwise the comparatively large numbers of Roman inscriptions would not have survived.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Except for the one series of inscribed dark blue limestone bases (*infra*), which show how many fragments of smashed inscriptions could survive in Corinth.

<sup>44</sup> This count omits eight inscriptions in *Cor.* VIII 1 which cannot be dated at all, and one (no. 267) which is modern. From *Cor.* VIII 2, 131-143, some 163 legible bits, of the sort published more fully in *Cor.* VIII 1, are included, but not the 21 illegible bits listed in *Cor.* VIII 2, 141. Allowance must be made here and *infra* for the fact that some fragments now separate should be united. On the other hand no account is taken here of inscriptions not in *Cor.* VIII 1 and 2, i.e. mainly of inscriptions discovered since 1927. It is reasonably sure that a complete count would alter the proportion still further in favor of the Roman period.

<sup>45</sup> O. Broneer writes me that the excavations have revealed numerous limekilns, some with broken marbles in heaps round about; but he recalls that the marbles are mostly of Roman date. This means that the kilns themselves are late, and their operators doubtless used Roman and Greek material indiscriminately—if there was any Greek to use. Apparently there was little or none, since if Greek material survived in equal quantity with Roman, then an equal amount would have been found by the excavators; and the debris round the kilns would have been partly Greek.

The facts therefore which more than forty years of excavation at Corinth have established point not to the destruction of a host of Greek inscriptions but rather to the conclusion that comparatively few Greek inscriptions were ever set up. It might be suggested however that in the Greek period inscriptions were more commonly inscribed on bronze and not on stone. Corinth was the seat of a famous bronze industry, and indeed not a few bases of bronze statues have survived.<sup>46</sup> Of course bronze stelai would have a cash value to the soldiery of Mummius; by 46 B.C. hardly a single bronze stele would be left. But the fact that bronze was well made at Corinth does not mean that it was cheap there, whereas we shall see that inscribable stone was available in quantity. In the second place, bronze stelai of any size would ordinarily be set in stone bases, bases that would be as likely to survive as bases of statues, yet so far as I know not one such base has been found.<sup>47</sup> Bases or cuttings for stone stelai in steps or in living rock likewise are extremely rare at Corinth, a fact which again indicates that no large number of inscriptions was set up in Greek times.

It might also be objected that Greek inscriptions, stelai and bases alike, are rare simply because Greek levels have not been sufficiently dug. Numerous Greek strata have however been excavated, and the fair number of tiny scraps of Greek inscriptions dating from before 146 B.C. is sufficient proof that the work has been careful. Moreover inscribed stelai make excellent building blocks, so that as in Athens many earlier inscriptions, if they ever existed, would survive in later levels: hence even if no Greek levels had been dug, the conclusion would still be warranted that inscriptions of the Greek period were never numerous. As it is, when due allowance has been made for all the factors thus far mentioned, the conclusion is inescapable that the Corinthians set up comparatively few inscriptions in the Greek period.

<sup>46</sup> I understand that some years ago one inscription on bronze, a list of names, was found at a nearby city not in Corinthia.

<sup>47</sup> One base of a bronze stele in Athens is known to me, and two decrees of Athenian garrisons are cut in a technique which indicates familiarity with inscribing on bronze.

A more exact notion of the problem may be obtained by inquiring what kinds of inscriptions dating from ante-146 B.C. have actually survived. Except for decrees, the count is limited to *Cor. VIII* 1, from which the descriptions of the stones are taken:<sup>48</sup> again it is assumed that these constitute a sample large enough so as not to be grossly misleading.

<i>Decrees of Corinth</i> (listed <i>supra</i> ) . . . . .	6
<i>Not of Corinth</i> (nos. 4 and 6) . . . . .	2
(Of the six decrees set up at Corinth, there are one each on gray, blue, and blue-gray marble, and one each on blue-gray, Acrocorinthian, and yellow Acrocorinthian limestone).	
<i>Fasti sacri</i> (no. 1, on poros) . . . . .	1
<i>Lists of men's names</i> (nos. 221 on island marble, 11 on blue marble, 21 on greenish white marble) . . . . .	3
<i>Boundary stone</i> (no. 22, on poros) . . . . .	1
<i>Dedications of statues, buildings, and other monuments</i> . . . . .	49
(An early group on poros: nos. 26-28 and 61; later base and building blocks of poros: nos. 32, 36, 66, 112; nos. 25 [of early date ?], 63, and 73 on blue marble, 59 on blue-white, 33 on marble, and on white marble nos. 29-31, 60, 78, 222, 223, 240, and 250; on sandstone no. 35; and on dark blue limestone a group of twenty-six fragments of statue bases, dating from the period of Lysippos and later, nos. 23, 34, 38-57, 67, 68, 72, 73, 235).	
<i>Grave monuments</i> (no. 127 on white marble and 128 on sandstone <sup>49</sup> ) . . . . .	2
<i>Miscellaneous</i> (weight, no. 255, on white marble; nonsense, no. 226, on poros; uncertain, no. 224 on poros) . . . . .	3

The readiest explanation of the paucity of Greek inscriptions has always been that the Corinthia has no marble. Marble would have had to be imported, probably from Attica or the islands.<sup>50</sup> As in other cities, the earliest Corinthian inscriptions

<sup>48</sup> As to the dates, the *fasti sacri*, the boundary stone, and about six dedications date from before 450. In the period 450-400 there is only the list of names no. 221 (*supra*, p. 107). There are about nine dedications from the third century, (date nos. 63 and 78 here; but no. 64 is Roman) and perhaps four from 200-146; the rest of the dedications, some 30 in number, seem to be of the fourth century (including nos. 38, 235, and probably 72 and 73).

<sup>49</sup> No. 126 is probably from the second half of the second century after Christ.

<sup>50</sup> As to sculpture unfortunately I am dependent on *Cor. IX*, which has nothing on the kinds of stone except for nos. 1 ("a white stone not marble"),

are on poros. The use of marble begins in the fifth century, with no. 25 on "blue" marble and no. 29 on "white." No. 221, a public inscription probably, and cut in "island" marble, shows that at least once in the latter part of the fifth century the Corinthians did not go to Attica for marble: probably hostility to Athens was the reason. There are in all only 22 inscriptions on marble, dating from *ca.* 500 to 146 B.C.; on poros, 12; on sand-stone, 2; on Acrocorinthian limestone, 3; and on dark-blue limestone, 28. As we have seen, fragments of about 31 marble statues from the Greek period have managed to survive. There can be no doubt that at nearly all times ample marble could have been obtained: if the [Romans] could face the theater and stadium at the Isthmus with white marble (Pausanias II 1. 7), then the city of Corinth earlier could afford to buy sufficient marble for stelai. Actually the Corinthians of ante-146 B.C. made extensive use of Acrocorinthian limestone, for a few decrees but more for other purposes, as did the Romans later; many ancient limestone quarries have been found near Corinth (*Cor.* I, 106). The Romans did, the Greeks could have, set up many inscriptions. It should be noted especially that the Greek decrees are cut on poor material and are conspicuously brief and small: a curious contrast to the size and power of the city. It is clear also that the Corinthians knew the use of marble grave stelai and of dedicatory plaques and the like in marble, since we have some 12 marble grave monuments of ante-146, and almost as many votives. Others doubtless exist at some distance from the Agora in areas not yet excavated.<sup>51</sup> It is precisely in the excavated areas that public inscriptions—decrees, *fasti sacri*, lists, boundary stones, and the like—ought to have been found. It seems curious that there are few such inscriptions: one would have expected a larger number, or none at all.

25, 26, 29, 31 (all four "Parian" on Richardson's authority; all four are Roman; cf. Pausanias II 2. 9, a statue of Tyche in Parian marble), 99 ("island" marble, date uncertain), and 253 ("reddish stone"); and a few references to Pentelic marble.

<sup>51</sup> At Olynthus only one inscribed grave monument was discovered, and the excavators have proved that many graves never had stone markers (D. M. Robinson, assisted by F. P. Albright, *Olynthus*, XI, pp. 133-134).

On the whole, nevertheless, taking the facts as they have come to us, and even making a fair allowance for future publications and discoveries, we must conclude that till late in their history as a free city, the Corinthians were not much given to setting up public inscriptions. Public documents simply did not interest them. The reason for this is doubtless the temper of the city—that city which produced in the years 480–146 only one great man, Timoleon, and he won his fame abroad—that city of which Herodotus remarks tellingly (II 167), *ηκιστα Κορινθιοι όνονται τούς χειροτέχνας*. The suspicion arises that the percentage of illiteracy was high. One effect, which was also in turn a cause, may well have been the nature of their government. In Hellenistic Athens, periods of democracy such as the years 307/6–302/1 (in contrast with the preceding decade under Kassandros, Demetrios of Phaleron, and a citizenry reduced by a property qualification) were periods of intense legislative activity and of copious publication on marble. Demos likes to read what Demos has done, whereas your tyrant or oligarch only invites unwanted publicity, or even defacement of his inscription, when he publishes an edict. The indications are that Corinth was mercantile and for long oligarchic, and that when it became less oligarchic, and when the *ekklesia* perhaps grew stronger, some decrees were passed and a few were inscribed and set up. It is tempting to believe, indeed, that the surviving decrees of Corinth, since all or most of them date from a time when the popular will was making itself felt, when social revolution was in the Greek air and 146 was not far away, are straws which show how the wind was blowing. Admittedly they are mere straws; but there was a real wind.



# THE SCOPE OF EARLY RHETORICAL INSTRUCTION

By STANLEY WILCOX

MODERN scholars seem almost without exception to have insisted that early rhetorical instruction was confined to forensic oratory. Here and there appear hints<sup>1</sup> that the sophists and rhetoricians considered other kinds of speech, but no systematic attempt has been made to question the prevailing view. In the most recent investigation of the subject, D. A. G. Hinks ("Tria Genera Causarum," *C. Q.* XXX (1936), pp. 170-176) begins by saying, "The early handbooks of rhetoric compiled by Tisias and Corax and their successors seem to have been directed entirely at successful speaking in courts of law. This was the art that Strepsiades set out to learn in the Philosopher's Thinking-shop; this, Isocrates complains, was the only object of technical writers on rhetoric before his time,"<sup>2</sup> and Aristotle, when he wrote the chapter that stands first in his *Rhetic*, made just the same complaint: . . . περὶ μὲν ἐκείνης (deliberative oratory) οὐδὲν λέγουσι, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρῶνται τεχνολογεῖν. The art as the Sophists practised it was by no means so limited in its

<sup>1</sup> For instance W. Kroll, Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *R.E.* s.v. "Rhetorik" (separately printed), col. 7. 46-51, remarks, "Wir befinden uns in einer Zeit, wo auf die Geltung des einzelnen im Staate alles ankam, und der sophistische Unterricht war für künftige Politiker bestimmt; das hatte die Folge, dass über die Gerichtsrede hinausgegriffen und Anweisungen auch für die politische Rede gegeben werden mussten." But col. 3. 11-15, he says, "Wenn am anfang der Geschichte der Rhetorik für die Alten wie für uns nur die Gerichtsrede berücksichtigendes Handbuch (Corax') steht, so ist das von symptomatische Bedeutung." The influence of rhetoric on early unjuridical passages is suggested by J. H. Finley, "Euripides and Thucydides," *H.S.C.P.* XLIX (1938), pp. 28 and 66; "The Origins of Thucydides' Style," *H.S.C.P.* L (1939), pp. 36, 51, and 82; and by C. T. Murphy, "Aristophanes and the Art of Rhetoric," *H.S.C.P.* XLIX (1938), pp. 70 and 84, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Isocrates, XIII, 19-20: λοιποὶ δὲ ήμὲν εἰσὶν οἱ πρὸ ήμῶν γενόμενοι καὶ τὰς καλούμενας τέχνας γράψαι τολμήσαντες, οὐδὲ οὐκ ἀφετέον ἀνεπιτιμήτους οἴτινες ὑπέσχοντο δικάζεσθαι διδάξειν, ἐκλεξάμενοι τὸ δυσχερέστατον τῶν ὄνομάτων δ τῶν φθονούντων ἔργον ἦν λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν προεστώτων τῆς τοιαύτης παιδεύσεως.

application. . . . But the systems of rhetoric that they devised and taught did not cover their own practice . . . Plato shortly describes the position thus: *μάλιστα μὲν πῶς περὶ τὰς δικὰς λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται τέχνη, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίας ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα* (*Phaedrus*, 261b)."<sup>3</sup> That instruction before Isocrates considered only the law-courts was maintained by Leonard Spengel in his epoch-making *Synagoge Technon* (Stuttgart, 1828), pp. 13-14 and 23, and already in his time those three passages from Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle were considered the decisive evidence. Blass,<sup>4</sup> Gercke,<sup>5</sup> Drerup,<sup>6</sup> Hamberger,<sup>7</sup> Barwick,<sup>8</sup> Stegemann,<sup>9</sup> and Fries,<sup>10</sup> all agree that the early technographers concentrated on judicial oratory under the influence of Corax and Tisias.

Because of the recent tendency to emphasize the oratorical instruction given by the sophists<sup>11</sup> and to recognize that rhetoric was well-developed in Athens before Gorgias arrived in 427,<sup>12</sup> it seems time to reconsider the evidence and to investigate what

<sup>3</sup> D. A. G. Hinks, "Tisias and Corax and the Invention of Rhetoric," *C.Q.* XXXIV (1940), p. 63. says that no matter what allowance must be made for Plato's polemic this sentence indicates a real failing in the rhetoricians.

<sup>4</sup> F. Blass, I<sup>2</sup>, 17 and 92.

<sup>5</sup> A. Gercke, "Die alte *Techne Rhetorice* und ihre Gegner," *Hermes*, XXXII (1897), pp. 350-351 and 354.

<sup>6</sup> E. Drerup, "Die Anfänge der rhetorischen Kunstprosa," *Jahrb. für class. Phil.* suppl. XXVII (1901-1902), p. 254.

<sup>7</sup> P. Hamberger, *Die rednerische Disposition in der alten Techne Rhetorice*. Paderborn, 1914, pp. 3 and 13-14.

<sup>8</sup> K. Barwick, "Die Gliederung der rhetorischen *Techne*," *Hermes*, LVII (1922), p. 34, says that *technae* were purely dicanic until the *Theodecteia*, although (n. 1) he is not sure about verbal instruction.

<sup>9</sup> W. Stegemann, *R.E. s.v. "Teisias,"* V A<sup>1</sup> (1934), 143. 16-144. 14.

<sup>10</sup> C. Fries, "L'Origine de la Rhétorique Antique," *Rév. de Phil.* XIV (1940), pp. 46-47. G. Kowalski, *De arte rhetorica*, Lwow, 1937, p. 18, and *De artis rhetoricae originibus quaestiones selectae*, Lwow, 1933, p. 44, even argues that Protagoras' antilogies were for juridical training.

<sup>11</sup> H. Gomperz, *Sophistik und Rhetorik*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 41 and *passim*. This point is accepted by W. Kroll, *R.E. s.v. "Rhetorik,"* 5. 8-14, and W. Aly, "Formprobleme der Frühen Griechischen Prosa," *Philologus*, suppl. XXI (1929), p. 76.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Philodemus, *Rhetorica*, I, 188; Aly, 93 and 175; Murphy and Finley as referred to in note 1; O. Navarre, *La Rhétorique grèque avant Aristote*, Paris, 1900, pp. 20-23.

part deliberative oratory played in fifth-century education. The evidence falls into two groups, the material used by modern scholars to form probable inferences and the specific testimonies of the ancient authors themselves. I shall first discuss the inferences of Hamberger and others who believe that there was no instruction in deliberative speech. I shall take into account the social status and ambitions of the students as well as the background and announced programs of their teachers. This will be based chiefly upon a complete study of Aristophanes and Plato, who are the best sources for gathering a conception of education in the fifth century. Secondly I shall examine some indications of deliberative theory in early sources and the specific statements of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle themselves about the scope of early instruction. Instruction in the next century and the nature and contents of early *technae* will be reserved for detailed discussions in the future. At present our subject is the aim of the fifth-century technicians: did they train their pupils for the assembly or the courts of law?

### I. THE PROBABILITIES ABOUT DELIBERATIVE INSTRUCTION

Certain general arguments are often employed to bolster Aristotle's contention that deliberative speech was neglected, and these are well set forth by Hamberger.<sup>13</sup> While accepting Aristotle's thesis he rejects the invidious explanations therewith offered for the concentration on dicanic rhetoric (*Rhetoric*, 1354b23). Evading the issue, he remarks, is not peculiar to litigants, since slander and appeals to the emotions are as natural in the assembly as in the law-court. It may be easier to cheat in court because the judges have nothing of their own at stake, as Aristotle suggests, yet there is certainly more glory and profit to be won in the assembly. Those reasons do not explain why technographers should concentrate on forensic oratory. So instead of those explanations Hamberger prefers Aristotle's suggestion (*Rhetoric*, 1418a22) that dicanic is less difficult than deliberative oratory since it is easier to discover the past than

<sup>13</sup> Hamberger, *Die rednerische Disposition . . .*, 14; repeated by Stegemann, *R.E. s.v. "Teisias,"* 143, 16 sq. and Hinks, *C. Q.* XXX (1936), p. 170.

to predict the future. Therefore, Hamberger infers, it is easier to formulate general rules for conjectures about what has been done than about what is going to happen, and technical studies were accordingly confined to reasoning about the past. But this inference does not seem convincing to me. Although more certainty can be attained about the past, more value is placed upon foreknowledge of the future. Furthermore, lies and biased predictions about the future are much safer at the time and less easy to refute than distortions of facts in the past. Utility and safety are as important factors as ease of formulation.

That rhetoricians would be unable to formulate rules for prediction seems hard to believe since the method of probabilities, which is the basis of rhetorical argument, applies as readily to the future as to the past and must underlie every statesman's prognosis of coming events.<sup>14</sup> Take the famous instance from Corax' *techne* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, 1402a17, the debate between a strong and a weak man as to which one started the quarrel.<sup>15</sup> The weak man argues that he was not likely to attack a stronger man; the strong man points out that he would have refrained from attacking precisely because he knew that suspicion would fix on himself. As Aristotle explains it, there are two kinds of probabilities herein involved: (1) the general probability that men of a certain class act uniformly, an unconscious and mechanical probability that if A then B; and (2) the limited probability or enlightened exception to the rule that results when the general probability is recognized and deliberately avoided, a conscious and psycho-

<sup>14</sup> Thucydides, I, 138. 3, calls Themistocles the best *εικαστής* of the future. Protagoras in Plato, *Theaet.* 179a, and the philosophers in Isocrates, XIII, 7, claimed to possess the art of prediction. A good example of probable arguments used in a deliberative speech is the plea of the Corinthians for the Peloponnesian Confederacy to attack the Athenians in Thucydides, I, 120-124; cf. especially 121, where the word *εἰκός* occurs twice, once in the phrase *κατὰ τὸ εἰκός*. This speech, along with Eur. *Ion.* 585-620, is cited by Finley, *H.S.C.P.* XLIX (1938), p. 38; he remarks that these passages show "how closely allied is this future use of *εἰκός* with the *πρόγνωσις* which Thucydides thought the chief quality of statesmen (I, 138, 3; II, 65, 5 and 13)."

<sup>15</sup> This debate has recently been explained by Hinks, who considers the arguments confined to juridical practice. *C. Q.* XXXIV (1940), pp. 63-64.

logical probability. The enlightened probability is more subtle but less common.<sup>16</sup> Now those two probabilities, it seems clear, are not confined to the past or to litigation.<sup>17</sup> Let us use this form of reasoning in future time and with a political content.<sup>18</sup> The Corinthian ambassadors to Athens before the Peloponnesian War might have said, "Our attempt to subjugate Corcyra does not threaten Athens because our fleet is weaker than yours" (general probability). On the other hand, when charged with intending to arouse the Peloponnesian Confederacy against Athens, the ambassadors might argue, "We have been your enemies and if war broke out you would immediately suspect us and concentrate on our destruction." That is the strong man's argument: he is open to suspicion and therefore unlikely to risk the punishment.<sup>19</sup> It is noteworthy that Agathon's couplet quoted

<sup>16</sup> The enlightened probability is clearly expressed in Isocrates, XXI, 17: all men when planning crimes consider their defense. That such subtle arguments have a real value is shown by the bulletin of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, vol. IV, no. 7, New York, 1941. The bulletin is devoted to what is called provocative propaganda. In this type men discredit their opponents by themselves committing crimes for which their opponents are the logical suspects. This is the limited probability from the point of view of Corax' weak man: he starts the fight in order to make people suspect the strong man of beginning the trouble and to make the strong man appear a bully.

<sup>17</sup> Isocrates' rivals in teaching deliberative oratory are said to use opinion rather than truth, XIII, 8-9.

<sup>18</sup> For this distinction and its importance in early theory, cf. F. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *A. J. P.* LXII (1941), pp. 40-41, and my Yale dissertation, *The Destructive Hypothetical Syllogism in Greek Logic and in Attic Oratory* (privately printed, 1938), pp. 129-134, especially p. 131, n. 2, on Aristotle's topics of enthymemes, which I think are survivals from earlier rhetorical theory and neither purely formal nor material but both elements intermingled and confused. Therefore I differ from Hinks' view (*C. Q.* 1940, p. 66) that form is to matter as logic is to topics and that Tisias began the study of topics as opposed to logic. Cf. note 63.

<sup>19</sup> A real example of probabilities in deliberative persuasion, but for a private audience, is Lysias' *Eroticus*, which urges a young man to accept as a lover some one who does not love him. The speaker also uses the limited probability (*Phaedrus*, 232a-b) when he argues that the youth may consort with the non-lover and fear no suspicion, for no one would suspect improper relations with a non-lover. In Euripides' *Electra*, 524-526, Electra argues that

in this connection by Aristotle (1402a10) talks about the future as well as the present and the past, that the unexpected does happen and therefore can be expected. Thus to judge from the quotation Aristotle himself does not confine the method of probabilities to the past, and indeed there is no reason to do so. The uncertainty of the future does not explain the supposed disregard of deliberative oratory, since rules for prediction can be formulated. In his letter to Alexander (V,4) Isocrates says that by means of rhetoric Alexander will be able to form conjectures about the future.

The only satisfactory explanation for a lack of deliberative theory would be a lack of demand for such knowledge and a lack of practical opportunity for developing the theory. Accordingly, Hamberger asserted that there were many more opportunities in fifth-century Athens and Syracuse for speaking in courts of law than in assemblies of the people. This assumption has been accepted because scholars have been misled by the predominance of dicanic theory in later rhetoric, especially in the much-imitated *staseis* of Hermagoras.<sup>20</sup> This later emphasis should not, I think, be used to prove an early disregard for deliberative oratory or the alleged ease of dicanic theorizing, a point which seems open to question. Judicial problems predominated in later theory because of a radical change in practice, and consequently in demand. In post-Aristotelian Greece and Rome the cities lost their autonomy and the local assemblies their importance, whereas forensic oratory remained essential,

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her brother would not come secretly because he is brave. This is a general probability, but she was wrong. Brave Orestes' reason for coming secretly would be based on the limited probability. He hoped to escape suspicion since his enemies, trusting in the general probability, would expect him to come openly.

<sup>20</sup> But even in later times Philodemus argued that only epideictic oratory could be reduced to a *techne*; cf. his *Rhet. Suppl.* p. 38, and H. M. Hubbell, "The *Rhetorica* of Philodemus," *Trans. Conn. Acad.* XXIII (1920), p. 251. Ioannis Doxopater (H. Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, pp. 149-151) proves at length that deliberative oratory is the most important kind. Hinks, *C. Q.* XXX (1936), p. 176, sketches and discusses the later predominance of dicanic rhetoric.

and at Rome especially the road to political success lay through successful pleading in the courts of law. In the fifth century, however, an accomplished speaker might well have had more opportunities to speak in the assembly than in the courts; at least there was ample opportunity to develop a technique. The treatise of the "Old Oligarch" (III, 1-5) vividly pictures the incessant activity and limitless business of the Council and Assembly at Athens. Praxagora in Aristophanes (*Eccl.* 243-244) demonstrates that she quickly learned to ape *demegeoria* while forced to live in the Pnyx (403 B.C.). And Plato's *Apology*, 36b, offers another indication that men spoke more often in state affairs than in personal litigation. There Socrates contrasts his quiet life with the interests of most other men: money-making, household management, generalships, public speaking, other offices, conspiracy, and revolution. Certainly the sophists and their pupils, as we shall see, believed that the ideal of education was political oratory.

Before consideration of the sophists' announced aims in education, however, it seems appropriate to notice the actual state of political life in Athens and the development of a special class of politicians known as the *rhetors*. The rise of this class has been sketched by W. Pilz, *Der Rhetor im attischen Staat*, Weida, 1934. His main thesis seems correct that the term "rhetor" applies primarily to a political speaker, came into general use at Athens in the fifth century, and fell into bad repute during the fourth century. The word first appears in a decree of 446/5-442/1 (*I.G.* I,<sup>2</sup> 45.21) and described a speaker in the assembly ( $\delta\eta\tau\omega\pi\alpha\gamma\omega\pi\epsilon\nu\epsilon\iota$ ). Curiously enough, the word does not reoccur in the many other and later decrees that have been found; instead the phrase  $\delta\epsilon\iota\pi\alpha\epsilon\iota\pi\epsilon$  is the common formula.<sup>21</sup> In many cases, of course, the absence of a class name can be explained by the need to record the individual speaker's name. That omission of the term *rhetor*, combined with the many attacks on the rhetors in comedy and in Plato, makes Pilz conclude (p. 20) that the word acquired a bad color before 411. But he presses the complaints too hard when from Critias' criticism (*Diels*<sup>5</sup> 88B22) he decides that the

<sup>21</sup> Similar *formulae* for decrees are noted in Plato's *Phaedrus*, 258a.

sophists disapproved of their products<sup>22</sup> and explains the attack on the rhetors in the fragment of Thrasymachus' deliberative speech (Diels<sup>5</sup> 85B1, p. 323.12) by saying that the speech was written for delivery by some new-comer who was not yet identified with the class. Of course speakers called each other "rhetors" and any other bad names available; that is one of the tricks of the trade. But mere name-calling is no proof that a man is opposed to the class and not a rhetor himself. Pilz also tries to prove (p. 13) that although originally lacking reproach the term rhetor was never applied to leading statesmen like Pericles and Nicias. Yet Pericles is expressly called "the only rhetor who left his sting in the audience" by Eupolis, frag. 94K (cf. Pilz p. 28). Alcibiades (probably already a statesman, for by 427 he was at least twenty-three years old<sup>23</sup>) is associated with rhetors and *συνήγοροι* in the fragment from Aristophanes' *Daetalea*, 198K; and similarly in his *Knights*, 358, Nicias is mentioned along with the class. Certainly Plato suggests that statesmen like Cimon and Pericles are rhetors (e.g. *Gorgias*, 517a). Thus it seems clear that the word did not imply a reproach at the beginning, that it could be used of leading statesmen, and that it denoted primarily a speaker in the assembly. Moreover, since Gorgias preferred to be named a rhetor (not a rhetorician! *Gorgias*, 448a), and Demosthenes accepted the appellation (XXI, 189; cf. XVIII, 280), probably the word could always be used in a good sense.

Who were these quasi-professional speakers in the assembly? Pilz, perhaps without sufficient proof, asserts (p. 13) that they were pupils of the sophists. If that is true our thesis needs but little further evidence, for if deliberative speakers were trained by the sophists, then rhetorical theory probably included deliberative speaking. But further evidence is needed to prove that the rhetors studied under the sophists. Pilz also says that

<sup>22</sup> Critias seems to have tried to destroy the sophists themselves when he was one of the Thirty Tyrants; cf. Xen. *Mem.* I, 2. 31.

<sup>23</sup> Xenophon, *Mem.* I, 2. 40, testifies to his interest in political problems before the age of 20 by telling of his dispute with Pericles about the nature of law. More definitely, the dialogue *Alcibiades* I in the Platonic *corpus* says (123d) that he was about to enter politics at the age of 20; cf. Plutarch, *Alc.* 13. 1. Glaucon addressed the people before reaching 20, Xen. *Mem.* V, 6. 1.

they were enemies of radical democrats like the uneducated Cleon, who opposed them bitterly.<sup>24</sup> He fails to identify them further. Now it seems questionable whether Cleon's attempt to keep others away from Demos (Aristophanes, *Knights*, 58) indicated their anti-radicalism or Cleon's greed. But it seems fairly obvious that if some early rhetors were really pupils of sophists they must have belonged to the upper classes at Athens. The sophists' fees were notoriously high in the fifth century. Hippias boasts in the *Hippias Maior*, 282e, of his enormous and quick gains in Sicily; in 282d Socrates states that they made more money than any other professionals; and we even hear that Protagoras was better paid than Phidias (*Meno*, 91d). The interest of the Athenian nobility in the sophists is shown by the men gathered at Callias' house in Plato's *Protagoras*; in the *Sophist*, 223b, the sophists are defined as hunters of rich pupils. And another odd fact proves that those aristocrats became the early rhetors. At Athens the paederasts seem to have been confined to the upper classes, who imitated the Spartans in all things.<sup>25</sup> Now it was precisely the young men practising this form of aristocratic friendship who were expected to become the future political leaders and rhetors. Indeed, Aristophanes in Plato's *Symposium*, 192a, insists that only the paederasts became statesmen.<sup>26</sup> Similarly in *Phaedrus* 256b-c Socrates distinguishes between the pure affection of philosophic lovers and the more carnal relation between men who desire (political) honor. This

<sup>24</sup> Starkie in his edition of the *Acharnians* (1909), p. xxii, also considers them to be the enemies of radical democrats. But Murphy, *H.S.C.P.* XLIX (1938), p. 75, apparently concludes from Phidippides' dislike (*Clouds*, 100-104) that the pupils were radical democrats and not aristocrats. Alcibiades' career, however, warns us that apparent irreconcilables could be united and I think that no one party had a monopoly on well-born trained rhetors; cf. note 66.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, New York, 1927, p. 213. It came from the Dorians in general, E. Bethe, "Die Dorische Knabenliebe," *Rh. Mus.* LXIII (1907), p. 422.

<sup>26</sup> The most interesting evidence is in *Symposium* 192a and *Phaedrus* 256c, for the speakers there are in favor of paederasty. In a different context Pilz, *Der Rhetor . . .*, p. 17, simply mentions Aristophanes, *Knights*, 876-877; *Eccl.* 112; Plato *comicus*, frag. 186.5 K.

may be over-statement, but I think that it reflects a fact which occasioned criticism. The same statement appears in Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae*, 112-113, where it is called a general belief, and in Isocrates' *Panathenaicus*, 140. Thus some rhetors were well-born. Plato himself testifies in his seventh letter (324-326) that he too succumbed to the popular tendency and planned to enter politics even while associating with Socrates and even until his unjust execution. And some rhetors were produced by sophists, for Gorgias specifically asserts that he trains them (*Gorgias*, 449c), and Isocrates, XV, 256, remarks that the Athenians called men able to speak before the people *ρητορικοί*.<sup>27</sup> Since the aristocrats at Athens were eager for political power, as Plato amply attests, and were almost the only men who fulfilled those peculiar qualifications for rhetorship, it is clear that they expected their teachers to provide them with training for public life.

In many passages Plato shows that young aristocrats turned to the sophists in order to get training for political leadership.<sup>28</sup> The clearest evidence comes from his *Sophist*, 232d, which though late seems typical. The Eleatic stranger, while enumerating the various subjects about which the sophists' pupils are trained to debate, mentions the fact that the teachers promise to give them the ability to discuss laws and the entire field of politics. Theaetetus answers that no one would even talk to them if they did not promise that political ability. Again, in *Meno* 91a Socrates tells Anytus that Meno, the young Thessalian nobleman, desires the wisdom and excellence (*arete*) by which men manage home

<sup>27</sup> Socrates in *Euthydemus*, 305b, also testifies that rhetors were trained by the teachers. Thucydides, III, 38, 7, compares the audience of rhetors to that of sophists, and Gomperz, *Soph. u. Rhet.* p. 45, takes this to mean that he considered the sophists primarily as orators. Certainly it shows that the rhetors were trained. A. Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*<sup>5</sup>, Oxford, 1931, p. 158, n. 2, records the new recognition that many aristocrats were then active in politics, not just poor demagogues. Theramenes was the pupil of Prodicus, and Demosthenes (XXI, 145) calls Alcibiades the best speaker of his day.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Gomperz, p. 41, and Xenophon, *Cyr.* III, 1, 14 and 38, for the strange fate of a sophist at an Asiatic court. That sophist supposedly stands for Socrates; cf. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, II<sup>2</sup>, p. 48.

and city well. Xenophon in his *encomia* of the Greek generals executed by the Persians (*Anabasis*, II, 6.16–22) not only notes Meno's passion for rule and rather Calliclean ethics but also describes another pupil of Gorgias with very different ethics in the following words: "The Boeotian Proxenus even as a boy wished to become a man capable of dealing with great affairs and therefore gave money to Gorgias of Leontini; after he had associated with Gorgias he considered himself ready for rule and for friendship on equal terms with the leaders of Greece. So he joined Cyrus in his enterprises." Alcibiades in the first dialogue bearing his name (125b) defines the good man as one able to rule in a city. Hippocrates in Plato's *Protagoras* wishes to study under Protagoras in order to become famous in the city (316c) and because the sophist will make him skilful at speaking (312d). Likewise, Theages has been begging his father to let him make more advanced studies under a sophist (Socrates! *Theages* 121e and 122e) because he wants to know how to rule men (123e). That dialogue may be spurious, but its evidence is confirmed by Plato's own *Republic* (496b–c), which informs us that only Theages' frail constitution later kept him from politics and saved him for the true learning of a Socrates, or rather of a mature Plato, since even Plato planned a political career while associating with Socrates. Thus young men in the fifth century consorted with the sophists chiefly in hope of becoming political leaders. Their teachers of politics were sophists as well as rhetoricians since Theages' father specifies a sophist; Socrates in the *Apology*, 20a, says that Callias, who had spent much money on sophists, sent his sons to Evenus to learn political excellence; and of course Hippocrates was eager to associate with Protagoras, the first professed sophist (*Protagoras*, 317b). If we consider the rhetoricians a separate class, the references to Evenus and Gorgias given above suffice to show that rhetoricians too were hired for political instruction. There is no evidence outside of the comic poets that young men anywhere in Greece went to sophists and rhetoricians in order to learn sycophancy and the art of petty blackmail.

That these teachers promised knowledge of deliberative oratory is obvious first of all from the name that some of them at least gave their subject, rhetoric. For rhetoric was connected by the Athenians with *rhetor* and is most naturally derived from that word which is found in a decree of before 440 and which has the usual meaning there of a speaker in the assembly.<sup>29</sup> Plato's use of these terms confirms the derivation. In *Gorgias* 449a, 455a, 500c (periphrase for *rhetor*), 520e, and 517a, the two words are closely associated. In *Phaedrus* 260a and c, *ρητορικός* is later substituted for *rhetor*; in the second *Alcibiades* (probably not by Plato), 145e, among the classes in a city are said to be "rhetorical men blowing a political blast" (i.e. rhetors).

Secondly the personal career of most of the sophists fitted them to teach deliberative oratory.<sup>30</sup> They not only had ample opportunity to observe speeches before assemblies but themselves were experienced statesmen and orators. Protagoras was the friend of Pericles, helped compose the constitution of Thurii, and himself participated in the first settlement. Hippias boasts that Elis often used his services as an ambassador, and Gorgias' success as the envoy of Leontini to Athens in 427 needs no mention. Even Prodicus often went on state missions for Ceos (cf. *Hippias Maior* at the beginning for all those ambassadors.) Fragments of political speeches survive from Thrasymachus, while Antiphon's political experience and activity as leader of the oligarchical party at Athens is well attested by Thucydides, VIII, 68, 1-2, who specifies that Antiphon was best able to help a contestant (*ἀγωνιζόμενος*) in court and assembly (i.e. wrote dicanic and deliberative speeches for others). Whether Corax and Tisias had any interest in political matters I shall discuss later in this paper. But the majority of these early teachers were men of great political experience, and therefore their professional claims come as no surprise.

<sup>29</sup> See p. 127, above. This is the opinion of Pilz, p. 15, and Kroll, *R. E. s. v. "Rhetorik,"* col. 1. 24-47. Kowalski, *De arte . . .*, p. 61, and *De artis . . .*, p. 83, thinks that they are Sicilian words introduced along with the art and derived from the Sicilian *rhetra*.

<sup>30</sup> Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 2. 4, connects the early sophists with the political thinkers who succeeded Solon.

The basic promise of the sophists was to teach *arete*. Naturally this means something very different from the ethical concept of a Plato. As a study of these promises shows, *arete* means skill in political matters.<sup>31</sup> Meno, apparently quoting Gorgias, says (*Meno*, 71e) that a man's *arete* is to manage affairs of state, benefit his friends, hurt his enemies, and protect himself. In *Meno*, 91a-b, Socrates notes that this excellence is promised by the sophists and includes good management of home and city. *Arete* is allegedly instilled best and fastest by Dionysodorus and Euthydemus (*Euthydemus*, 273d); that is why Callias sends his sons to Evenus (*Apology*, 20b); and that claim defines a sophist in the *Sophistes*, 223a. Evenus' *arete* is called political in the *Apology*, and later in the *Sophist* (232d) the sophists specifically promise instruction in discussing laws and all political subjects. Gorgias, whose definition of *arete* appears above, stated in the dialogue named after him (452d-e and 454b) that he taught how to persuade any assembly of men, and that this ability was better than anything else.<sup>32</sup> But Gorgias is supposedly the type of the pure rhetorician. How about the pure sophists? Even the encyclopaedic Hippias rebukes Socrates for his dialectic of short questions and answers and says that it is valuable and good to be able to speak well and persuasively in any assembly (*Hippias Maior*, 304a).<sup>33</sup> The venerable Protagoras sounds like the man desired by Meno (*Meno*, 91b) when in the *Protagoras* (318e) he promises to teach good counsel for home and city as well as the art of public speaking. And in the *Republic* (600d-e) Plato says

<sup>31</sup> Thucydides, VIII, 68, 1, uses *arete* to express Antiphon's ability.

<sup>32</sup> The *agones* that Gorgias, *Helen*, 13, mentions seem definitely to include deliberative oratory; cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1391b18 and 1403b34. Murphy, *H.S.C.P.* XLIX (1938), p. 80, discusses the term *agon* in drama. Corax supposedly used this word to describe the middle part of a speech (Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, p. 26) and there is no reason to consider that expression an indication of dicanic intent, for the word applied to any contest; cf. C. Brandstätter, "De notionum τολιτικὸς et σοφιστῆς usu rhetorico," *Leipziger Stud.* XV (1894), pp. 43, 49, 167, 177, n. 1, and my article, "Corax and the *Prolegomena*," to appear in *A.J.P.* January 1943.

<sup>33</sup> W. Zilles, "Hippias aus Elis," *Hermes*, LIII (1918), p. 51, n. 1, says that Hippias recommended general oratorical ability and not simply forensic skill.

that Prodicus also, and many others, promised to teach home and city management and were so popular that their pupils were ready to carry them around on their shoulders.<sup>34</sup> Similarly Thrasy-machus' students would gladly escort him like a monarch (*Phaedrus*, 266c). In short, just as the pupil demanded instruction in politics, so the sophist and rhetorician, who usually had experience in affairs, promised to train statesmen.<sup>35</sup> Their *arete* was political.

The two terms, rhetorician and sophist, seem almost interchangeable. Gomperz has rightly emphasized the rhetorical instruction given by the sophists, and even in Plato the rhetoricians are confused with their betters. For instance Evenus, Thrasy-machus, and Protagoras, named in the *Phaedrus* for rhetorical precepts, are mentioned elsewhere as sophists. True, in the well-known passage of the *Gorgias*, 464b-465e, Plato distinguishes the two terms in his four-fold division of the true and the simulated arts of caring for men. He very briefly compares the lawgiver or statesman with the sophist, and the judge with the rhetorician, thereby suggesting that the sophist trains men for making laws in the assembly whereas the rhetorician trains men for using laws in the courts. But the rhetorician cannot fairly be confined to dicanic oratory, and Plato nowhere specifically asserts this. Instead, later in the *Gorgias*, he thrice summarizes this discussion of the true and simulated arts (500e-501c, 513c-e, 517d-e) yet does not again separate the rhetoricians from the sophists. Indeed, when the practical Callicles sneers at the sophists (520a), Socrates says that they are the same as the rhetoricians or very close to them.<sup>36</sup> In the *Euthydemus*, 305c, a quotation from Prodicus suggests that the rhetoricians are the same as the sophists by stating that they are in between philos-

<sup>34</sup> Kroll, *R. E.* 8. 57-62, thinks that all the sophists made the same promise that Protagoras did.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Kroll as cited in note 1.

<sup>36</sup> Gomperz, p. 44, stresses this passage to establish the identity of sophist and rhetorician. Similarly A. Westermann, *Geschichte der Rhetorik*, p. 43, n. 6, and W. Nestle, "Die Horen des Prodigos," *Hermes*, LXXI (1936), p. 170. But Brandstätter, p. 210, warns against this use of the passage.

ophers and statesmen.<sup>37</sup> Prodicus, as quoted by Plato (*Phaedrus*, 267b), himself showed an interest in rhetorical problems by attacking some of his fellow-teachers for their opinions about the proper length of a speech. His first statement suggests the only distinction that can be made between a sophist and a rhetorician. The latter has a narrower interest in the art of persuasion alone, whereas sophists like Prodicus and Hippias perhaps felt some disdain for such one-sidedness (cf. *Phaedrus*, 267b and *Protagoras*, 318e), and themselves had more general philosophic interests in addition to rhetoric. The sophistic movement consisted of many divergent trends: eristic, philosophy, encyclopaedic culture, special sciences, and rhetoric. No one man represented all trends. Yet we must remember that Protagoras' precepts are listed along with the contributions of the rhetoricians in the *Phaedrus* (267c),<sup>38</sup> and Gorgias, although supposedly styling himself a pure rhetorician (*rhetor*, *Gorgias*, 449a), is often considered a sophist.<sup>39</sup> Likewise, Thrasymachus' amusing grave-inscription (Athen. X, 454F) says that his *techne* was *sophia*, and he appears in the *Republic* as an arch-sophist. So we must turn back to the promises of the sophists themselves, where we have discovered that they differed little from the rhetoricians and that both classes promised to train future statesmen in the art of persuasion.

Rhetorical instruction seems to have been aimed primarily at training speakers for the assembly, since this is what pupils wanted, but probably the early rhetoricians did not carefully distinguish persuasion in assembly from persuasion in court. They had some justification. The same men often spoke or listened in the different gatherings, and theorists probably considered the principles basically the same in all popular persuasion. They recognized that persuasion depends on plausibility, not

<sup>37</sup> Diels<sup>5</sup>, II, p. 317, even takes this passage as referring to the sophists, although Socrates called them dicanic teachers; and Nestle, *op. cit.* p. 170, implies that Prodicus would consider himself no philosopher but a member of the inferior class.

<sup>38</sup> Gomperz, p. 199, notes this point.

<sup>39</sup> O. Gigon, "Gorgias' 'Über das Nichtsein,'" *Hermes*, LXXI (1936), p. 187, argues that he was interested in rhetoric and Eleatic philosophy at the same time.

truth, and that fiction should not be as strange as truth can be (*Phaedrus*, 260a and 272d–e), principles which apply to all assemblies. Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, 1418a29–32) notes that deliberative speeches often turned into accusations. Even earlier statesmen like Ephialtes and Pericles possessed juridical skill, for they attacked their political opponents with law-suits.<sup>40</sup> So judicial and deliberative ability cannot be separated. Certainly in the claims that we have examined the sophists and rhetoricians always insist that they teach how to persuade men in any assembly. Thus it is highly probable that rhetoric included more than dicanic oratory.

Private persuasion (eristic dispute?) is mentioned in the *Sophist*, 232c, although Plato implies in the *Phaedrus*, 261a and c, that this branch of the art was omitted from official theory.<sup>41</sup> That another branch, the *epitaphius*, was taught, and not just dicanic pleading, is indicated in the *Menexenus*, 236a; for Socrates says that he learned his skill from Aspasia, but that even an inferior rhetorician like Antiphon could teach how to praise Athenians to the Athenians.<sup>42</sup> Only one passage in Plato (*Politicus*, 304c–d) really concentrates on the powers of rhetoric in the assembly and ignores its use in courts of law; but the Eleatic stranger makes this concession only to show that rhetoric is the servant of true statesmanship, which sometimes uses force instead of persuasion. One incidental remark by Adeimantus (*Republic*, 365d) puts deliberative oratory first when noting that there are teachers of persuasion who impart demegoric and dicanic wisdom. The other passages in Plato which show that rhetoric was useful in deliberative speech are too numerous to itemize.<sup>43</sup> Their tenor is

<sup>40</sup> Aly, "Die Formprobleme . . .," p. 33, discusses that premonition of the practice common in the fourth century.

<sup>41</sup> But cf. note 58, below.

<sup>42</sup> Brandstätter, "De notionum . . .," p. 205, assumes that the rhetoricians taught epideictic primarily and dicanic oratory only secondarily. Rather, the *epideixis* seems to have been an early form of advertising, not the commodity itself; cf. Hippias' repertory in the beginning of the *Hippias Maior*.

<sup>43</sup> *Gorgias*, 500c, 502d–e, 513b, 517a, 520a; *Sophist*, 222c, 232d, 268b; *Politicus*, 304c–e; *Philebus*, 58a; *Phaedrus*, 268a.

Some outstanding passages that note only the forensic use of rhetoric are:

best summarized in the *Euthydemus*, 289e–290a: rhetoric is an inferior part of witchcraft, for the latter can charm beasts and diseases, whereas the *λογοποιική τέχνη* enchant merely judges, assemblymen, and such. So much for the Platonic evidence that rhetorical training was not simply for the courts but helped political leaders. Not only was early instruction expected to train statesmen but I also believe that the emphasis was on political leadership rather than on private litigation. The ideal was Alcibiades, not Strepsiades. This is a difficult point to prove precisely since our contemporary sources are interested in conveying the opposite suggestion; but the pupils' desires as discussed on pages 128–131 above seem to me decisive.

## II. THE DIRECT EVIDENCE CONCERNING DELIBERATIVE INSTRUCTION

We have seen that some rhetors at Athens came from the rich aristocrats who turned to the sophists and rhetoricians for instruction because they promised training for leadership. This makes it extremely probable that deliberative oratory was taught. It remains to consider the specific evidences of such instruction and the testimonies of the ancient authorities. I hope to examine the nature of this oratorical training elsewhere, but some discussion of deliberative instruction belongs in this place.

If we should accept Alfred Gercke's contention that the early *technae* consisted solely or almost exclusively of model speeches, that the surviving early orations were composed for this purpose, and that Plato attacked rhetorical theory precisely because there was none,<sup>44</sup> then we could easily prove that the sophists taught deliberative speech-making simply by citing the evidence that

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Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 466–475, 872–875, 1004, 1151; *Birds*, 1694–1705; Plato, *Euthydemus*, 272d, 304d, 511c; *Rep.* 405a; *Laws*, 937d–938c; *Epinomis*, 976b.

<sup>44</sup> A. Gercke, "Die alte *Techne* . . .," *Hermes*, XXXII (1897), p. 348, states baldly that the *technae* were collections of speeches, although he is more cautious later, pp. 356–358. On p. 351 he says that the orations were written for the *technae*, and on p. 358 he gives Plato's real reason for attacking rhetoric. W. Kroll, "Randbemerkungen," *Rh. Mus.* LXVI (1912), p. 166, n. 1, rejects Gercke's theory.

they wrote orations for the assembly. Not only is it definitely stated by Thucydides that Antiphon, the guiding spirit of the revolution in 411, helped his colleagues with their work in the assembly as well as in the courts, but we possess a considerable fragment from a fifth-century deliberative speech by Thrasy-machus, and late sources credit written orations of this kind to Gorgias and Antiphon. By Gercke's theory these speeches would be from their *technae* and therefore would prove the existence of instruction in deliberative persuasion. But his interpretation of the evidence seems impossible to maintain. A careful reading of the *Phaedrus* will show, I think, that Plato recognized the existence of real theory in the *technae* and oral instruction. In the first place, Socrates while contrasting the ideal rhetorical theory of division and synthesis (i.e. dialectic) with existing rhetoric, states, 266c, that Thrasy-machus and the others not only were good at speaking themselves but successfully trained other men.<sup>45</sup> Successful teaching implies some theory. The method of instruction was not simply the study of the various sciences of the time, for Protagoras (*Protagoras*, 318d-e) expressly states that his students will be spared theoretical subjects like astronomy and geometry (referring to Hippias) and will concentrate on thoroughly practical things. Gomperz (p. 128) rightly considers that Protagoras' criticism of the poets (339a) could not have been the method of instruction, although we cannot be certain that Protagoras made his pupils practise the composition of speeches on themes suitable for the assembly. Gomperz' conjecture is likely, but more definite evidence is available to show that theoretical instruction was given.

Written theory is definitely indicated by Phaedrus' answer to Socrates' question, "What else is there to rhetoric?" He answers, 266d, "There are very many things in the books that have been

<sup>45</sup> Hinks as quoted on page 121 above seems to be unaware of this assertion that the teachers taught what they practised. Isocrates, XV, 203-204, also testifies to the sophists' success in instruction.

<sup>46</sup> If we must accept something as a genuine early definition of rhetoric, I agree with Kowalski, *De arte . . .*, p. 56, that *τέχνη λόγων* seems the most satisfactory. H. Mutschmann, "Die älteste Definition der Rhetorik," *Hermes*, LIII (1918), pp. 440-443, has at last established that *πει οὖς δημιουργός* is

written about the art of speech’’;<sup>46</sup> and Socrates then remembers the various technical devices (parts of a speech, magnification, brevity, devices of style, emotion, etc., cf. 272a). Those ‘things in the books’ do not sound like Gercke’s model speeches. That the devices were not just examples and lacking in theory is shown by Socrates’ criticism (268a-e). Referring to Thrasymachus’ control of the emotions, Socrates asks what a doctor would say if a man pretended to be able to teach others how to warm and cool the body; again, alluding to Gorgias’ ability to speak briefly or at length, Socrates asks what Sophocles and Euripides would say if somebody asserted that he could teach others how to make long or short tragic speeches. Socrates does not mean to question the possibility of such instruction. He wishes to imply that something should be said about the proper use of those devices. Naturally the devices cannot be transmitted without fairly specific instructions. No sample long and short tragic speeches would suffice, nor would ready-mixed drugs and potions. Some explanation of the formulae or techniques is needed although many samples might well be included.

The Thrasymachean methods for arousing the people seem again to be alluded to in *Republic* 493a-d. Socrates calls the people the real sophist and likens them to a great monster: paid private sophists (not rhetoricians!) learn by long experience the monster’s moods (*orgas*) and desires, how to approach it, where to lay hold of it, when and why (theory!) it is cruel or prone to pity, its usual sounds under various circumstances, and what voices calm or arouse it; then they call this knowledge wisdom, pretend that they have composed a *techne*, although really ignorant of the truth (i.e. Platonic truth), and so turn to teaching politics. This detailed technique calls to mind Aristotle’s treatment of the emotions in his *Rhetoric*. Thrasymachus in the

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Plato’s own contribution. To his parallels add *Euthydemus*, 291c, and 292d, *Symposium*, 197a; in all these passages the word  $\delta\eta\mu\alpha\nu\rho\gamma\acute{o}s$  is used with *technae*. This frequent use of the word in Plato answers, I think, M. J. Milne’s argument (*A Study of Alcidamas . . .*, Bryn Mawr, 1924, p. 19) based on the use of the word by Alcidamas, whose alleged source (Gorgias) is no more likely than Plato to derive a phrase from medicine.

*Phaedrus* is said to have technical mastery over the art of exciting pity, arousing or calming the people's anger, and slandering men and removing that slander. Since pity and anger are mentioned in both passages, Thrasymachus appears to be the sophist indicated in the *Republic*. Whether his *Eleoi* is the treatise in question it is impossible to determine, although that title would better fit the first section of the larger text-book on the emotions which Plato describes in the *Republic*. Those details about handling people at any rate seem to symbolize definite theoretical and rhetorical precepts. And note that rhetoric is equated with politics!

Again, Polus' devices (*διπλασιολογία*, *γνωμολογία*, *εἰκονολογία*), whatever they really were, clearly suggest definite details in a speech, and it is certain that in a written treatise he specifically claimed to make rhetoric a *techne*, although Socrates thinks that rhetoric cannot be truly scientific (*Gorgias*, 462b). Plato's criticism in the *Phaedrus* is not that the rhetoricians lacked theory or the methods of teaching oratorical devices but that they neglected to teach the right use of these devices (cf. especially 269 and 272a) or did not know the real truth. They gave a panoply to the hoplite without training him how and when to use sword or spear.

I think that it is clear, therefore, that oral and written theory existed, and there are some indications that this theory included instructions for speaking in the assembly. As noted above, the Thrasymachean technique is called political and *demegoric* in the *Republic* (especially 493d). Moreover at the very beginning of the technical discussion in the *Phaedrus* (260), Socrates asks whether the speaker needs to know the truth. Phaedrus answers that as he has been told the rhetor does not need to know what is really just or good but only what the people will consider just or good. This is an important principle, that a speaker must keep his audience in mind and must say nothing which his audience will consider impossible or false. That this precept belongs to deliberative instruction as well as to the courts is clear from the inclusion of "the good" and from Socrates' further discussion, for in a *reductio ad absurdum* he chooses an example of

deliberative persuasion, that you should get a horse in order to ward off the enemy, and in conclusion he remarks that if a rhetorical man ignorant of good and bad should control a city he will sometimes cause the city to follow bad policies because of his own ignorance and his desire to comply with the opinions of the citizens. Similarly, Isocrates tells us (*Against the Sophists*, 9) that the teachers who promised to train statesmen disregarded truth and concentrated on opinion. In short, there we have a deliberative precept recognized as such by a rhetorician; and Plato in the less polemical *Republic* seems to admit that Thrasymachus' whole study of the emotions is designed solely for the assembly. There seems to be absolutely no evidence in early or late writers that Thrasymachus ever wrote a speech for the law-court. Apparently the only reason for assuming that he even considered judicial theory is the riddling and unspecific allusion in *Phaedrus* 261b, which repeats the essence of the passage in the *Republic* and lists him with theorists like Protagoras, whom few would call dicanic. The passage in the *Republic* specifically labels the theory as deliberative, and Thrasymachus is called a teacher of political wisdom by Metrodorus in Philodemus (*Supplementum*, p. 43. 3-9) and by Cicero in the *De oratore* (III, 59).

The one piece of theory in the *Phaedrus* that is definitely labelled as dicanic is the use of  $\delta\lambda\epsilon\gamma\chi\sigma$  and  $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\delta\lambda\epsilon\gamma\chi\sigma$  (*Phaedrus* 267a). How many of the remaining devices in Socrates' catalogue can be used in the assembly is of course open to argument, but after all it seems obvious that the techniques of deliberative and judicial speech are essentially the same.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, that the deliberative orations incidentally composed by historians and playwrights show many specific features traceable to the theorists of the fifth century has often and recently been maintained by

<sup>47</sup> Cf. p. 135 above. I should even question Aristotle's remark (*Rhetoric*, 1414a36-38) that a narrative has no place in a deliberative speech. Murphy in his study of Aristophanes twice notes the use of narratives in his analyses of the deliberative speeches, *Lys.* 510-528 (p. 107), and *Eccl.* 176-208 (p. 109). Anaximenes, *Rhet. ad Alex.* 30 and 31, discusses the use of narratives in deliberative speech. Aristotle's statement, which he qualifies later (1417a11-12), was even used by Spengel, *Synagoge Technon*, p. 13, to prove that the early rhetoricians disregarded deliberative speech since the parts were forensic.

scholars like Aly in his studies of Herodotus and of early prose, and by Finley and Murphy in recent volumes of the *Harvard Studies*.<sup>48</sup> I refer especially to the debates in Euripides and Sophocles and to the speeches in Thucydides and Herodotus, where many traces have been found of sophistic style and concepts. Murphy notes instances in Aristophanes where he uses or alludes to specific rhetorical precepts for deliberative speeches (e.g. *Knights*, 1340–1344). So there seems to be every reason to believe that far more than judicial training was offered by the sophists. The pupils wanted it; the teachers had the experience; their professional claim was to produce statesmen.

But how about Corax and Tisias? They certainly trained men only for the courts of law. That statement has gained respectability by repetition, but the evidence is not very conclusive. There is no explicit ancient statement that confines the Sicilians to juridical pleading. Aristotle in Cicero, *Brutus*, 12, traces the origin of rhetoric to property-trials. Of course this statement contains an implication of limited activity, but as we shall see below, such indirection was the characteristic weapon employed in the attack upon rhetoric by comic-poets and philosophers, and we cannot tell how accurately or fully the knowledge of

<sup>48</sup> Caution must be used, however, in tracing the influence of the sophists on contemporary literature; for Aeschylus shows features which might as readily be ascribed to technicians. In the *Suppliants* Danaus gives rather elaborate rhetorical precepts to his daughters, 194–204 and 995–996; cf. *Prom.* 379–382. Terms which later became technical occur: *tekmerion*, *Prom.* 826, *Eum.* 447; *semeion*, *Prom.* 842; *prooimion*, *Prom.* 741; *kairos* in speech, *Prom.* 381, frag. 208 and 302 (Sidgwick). The magic of persuasion is emphasized, *Prom.* 173, *Eum.* 885–886, 900; sophistic arguments appear in the *Eumenides* (notably the Furies' reference to Zeus' imprisonment of Cronus, 641, distrust of oaths, 432, and Apollo's proof that Orestes is not related to his mother, 658); and Apollo is extremely self-conscious when he appeals to the emotions of the audience, 638–639, by describing how great a man Clytaenestra killed. I note these details not to prove that Aeschylus was influenced by the sophistic movement but to show that apparently such things can occur without the existence of rhetorical theory. Aly, pp. 29–44, discusses this part of the *Eumenides* under the bold heading, "Ein unbekanntes Stück altattischer Beredsamkeit," and, pp. 82–83, points out that so-called technical inventions of Thrasymachus must have appeared in earlier practice.

Aristotle's passage has been transmitted to Cicero. In the *Sophist* he derived rhetoric from deliberative rather than forensic oratory by calling Empedocles the founder.<sup>49</sup> It is noteworthy that the theory of probabilities ascribed to Corax and Tisias is not especially suited to property-trials. The legal situation underlying the examples in Plato (*Phaedrus* 273) and Aristotle (*Rhetic* 1402 a17) is a trial for assault. The kinds of probabilities there discussed are not concerned with establishing impersonal facts, as would be appropriate in litigation over property, but with discovering the probabilities of human action. So we must admit that the Sicilians developed rhetoric beyond precepts for property-litigation. The use of Corax' probabilities in deliberative speeches has already been discussed above (pages 124-6), and it is significant that in introducing the theory of Tisias (*Phaedrus* 272d-e), Plato definitely links it with the earlier discussion whether truth is necessary for the rhetor (260). We have seen that the rhetoricians' precept about the necessity of being plausible was there treated as a deliberative principle and as common to all rhetoricians, not as confined to Tisias alone. Therefore there is good reason to accept Diodorus' statement when he says (XI, 87) that the Syracusan youth became interested around 450 in studying oratory for political power, and to connect these studies with Corax, as well as to trust the accounts derived from Timaeus that Corax was himself a demagogue and devised certain simple parts of an oration.<sup>50</sup> As for Tisias, he would transmit whatever kinds of oratory he learned from his master and the public demanded. Now if Corax were the only rhetorician or sophist for whom evidence existed that he taught statesmen, we should be wise to disregard his alleged exception to the rule. But since we find that all the other teachers thought that they taught the political ability desired by their students, we must pay more attention to Timaeus' authority for Corax and must not dismiss him by saying as Hamberger does<sup>51</sup> that he was under the

<sup>49</sup> Aristotle, frag. 65 Rose.

<sup>50</sup> These aspects of Corax and of Aristotle in Cicero are discussed in my article, "Corax and the *Prolegomena*," which is to appear in *A.J.P.*, Jan. 1943.

<sup>51</sup> Hamberger, *Die rednerische Disposition . . .*, p. 16.

influence of Isocrates, who first insisted on the superiority of deliberative speech, and that he therefore patriotically though anachronistically ascribed that kind of oratory to his countrymen. It remains to be proved whether Isocrates was the first. No ancient says specifically that Corax taught only forensic pleaders but the opposite is testified. So it seems more consistent with the whole sophistic movement and the spirit of the rising democracy to accept the evidence that Corax like all the others promised to train political leaders and included all kinds of public oratory in his theory.

But if the sophists and rhetoricians really were primarily teachers of deliberative oratory, how shall we explain the statements of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle quoted at the beginning of our discussion? Of course we might say that the teachers considered the best training for political oratory to be the composition of forensic speeches. Evidence for this would be the amusing remark of Cleon in Aristophanes' *Knights*, 344-350. He says that when most people have successfully argued a case in court they think that they are able to speak in the assembly. But Plato's emphasis on dicanic oratory (usually he specifies first that the training was for the law-courts, and then dismisses the other audiences with some collective phrase)<sup>52</sup> can best be understood from a study of Aristophanes, who exhibits the same bias against rhetoric. In the *Acharnians*, 676-691, young and skilful speakers are said to drag the old men to court; in the *Clouds* Strepsiades goes to the sophist Socrates to learn how to cheat his creditors. Gomperz (p. 132) points out that Protagoras' weaker and stronger arguments are degraded in the *Clouds* by being called just and unjust; and in the *Birds*, 1698-1705, sycophants and litigants are given the class-name of "Gorgiases." Yet we have seen what little evidence there is that Gorgias, the intimate of the aristocratic Aleudae in Thessaly (*Meno*, 70b), was a mere teacher of petty blackmailers and shyster-lawyers.<sup>53</sup> In Aristophanes the belittling attack on the rhetoricians, who fancied

<sup>52</sup> This fact was noted by Brandstätter, *Leipz. Stud.* XV (1894), p. 191, n. 2.

<sup>53</sup> Dicanic orations are not ascribed either to Gorgias or Thrasymachus by later writers, despite the *Palamedes*.

themselves as statesmen and trainers of statesmen, is part of the comic fun and burlesque. The truth of the situation is revealed even in the *Clouds*. Although Strepsiades went to Socrates for dicanic instruction, as Hinks says,<sup>54</sup> yet the Clouds themselves, those patron saints of sophists, promise something very different. The first speech of the Clouds, 412–420, promises to make diligent students victorious in action and counsel. (*βουλεύω* also has a technical political connotation; the whole phrase recalls Protagoras' *εἰβουλία*).<sup>55</sup> This promise becomes more specific in 431–432: no man shall propose more measures to the people than Strepsiades. This promise is carried into effect when the Just Argument describes the Unjust Argument (1019) as having various physical characteristics and a long decree; the villain of the play in turn boasts (1039–1040) that he was the first to devise arguments against laws and judgments. Even Strepsiades finally recognizes that skill in deliberative speech is worth having, for in 1109–1110 he asks Socrates to train one of Pheidippides' jaws for suits, but the other jaw for bigger things (i.e. statesmanship). So in the *Clouds* the sophists are clearly considered as teachers of statesmen as well as of lawyers. Only Strepsiades is mad enough to disregard political power and prefer judicial skill. That is the joke in Aristophanes, to belittle the powerful rhetors and make them appear as petty litigants.<sup>56</sup>

This same prejudice against rhetoric, which no doubt represented a popular feeling (entertained also against philosophy and science), reappears again and again in Plato.<sup>57</sup> Sometimes he begins by speaking of rhetoric as deliberative but ends by criticizing it as dicanic. For instance in the *Theaetetus*, 172c–173b, he speaks about the men who spend their lives in law-courts and such places (i.e. assemblies; cf. *Hippias Maior* 304c and a), says that they are slaves compared to the philosophers, and then

<sup>54</sup> Quoted page 121 above.

<sup>55</sup> Starkie *ad locum* takes *βουλεύω* as actually referring to politics.

<sup>56</sup> Murphy, *H.S.C.P.* XLIX (1938), p. 74, remarks, "Aristophanes wilfully confuses the sophists with sycophants. . . ."

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Pilz, *Der Rhetor* . . ., pp. 12, 20, and 25. Isocrates as quoted in n. 2 suggests that those who envied rhetoric emphasized its juridical aspects; cf. XV, 260.

describes only the limitations of judicial rhetoric—the water-clock, the narrow subject, the flattery of the judges—but does not speak further about speeches before other assemblies. Again, in the *Phaedrus* disregard for truth first appears as a deliberative doctrine and then later is treated as purely dicanic in discussing Tisias (272d; cf. *Theaetetus* 201a-b). I am inclined to believe that the additional details which Plato gives for the contest between the two men, that the stronger was a coward and the weaker a brave man, are Plato's own invention and improvement in order to throw into relief the disregard for real truth in the whole argument.<sup>58</sup> This too would be a slight misrepresentation of rhetoric, which did not really disregard the truth (cf. *Phaedrus* 260d). While recognizing the value of honor and knowledge (*Gorgias* 450b and 457a), rhetoric, although a little heady with its own power, did not pretend to install special knowledge or to guarantee a student's future behavior.<sup>59</sup> So *Phaedrus* erred when he said (*Phaedrus* 260a) that the rhetor needed only a knowledge of popular opinion. Protagoras reveals the official view in the *Theaetetus* 167b-c: the sophist needs to know more than popular opinion, for he persuades his audience to accept the attitude which he considers better and more useful than the prevailing belief. Ancient rhetoric rejected the vain pursuit of absolute truth and preferred useful knowledge. Plato preferred dialectic.

Again, in the *Euthydemus*, 305b, the critic of eristic dispute is called a dicanic speaker, although his attitude resembles the impatience with the sophists of the rhetor Callicles (*Gorgias*, 520a); and Prodicus says that such men are between the philosophers and the true statesmen. Moreover, although the *Gorgias* tries to confine rhetoric to the law-courts, in 500c Socrates says that his mode of life is better than Callicles' "speaking before the people, practising rhetoric, and participating in government as

<sup>58</sup> Kowalski, *De Arte* . . . , p. 51, considers this Tisias' improvement.

<sup>59</sup> Note that Socrates had no better success with Critias and Alcibiades. This failure was urged against him just as similar instances were emphasized to the discredit of the sophists and rhetoricians. See also the defense of philosophy in the *Republic*, 488a-497a. Yet especially Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, and Gorgias are everywhere treated by Plato as moral and respected men.

the rhetors now do." Similarly in 513b he tells Callicles that if he would become *politicus* and *rhetoricus* he must become like his audience (cf. *Republic*, 493a; a perversion of a rhetorical precept for *ethos*?). Thus it seems clear that Plato too is belittling rhetoric and concentrating on its weakest aspect, although he knew that it was used by contemporary statesmen and helped to train them. But he does not like these products of rhetoric and consequently attacks what helped produce them, the art of persuasion. An interesting example of a depreciatory reference is in the *Euthydemus*, 273c-d. There Socrates says that the two brothers used to train dicanic speakers. But the context strongly suggests that they trained deliberative speakers as well, for they promise to teach the usual *arete*—we have seen above what that means for the sophist—and later Socrates says that they trained men to be generals. The importance of military knowledge for statesmen is shown in the *Laches*, where the sons of Aristides and Thucydides hope to make their own sons as prominent in the state as their grandfathers by giving them military training. So it seems fair to conclude that if we had asked Euthydemus and Dionysodorus ourselves they would have promised deliberative as well as forensic skill. More Socratic irony!

And so we come to the one sentence in Plato (*Phaedrus*, 261b; quoted above, p. 122) which, strictly interpreted, might suggest that only forensic oratory was subject to written technical precepts, though some mention was made of deliberative oratory in the oral instruction. There is no doubt that Phaedrus himself asserts that more attention was paid to dicanic theory. But Socrates is perhaps interested only in establishing that the official theory omitted private persuasion<sup>60</sup> and so he disregards the relative importance of the different branches in public oratory. How much trust we should put in Phaedrus' one sentence I do not know. Once before he misstated the rhetoricians' case when he said that the rhetor needed no knowledge (cf. 260d, and

<sup>60</sup> But private persuasion is recognized by Gorgias, *Helen* 13; Alcidamas, *On the Sophists*, page 80 (Reiske); Plato, *Sophist*, 232c, *Euthydemus*, 272a; Anaximenes' *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1. Lysias'(?), *Eroticus* could be used as a model for private persuasion.

*Gorgias*, 450b, for the orthodox view). Certainly there is enough independent evidence that the primary interest of pupil and teacher was deliberative oratory. And it is difficult to confine exclusively to the courts the few traces of early theory that remain and to deny that the same principles applied to both *genera*.<sup>61</sup> Moreover almost every word on rhetoric in Plato shows that he emphasized the forensic application; and I believe that this emphasis resulted from fairly conscious bias, just as in Aristophanes. So we should not overemphasize Phaedrus' words. However much the rhetoricians exaggerated their pretensions, it is obvious that Plato criticizes them by unfair standards and proposes an impossible goal for true rhetoric (perfect knowledge, truth, and justice). Similar impractical criticisms, which should not be confused with modern views, are made in the *Republic* (525d, 527a, 531a; cf. *Epinomis*, 974e–976c) about contemporary arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music, whose exponents insist on busying themselves with mundane observations.<sup>62</sup> But as Plato suggests in *Politicus* 304e, rhetoric is a tool, not a complete and infallible education in itself. In short, Phaedrus' sentence, contradicted as it is by other statements in Plato, seems insufficient to demonstrate that there was no deliberative theory or that it was less important. Possibly Plato momentarily indulged in unfair polemic by means of a passing remark not meant for serious consideration. Phaedrus' sentence is brief, irrelevant, unrepeated, and not delivered by Socrates himself. Even Isocrates complains (XV, 2) of being called a dicanic teacher by his enemies.

Let us now consider Isocrates' oration XIII, *Against the Sophists*. First he discusses two contemporary classes of teachers;

<sup>61</sup> Cf. n. 44. The connection between dicanic and deliberative oratory is discussed by Kroll, *R. E.* 3. 27–31, and Pilz, *Der Rhetor*, p. 14.

<sup>62</sup> The pragmatic scientific studies of the Presocratics that Plato criticizes seem more akin to modern methods than the *a priori* approach of Plato, who by his influence obscured such vital sophistic concepts as that the world and its customs are relative, and suppressed those ideas for two thousand years until the relativity of judgments and the observation of nature seemed brilliant modern discoveries. The practical sophists often seem more contemporary than Plato though doubtless inferior intellectually and artistically.

those who seek the truth (1 and 8), and those who use opinion (8 and 9). The former class seems to be the philosophers, although they promise *arete*, tell their students what to do, like Protagoras' *εὐβούλια*, and also like Protagoras, pretend to predict the future (*Theaetetus*, 179a). Still Isocrates does not specifically state that they promised political ability, and he implies that the second class had more success in training statesmen (8). The second group promises to teach political oratory, disregards the truth like the rhetoricians in the *Phaedrus*, and says that their pupils will be successful rhetors. This group seems to comprise the sophists and rhetoricians of Plato, although no mention is made of their teaching *arete*. Apparently Isocrates uses *arete* in the newer moral sense; cf. 6 and 20, where it is paired with *σωφροσύνη*. The same classes of teachers are distinguished in II, 51, and XV, 260–261. So far Isocrates confirms our thesis that the instruction of the sophists and rhetoricians was for future statesmen. He criticizes their instruction (XIII, 12) much as Plato does in the *Phaedrus*, by saying that they omit to teach when and how rhetoric should be used.

Finally, however, Isocrates distinguishes these modern teachers from an earlier generation who write the “so-called *technae*.” The outstanding characteristic of this earlier generation is that they promised openly to teach the art of litigation. Who these men were or when they lived it is extremely difficult to say. If we assume that only litigation was offered and think of Tisias, then we must agree with the scholiast and add Thrasymachus, Theodorus, and the other *diadochi* alluded to in Aristotle's *Sophistici Elenchi*. But certainly if any of the sophists and rhetoricians that Plato mentions had made so vulgar an offer and confined himself solely to the courts Plato would have been the first to quote his own words. Yet no one in Plato confines himself to litigation. Even Plato limits only Euthydemus and Dionysodorus to dicanic oratory, and that was before they took up the art of eristic. We have already discussed the probable irony in that passage. In the others' claims Plato always quotes them as saying “speech in court and other assemblies;” sometimes the *ecclesia* is specified. So apparently Isocrates' technographers

happened to mention dicanic instruction in their promises but went on to give precepts for other audiences. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the sentence: ἐκεῖνοι δ' ἐπὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους παρακαλοῦντες, ἀμελήσαντες τῶν ἄλλων τῶν προσόντων αὐτοῖς ἀγαθῶν, πολυπραγμοσύνης καὶ πλεονεξίας ὑπέστησαν εἶναι διδάσκαλοι (XIII, 20). Isocrates seems to admit that they taught political oratory in general,<sup>63</sup> but criticizes them for mentioning that they also taught litigation. He certainly does not say explicitly that they taught only forensic oratory. Isocrates himself, it seems, felt that there is a sharp distinction between the lofty themes that he treats and the petty contracts of the law-court. Therefore he considers that one teacher should not combine the two fields of oratory: he should be either a *politicus* or a *dicanicus*. Thus Isocrates cautiously objects only to the inclusion of the term dicanic in the proclamations of early *technae*, and seems even to suggest that the later teachers scrupulously omitted any reference to the courts. Certainly Isocrates himself tried to ignore his own dicanic background.

So it seems either that Isocrates is here engaging in mere polemic as before when (10) he said that the rhetoricians disregard the importance of natural ability,<sup>64</sup> or else that there was a group of men before Isocrates' (and Plato's) time who promised to teach only the art of litigation. The latter seems to be Hinks' interpretation as quoted on page 121 above. It is hazardous to identify such men with any known teachers, for the famous sophists all sought rich pupils and promised statesmanship. No son of Pericles or Callias would have been content with such mercenary studies or with the limited career open to a trial-lawyer in Athens. Perhaps those dicanic teachers offered a cheap course in practical rhetoric to the sons of the poor who lacked political ambition and wanted a profitable trade! But it is surprising that this group is said no longer to exist, and Isocrates

<sup>63</sup> Brandstätter, *Leipz. Stud.* XV (1894), p. 137, apparently considers that *πολιτικός* here has primarily a deliberative significance.

<sup>64</sup> Protagoras had already emphasized this point, *Protagoras*, 328b, Diels<sup>6</sup>, 80B3. The subject has been discussed by Gomperz, *Sophistik und Rhetorik*, p. 175, and P. Shorey, "Φύσις, Μελέτη, 'Ἐπιστήμη,'" *T.A.P.A.* XL (1909), p. 193.

does testify clearly that the teachers of rhetoric in his day at least really gave training primarily or exclusively in deliberative oratory. Likewise Alcidamas in his speech, *On the Sophists* (p. 90 Reiske), Anaximenes in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, 1, and Epicurus in Philodemus' *Rhetorica*, *Suppl.* p. 18, list speaking in the assembly before forensic and private oratory. So it seems that Isocrates cannot be used to prove that the sophists and rhetoricians taught only for the law-courts.

Again when we come to Aristotle we find a similar difficulty. He says that no one speaks about deliberative oratory and that all confine their technical remarks to litigation (*Rhetoric*, 1354b25-27). But his testimony cannot be taken strictly. He scarcely separates oral from written instruction. Yet we know that Anaximenes wrote about deliberative speech, probably Theodectes also, for he was a pupil of Isocrates. The connection between these men and Aristotle however cannot be discussed at this time. Certainly Isocrates himself at least spoke about it, and he mentions that his contemporaries had the same interests. Alcidamas gives no hint of confining his instruction to the law-court; and of course the host of rhetoricians and sophists in Plato thought that they were training deliberative speakers. Yet Aristotle's criticism at the very least means that no one during the age of Protagoras or Gorgias or Isocrates even mentioned the problems of speaking before the people in technical treatises on rhetoric. Even if Isocrates wrote nothing, his pupils and rivals probably continued the tradition of technical handbooks and revealed the influence of Isocrates there as in their speeches. Plato's *Republic* (493) testifies to the existence of at least one early *techne* about deliberative oratory.

Again, Aristotle himself provides evidence that earlier technicians gave precepts for speech in the assembly. First of all, in the *Politics*, 1305a10-15, he testifies that the rhetoricians trained statesmen by remarking that men formerly won political control by military ability, whereas now that the art of rhetoric has developed (cf. *Hippias Maior* 282b) the leaders are skilled orators. Even more specifically in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1180b31-1181a17, he says that the sophists promised general political

knowledge and criticizes their instruction chiefly because they considered politics the same as rhetoric or a smaller part of it, and taught legislation by making collections of the best laws (cf. Aristotle's own collections). Similarly in the *Rhetoric* (1356a27-30) rhetoric and its teachers are said to assume the guise of politics. Plato, too, equates the two studies in the passage discussed above, page 140. Secondly, in considering the topics of arguments, Aristotle says (*Rhetoric* 1399a9-17) that Callippus' *techne* consisted of mentioning the consequences of an act and that this device was useful in deliberative as well as in other kinds of oratory. This *techne* is said also to include the topics of the possible, and others. So it could have readily been used in training statesmen. Again, another topic (1399b30-1400a5), which is also called suited to the assembly, consists of considering the incentives and deterrents for and against an action. This is said to comprise the entire *technae* of Pamphilus and of Callippus. The topic would be useful in deliberative oratory. Thus it seems that Aristotle cannot mean his words literally. There must have been some not only spoken but also written theorizing about deliberative speech.

After all, other Aristotelian assertions are equally open to question. At the beginning of the *Rhetoric* he says that the rhetoricians have paid little or no attention to proof. But he cites several topics of proof from early rhetoricians (Theodorus and Corax, as well as the unknown Pamphilus and Callippus), and modern scholars consider that a system of proof was Corax' chief contribution to rhetoric.<sup>65</sup> Pamphilus' and Theodorus' whole *technae*, Aristotle says, were each devoted to a single line of argument. This concentration probably implies some theory, for if a man can confine himself to exemplifying only one kind of argument he probably would be capable of expressing in words the common element upon which his collection is based, and that would be theorizing. Similarly, at the end of the *Sophistici Elenchi* Aristotle asserts that absolutely no logical theory existed

<sup>65</sup> Spengel, *Synagoge*, p. 16, was one of the first to insist that proofs were by no means unknown to the early rhetoricians. Süss, *Ethos*, Leipzig, 1910, *passim*, has the most to say about Sicilian argumentation.

before his time, only ready-made particular arguments, unlike rhetorical theory, which had gradually developed and attained considerable complexity.<sup>66</sup> Yet we learn from Diogenes Laertius, VIII, 57, that Aristotle in his *Sophistes* considered Zeno the founder of logic; Protagoras apparently wrote some kind of *techne* for eristics; and certainly Plato is full of remarks that show a well-developed logical theory.<sup>67</sup> How shall we interpret

<sup>66</sup> This famous passage has often been rightly interpreted, to the effect that Gorgias, unlike most of the other rhetoricians, had little theory and simply gave his students pieces to memorize as the eristic teachers had done; cf. Hamberger, *Die rednerische Disposition . . .*, p. 50, and Hinks, "Corax and Tisias . . .," pp. 65-66. Gercke, "Die alte *Techne* . . .," p. 348, however, remarks that the criticism about Gorgias' method must apply to all the other rhetoricians and sophists, and says that Aristotle's *τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης* (finished speeches or parts of them) must be the same as Plato's *τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης* (*ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα*, *Phaedrus*, 269b, technical devices used in oratory!). Solmsen, *A.J.P.* LXII (1941), pp. 40-41, does not mention Plato's more cautious criticism (*Phaedrus*, 269b) which implies real theory (cf. pp. 138-142 above), and considers that the argumentation of all the rhetoricians must be like Gorgias' *communes loci*, collections of arguments ready for immediate use in a specific but common circumstance, whereas he credits Aristotle with abstracting the pattern from the particular arguments and suggests that "before Plato and Aristotle the Greeks had generally lacked this capacity for abstracting." This view differs from Finley's conception of fifth-century oratory, which he says, *H.S.C.P.* L (1939), p. 78, and *passim* in both his studies of Thucydides, was characterized primarily by more abstract thinking than appeared in subsequent styles. It is unnecessary to mention the abstract thought which is exhibited by so many early philosophers like Parmenides and Heraclitus. But to return specifically to Aristotle's topics in the *Rhetoric*, I have suggested in my dissertation, *The Destructive Hypothetical Syllogism . . .*, p. 131, n. 2, that Aristotle did not succeed in separating logical form completely from the useful subjects of those arguments. So it seems that his topics were a survival from earlier rhetoric, though perhaps more abstract, and we should accept Aristotle's testimony in the *Sophistici Elenchi* that the theory was extensively developed and unlike the *communes loci* of Gorgias.

<sup>67</sup> A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, pp. 132, n. 1, 152, n. 2, and 374-378, points to the existence of a well-developed logical terminology in Plato's day, as well as studies of logical problems. C. Ritter, *The Essence of Plato's Philosophy* (translated by A. Alles), London, 1933, devotes a chapter to his logic and says (p. 230) that Plato founded the science of logic. Evidence of this logical theorizing appears in the dialogues: e.g. *Theaetetus*, 146e and 210a, a definition should not repeat the *definiendum* in the predicate; *Phaedo*, 102d, mutual

these inconsistencies? Perhaps Aristotle's standards were higher than those of modern scholars who are anxious to detect the first stage of growth. Or perhaps this is a forerunner of the rivalry of the Greek schools for control over Roman education.

The facts about rhetoric remain clear and receive ample indirect confirmation from Aristophanes, Plato, Isocrates, Alcidamas, and Aristotle himself. The teacher promised to and did train speakers for the assembly as their pupils desired. Thus Plato is half-joking when he asks again and again who trains statesmen. The sophists claimed to, but he did not approve of their training. The precise methods of instruction are hard to determine and deserve separate study. But few Greeks of the fifth century at least would have paid the high fees of a sophist in order to learn mere sycophancy and litigation. It has always been difficult to reconcile the brilliant picture that the ancients give us of Gorgias, statesman, stylist, and intimate of princes, with the allegation that as a pure rhetorician he should be training court-pleaders and blackmailers. Now, however, a revised conception of his activities as a teacher may throw new light on his career as a man.

The most definite evidences of deliberative instruction are the testimonies that Antiphon helped men in the assembly (Thucydides, VIII, 68), that the sophists promised political knowledge and identified politics with rhetoric (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1180b30-1181a17), and that teachers imparted demegoric and dicanic wisdom (Plato, *Rep.* 365d). The most striking indication of written deliberative theory is the itemized description in *Republic* 493a-d of the methods for handling that great beast, the people (Thrasymachus' *Eleoi*?). The typical pupil seems to be Proxenus, who paid Gorgias in order to learn how to become a leader himself and how to associate with the other rulers of Greece (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, II, 6. 16). And the political significance of sophistic instruction is most clearly indicated by an

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exclusion of opposites; *Protagoras*, 350c-d, faulty conversion; *Alcibiades II*, 139a, dichotomy; *Protag.* 332c and 335b, one opposite for each concept; *Phaedrus*, 265d-e, synthesis and division; *Theaet.* 168b-c, ambiguity.

action of the Thirty Tyrants. Xenophon tell us (*Memorabilia* I, 2. 31) that they passed a law prohibiting instruction in the art of speech and applied the law to the sophists. Of course Xenophon explains the law as resulting from Critias' personal grudge against Socrates, but the oligarchical rulers of Athens needed no such general law to cloak their hatred of an individual. Rather they shrewdly discerned that trained speakers meant men capable of arousing the people, an aroused people meant a revival of a democratic party, and a democratic party organized and united by effective speakers might mean the end of their oligarchical power. Recognizing that oratory is the life-blood of democracy, they shut off the flow at the source, the schools of rhetoric.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>68</sup> At first sight this passage appears to be evidence that the rhetorical schools produced rhetors from the lower classes who would oppose the oligarchs. But aristocratic individuals in Athens often preferred personal or national advancement to the interests of their own class; cf. Pericles, Nicias, and Alcibiades. Perhaps the particular reason for the closure of the schools by the Thirty Tyrants was that their arbitrary and bloody rule had estranged even the better classes and that they feared lest leaders from their own class would arouse the people against them; cf. n. 24.

The importance of rhetorical instruction for Athenian democracy is similarly stressed in C. Fries' article, *Rév. de Phil.* XIV (1940), pp. 48-49, although he goes too far in saying, "Il faut comprendre enfin que les écoles de rhétorique furent le fondement, l'origine de la liberté d'Athènes."



## DONATUS AND THE SCHOLIA DANIELIS: A STYLISTIC COMPARISON\*

By ALBERT H. TRAVIS

IN THE year 1600 Pierre Daniel, the eminent French scholar, gave to the world what he fondly believed was the complete Virgil commentary of the fourth-century professor of Latin literature, Servius.<sup>1</sup> Before 1600 scholars had known a briefer version of Servius, but Daniel's discovery of an apparently fuller form at once branded that briefer version with the unmentionable name of abridgement.

For some two centuries and a half Daniel's longer commentary was regarded as the true and complete Servius. But finally Émile Thomas,<sup>2</sup> Georg Thilo<sup>3</sup> and others<sup>4</sup> who followed their lead proved in various ways that the additional scholia of Daniel's fuller version were not by Servius and did not form an integral part of his Virgil commentary. These additional scholia had been interpolated into the text of Servius by an early scholar, perhaps of the seventh or eighth century.<sup>5</sup> This demonstration re-established the briefer version as the "real Servius," but left the body of supplementary scholia—now called the *Scholia Danielis*—without paternity.

\* Presented orally (under the title "Stylometric and the Source of the *Scholia Danielis*") before the American Philological Association at Hartford, Connecticut, December, 1941.

<sup>1</sup> In his edition of Virgil, published by Nivelle in Paris. On the title page he describes his version of Servius thus: *Mauri Servii Honorati grammatici commentarii, ex antiquiss. exemplaribus longe meliores et auctiores.*

<sup>2</sup> É. Thomas, *Essai sur Servius et son Commentaire sur Virgile*, Paris, 1879.

<sup>3</sup> G. Thilo and H. Hagen, *Servii Grammatici Qui Feruntur in Vergilii Carmina Commentarii*, Leipzig, 1881–1902, I, Praef. pp. I–XVIII, XXVII–XXXIV, LXVI–LXIX.

<sup>4</sup> Worthy of special mention is the stylistic study of R. B. Steele, "Servius and the Scholia of Daniel," *Am. Jour. Philol.* XX (1899), Part I, 272–281; Part II, 361–387.

<sup>5</sup> Thilo, *op. cit.* (n. 3) I Praef. pp. LXVI–LXIX.

The next important step was taken by Karl Barwick, whose paper on this subject appeared in 1911.<sup>6</sup> He showed that the Scholia Danielis were not a hodge-podge of comments assembled from various ancient sources by the interpolator but were a homogeneous body derived from a single ancient commentary. It now remained to name the author of that commentary.

There was much that pointed to a single great name, and it is not surprising that three eminent scholars<sup>7</sup> should come independently to the conclusion that the source of these scholia was the now lost Virgil commentary of Aelius Donatus.<sup>8</sup> This theory is today generally accepted as the most probable and attractive explanation of their origin.

It was this theory of the Donatian authorship of the Scholia Danielis that suggested the present study. Donatus's commentary on the plays of Terence is extant.<sup>9</sup> It has suffered disarrangement and interpolation in transmission, but it is certainly Donatus's work in the main and has previously been used as such for purposes of comparison in studies of various sorts.<sup>10</sup> It seemed therefore that a comparison of the stylistic traits of the

<sup>6</sup> "Zur Serviusfrage," *Philologus*, LXX (1911), 106-145. This proposition had been suggested though not demonstrated by R. Halfpap-Klotz, *Quaestiones Servianae*, Greifswald, 1882, 30.

<sup>7</sup> F. Lammert, "De Hieronymo Donati Discipulo," *Comm. Philol. Jenenses*, IX (1912), 41-51, 75; P. Wessner, in Teuffel, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.*<sup>6</sup>, 1913, III, sec. 431, p. 307; E. K. Rand, "Is Donatus's Commentary on Virgil Lost?" *Class. Quart.*, X (1916), 158-164.

<sup>8</sup> For the arguments in favor of this theory see E. K. Rand, *loc. cit.* (n. 7), *passim*; P. Wessner, art. "Servius" in Pauly-Wissowa (II Reihe, 4 Halbbd., 1834-1848), 1923; F. Lammert, "Lit. z. d. Lat. Grammatikern," *Bursians Jahresbericht*, CCLII (1936), 141-150.

<sup>9</sup> The standard edition is P. Wessner, *Aelii Donati Quod Fertur Commentum Terenti*, Leipzig, Teubner, 1902-05.

<sup>10</sup> E.g., in Servian studies, Thilo, *op. cit.* (n. 3) I *Praef.* p. XXI; P. Rosenstock, *De Donato Terentii et Servio Vergilii Explicatore Syntaxeos Latinae Interpretibus*, Marggrabowa, 1886; O. Feyerabend, *De Servii Doctrina Rhetorica et de Terentiano Commento Donati*, Marburg, 1910; Barwick, *loc. cit.* (n. 6), p. 108; G. B. Waldrop, "Donatus, the Interpreter of Virgil and Terence," *Harv. Stud. Class. Philol.*, XXXVIII (1927), 75-142. For a brief account of the problems concerning the transmission of the Terence commentary, see the *Praefatio* of Wessner's edition.

Terence commentary with those of the Scholia Danielis might be of some interest.<sup>11</sup>

But before turning to actual stylistic analysis I must mention three or four points of a more or less general nature. In the first place, although the entire Terence commentary is treated, of the Scholia Danielis those on the *Aeneid* alone are used. Special problems make it inadvisable to include those on the *Bucolics* and the *Georgics*.<sup>12</sup> In the second place, in accordance with the usual practice in analyses of scholiastic material, *praefationes* and paraphrases are not considered.

Further, a radical distinction must be made between two broad types of exposition found within the Scholia Danielis. The narrative style of the mythological and historical scholia and the curt formulistic language of the typical "philological" elucidation must be regarded stylistically as separate subjects for investigation. An example or two will serve best to make this clear. Here is a brief account of the death of Patroclus and the dragging of Hector's body around the walls of Troy:

(*Aen.* I 483) Patroclus cum iratum Achillem propter Briseidem sublatam ut adversum Troianos pugnaret exorare non posset, petit ab eo arma quae Peleo Vulcanus fecerat; quibus indutus dum Achilles crederetur, fugatis Troianis omnibus etiam plurimos interemis, ipse vero ab Hectore occisus est. quo dolore Achilles compulsus, inpetratis per matrem a Vulcano armis, Hectorem proelio superatum peremis, eiusque corpus ad currum religatum circa muros Ilii traxit; quod post placatus auro repensum Priamo reddidit.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> A preliminary phase of this investigation is represented by the third and fourth chapters of my doctoral dissertation (*De Servii Carminum Vergilianorum Interpretis Dicendi Rationibus*, Harvard University, 1940). In those chapters I compared many and various aspects of style of the Scholia Danielis on Books I and II of the *Aeneid* with the Terence commentary on the first three acts of the *Andria*. In preparing the present paper, I selected those discrepancies between the two commentaries which in the dissertation had appeared most significant and traced them through the Scholia Danielis on the whole of the *Aeneid* and through the entire Terence commentary.

<sup>12</sup> See G. Funaioli, *Esegesi Virgiliana Antica*, Milan, 1930, 60-87; Thilo, *op. cit.* (n. 3) III<sup>1</sup> *Praef.*; J. J. H. Savage, "The Manuscripts of the Commentary of Servius Danielis on Virgil," *Harv. Stud. Class. Philol.* XLIII (1932), 77-121, provides supplementary material on the manuscripts.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Aen.* I 52, 317, 651, 751 and *passim*.

Though this account is brief and simple, its essentially periodic nature is apparent at once; subordinate clauses are arranged according to periodic convention with studied care. Moreover, ideas and persons are conveyed from one sentence to the next by a scrupulous use of relative and demonstrative words. Finally, the diction is free and non-formulistic in character. Compare with this the ordinary philological comment; those found on page 161 will serve. Philological scholia are written very definitely in the "linked" style—the linked style in service of the lamp. The brief sentences are decidedly non-periodic in structure. Each short sentence more often than not treats a point of its own; thus there is comparatively little continuity of subject matter, and relative and demonstrative words rarely appear as sentence connectives; rather, we find ourselves in a downpour of copulative, adversative, causal, and asseverative particles. The tendency toward formulistic diction is strong. For mechanical reasons, then, the narrative and the philological comments of the *Scholia Danielis* (or of any other commentary in which the two types are found) must be treated separately. Problems of source make separate treatment even more necessary.<sup>14</sup> In this paper I have used the philological rather than the narrative comment; this choice was obligatory since the philological comment alone affords a common denominator of sufficient amplitude for a valid comparative study: four fifths of the *Scholia Danielis* and almost all the scholia of Donatus's *Terence* commentary are of this type.

Finally, the relative bulk of the two masses of material involved in this comparison should be held in mind; the *Terence* commentary is somewhat larger than the combined philological scholia of the *Scholia Danielis*, the relative proportion being about four to three in its favor.

Fortunately, philological scholia lend themselves admirably to stylistic treatment. The Roman commentators had by the

<sup>14</sup> Whether the narrative scholia betray the stylistic influence of a mythological handbook (or of mythological handbooks in general) or simply the desire of the schoolmaster to illustrate in his own elucidations the proper Latin narrative method, I do not know. The narrative scholia of *Servius* have the same general characteristics.

fourth century developed in this sort of elucidation a vehicle of expression as typically professional as the lawyer's brief or the doctor's prescription. Formulistic expression and standardization of formulae are its chief characteristics. The extent to which standardization may go is illustrated by the following scholia, each from a different commentary and each based upon the formula *bene . . . quia . . .*: Servius *Aen.* I 452 *AVSVS bene 'ausus,' quia inter incerta satis audacter salus speratur.* Scholia Danielis *Aen.* III 517 *ARMATVMQVE AVRO CIRCVM-SPICIT ORIONA* *bene 'armatum auro,' quia et balteus eius et gladius clarissimis fingitur stellis.* Donatus *Eun.* 236 *ANNISQVE OBSITVM* *bene addidit 'annis,' quia ut quisque miser est, ita senior videtur.* In the following group is another common formula that involves *bene*. Here there is first a brief comment on something suggested by the lemma; this is succeeded by a word of praise introduced by *et bene*: Servius *Aen.* I 531 *VBERE GLEBAE 'uber' proprie est fecunditas. et bene Italiae virtutem fecunditatemque conlaudat, ne Africam petisse videantur.* Scholia Danielis *Aen.* I 301 *CITVS pro 'cito,' adverbium temporis in nomen deflexum. et bene hoc de Mercurio.* Donatus *And.* 477 *NVM IN-MEMORES DISCIPVLI deest 'nunc.' et bene discipuli, quia ipsum magistrum supra fecit.* Such then is the tendency toward standardization of form and vocabulary among the Latin scholiasts of this period. Now, because of this general standardization, the deviations that do appear in the individual scholiasts are all the more obvious. Further, because of the tendency toward formulistic expression common to the scholiasts, such deviations tend to become constant in their respective users and to form genuine idiosyncrasies. Thus in a comparison of the styles of any two scholiasts, the crystallized idiosyncrasies of each stand out in bold relief against the background of the standard formulae common to each; and it is upon the isolating of just such idiosyncrasies that the success of stylistic comparison depends. Stylistic evidence derived from material so singularly adapted to stylistic analysis may, perhaps, be offered without the usual apologetic blush.

Let me first mention certain verbs employed by the commentators. One of these is *notare*, which is regularly used either impersonally in the passive periphrastic or in the imperative to call the reader's attention to some point worthy of special observation. In the Scholia Danielis I have found eleven instances of the word so used. Of these, ten are in the impersonal passive periphrastic; only one in the imperative.<sup>16</sup> *Notandum est* (or simply *notandum*) then is the form regularly employed in the Scholia Danielis. When we turn to the Terence commentary, we everywhere find the direct and personal *nota*, which is here used much more frequently than *notandum* in the Scholia Danielis: I have forty instances of the imperative with but one gerundive to provide the inevitable exception.<sup>18</sup>

In the Scholia Danielis the gerundive of *scire*, *sciendum*, is used side by side with *notandum*. There are thirteen instances of *sciendum* in that body of scholia.<sup>17</sup> In the Terence commentary, the word is lacking.

But in the Terence commentary, side by side with the imperative *nota*, we find the vivid *vide*, the imperative of *videre*. In using this word, Donatus sows with the sack, for there are over 160 occurrences of it.<sup>18</sup> Yet *vide*, so lavishly used in the Terence commentary, appears but once in the Scholia Danielis.<sup>19</sup>

In place of *vide*, the demonstrative particle *ecce* is used in the Scholia Danielis. It is not, however, frequent; there are fourteen instances.<sup>20</sup> In the Terence commentary, *ecce* is not to be found.

The ancient commentators, when touching upon material already discussed in an earlier part of their work, regularly labeled the repetition by some such expression as *ut* or *sicut diximus* or

<sup>16</sup> *Notandum*: I 193, 689, II 230, III 691, 706, V 68, VI 845, VII 464, VIII 398, X 603; *nota*: IV 294.

<sup>17</sup> *Nota*: e.g. *And.* 156, 473, 545, 614, 638, 798, *Eun.* 168, 303, 697, 847; *notandum*: *Hec.* 359.

<sup>18</sup> I 750, II 202, III 287 (two instances), 359, 468, IV 103, 137, 646, V 840, VIII 85, 552, XI 76.

<sup>19</sup> E.g. *And.* 89, 90, 112, 281, 286, 321, 355, 412, 485, 769.

<sup>20</sup> II 220.

<sup>20</sup> I 102, 379, II 105, 151, 297, 797 (three instances), V 9, 84, 300, VIII 601, IX 124, XII 169.

*dictum est.* The Scholia Danielis contain many of these repetitions; and the form of *dicere* used therein, since it is one of the most noticeable stylistic traits of these scholia, was long ago pointed out by Thilo.<sup>21</sup> The form is *dictum est*, the impersonal construction; in over seventy occurrences, the personal *diximus* is found only three times.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, Donatus not only makes comparatively infrequent use of such references (there are fewer than twenty in the Terence commentary), but always employs the personal *diximus*.<sup>23</sup> (Let me say in passing that this represents consistent usage on the part of both commentaries; it is the Scholia Danielis that employ the impersonal *notandum* and *sciendum*, the Terence commentary that uses the personal *nota* and *vide*). Again, in the particle employed to introduce these forms of *dicere* there is a difference in the usage of the two commentaries. In the Scholia Danielis *sicut* is found in the great majority of cases, the ratio being over four to one in its favor.<sup>24</sup> In the Terence commentary *ut* is the regular word;<sup>25</sup> *sicut* is wholly lacking.<sup>26</sup>

The forms *nota*, *vide* and *diximus* call to mind another personal usage of Donatus. After presenting a view which he thinks worthy of mention but which is not his own, he introduces his personal interpretation with a phrase involving the pronoun of the first person. There are sixteen such cases in the Terence commentary. Of these, thirteen have *ego*, three *mihi* (with *videtur*); ten have as their first word *at* or *sed*; seven have the

<sup>21</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 3) I *Praef.* p. XIV. He here points out that the Scholia Danielis use *dictum est* while Servius uses *diximus* (as does Donatus; see text below). On *diximus* in Servius see R. Halfpap-Klotz, *Animadversiones ad Veteres Vergilii Interpretates*, Triptow, 1893.

<sup>22</sup> Namely I 152, IV 246 (repetition of Servius), X 164 (*quod Scholium ex uno Turonensi edidit Daniel*). Cf. X 423 and Thilo's crit. app. on VI 603. Examples of *dictum est*: I 139, 242, 478, 529, 734, II 157, 196, III 24, 162, 178.

<sup>23</sup> E.g. *And.* 74, 180, 457, 720, 855, 970, *Eun.* 178, 305, 604, *Adel.* 259.

<sup>24</sup> For examples of *sicut*, see passages indicated in note 22 under *dictum est*; examples of *ut*: III 164, 407, IV 219, 372, VIII 125, IX 11; of *quod*: II 175, VII 610, VIII 485, 696, XI 532, 762, 858, XII 492; of *quemadmodum*: VI 20, XI 536.

<sup>25</sup> For examples of *ut*, see passages indicated in note 23.

<sup>26</sup> But *quod* in *Eun.* 361, *Hec.* 634.

verb *puto*. The following, then, are typical: *Adel.* 559 *EM VIDE VT DISCIDIT LABRVM Asper medium longam a caedendo accipit, ego medium brevem a scindo.* *Hec.* 440 *MAGNVS RVBI-CVNDVS C. imperite Terentium de Myconio 'crispum' dixisse aiunt . . . sed ego Terentium *puto* scientem facetius Myconium 'crispum' dixisse.<sup>27</sup>* These several scholia, because of the presence in them of *ego* and *mihi*, seem to bring us face to face with Donatus.<sup>28</sup> The author of the *Scholia Danielis* never places himself before us in this way.<sup>29</sup>

The commentators have pet adverbs as well as verbs. I made use of *bene* earlier in this paper to illustrate standardization of pattern and vocabulary in scholastic writing.<sup>30</sup> But *bene* is not

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *And.* 410 *ego puto*, 481 *quod ego non probo*, 510 *ego* (*puto* understood), *Eun.* 85 *at mihi videtur*, 689 *at ego sequor*, 823 *sed ego agnosco*, 1079 *sed mihi videtur*, *Adel.* 87 *puto ego*, 259 *sed ego puto*, 390 *sed ego . . . refero*, 480 *ego . . . intellego*, 752 *at ego puto*, *Hec.* 711 *ego . . . puto*, *Phor.* 74 *sed mihi videtur*.

<sup>28</sup> So Fr. Leo, "Die Überlieferungsgeschichte der terenzischen Komödien und der Commentar des Donatus," *Rhein. Mus.* XXXVIII (1883), 332. R. Sabbadini, "Il Commento di Donato a Terenzio," *Studi Ital.* II (1894), 13-15, ascribes these scholia to a polemic interpolator. His reason is curiously subtle: Donatus uses the first person plural (e.g. *diximus*; see text above); a man who submerges himself in the plural is not the sort of person to thrust himself forward here and there in the singular; it is psychologically improbable that the same man should use both. That this is not sound, at least where a Latin writer is concerned, can be shown simply by pointing to Cicero's letters, which contain countless examples of both the first person singular and the first person plural (i.e. the real 'editorial' *we*, as it might be called today). Further, *ut diximus, adnotavimus*, etc., are standard formulae among the scholiasts, and a commentator would quite naturally use them to refer to preceding passages no matter how often he asserted his own views in the first person singular. Finally, Sabbadini's way of reasoning can be used quite as well to prove just the opposite: Why not, after all, start with the scholia containing the first person *singular*, accept them as genuine, and reject those in the first person *plural* as spurious on the same psychological grounds? As a matter of fact, H. T. Karsten, *De Commenti Donatiani Origine et Compositione*, 1907, 157-164, thinks (albeit wrongly) that the first person plural is a sure sign of interpolation.

<sup>29</sup> The only instances of the first person singular in all the *Scholia Danielis* (both philological and narrative) on the *Aeneid* are two occurrences of the idiom *nescio qui* (I 651 *nescio quibus disciplinis*, XI 247 *vi nescio qua*). Steele, *loc. cit.* (n. 4), Part I, 274.

<sup>30</sup> Page 161.

the only adverb used by the ancient scholars to compliment the poet; there are several others. By far the most common after *bene* is the more enthusiastic *mire*. The *Scholia Danielis* and the Terence commentary resemble each other closely in the syntactical treatment of *mire*, but there is a striking quantitative difference. In the *Scholia Danielis* the word is found some fifty times, in the Terence commentary some 250.<sup>31</sup> This does not mean, I am sure, that Terence's art is simply more often worthy of *mire* than Virgil's.

Another adverb with a message is *recte*. This word is used by the scholiast to assure a seemingly doubtful reader that the poet is correctly or consistently handling some point or other; it is usually followed by an explanatory clause. *Recte* is thus employed three times in the *Scholia Danielis*.<sup>32</sup> In the Terence commentary the instances number almost ninety.<sup>33</sup> The frequency in the Terence commentary of *nota*, *vide*, *mire* and *recte* would seem to indicate a livelier interest in the fine points of the poet's art than that reflected in the vocabulary of the *Scholia Danielis*.

In presenting the views of other scholars, the commentators sometimes mention those scholars by name. More often the indefinite terms *alii*, *quidam*, *sunt qui*, *nonnulli* and *multi* are used. This is, of course, particularly true of a 'variorum' commentary, and from such a commentary the *Scholia Danielis* clearly derive; in them words such as *alii* and *quidam* appear literally by the hundred. The Terence commentary on the other hand is not specifically of the 'variorum' sort, and consequently *alii*, *quidam* and other such terms are far fewer in number. Thus, insofar as these words are concerned, quantitative differences between the two commentaries are of no significance. But there are divergences of usage that may be worthy of mention. Both the *Scholia Danielis* and Donatus use *alii*, *quidam* and *sunt qui*:

<sup>31</sup> Examples of *mire* in the *Scholia Danielis*: I 38, 75, 176, 479, II 100, 107, 393, 522, 543, 599; in the Terence commentary: *And.* 32, 36, 37, 73, 88, 129, 131, 135, 138, 139.

<sup>32</sup> I 84, III 572, VIII 529.

<sup>33</sup> E.g. *And.* 22, 335, 357, 608, 696, 735, 741, 919, *Eun.* 197, 317.

*alii* and *quidam* are comparatively numerous; *sunt qui* is comparatively rare. Here, however, the similarity ends. For the Scholia Danielis contain sixty-five instances of *nonnulli* and forty-two of *multi*,<sup>34</sup> whereas in the Terence commentary scarcely an instance of either of these words is to be found.<sup>35</sup>

Among the subordinating particles, *licet*, in the sense of 'although,' may be mentioned. I have found twenty-three instances of the word in the Scholia Danielis<sup>36</sup> and but one in the Terence commentary.<sup>37</sup> It may not be impertinent to recall here that the Scholia Danielis are less in bulk than the Terence commentary.

Among expressions involving coordinating particles, the formula *neque enim* is of interest. This collocation early forces itself upon the reader of the Scholia Danielis because, when *neque* appears as a sentence connective, it is more often than not thus joined with *enim*. I have noted thirty-one instances of *neque enim* in these scholia.<sup>38</sup> In the Terence commentary, although both *neque* and *enim* are not infrequently used, the combination of the two is extremely rare; I have but two instances.<sup>39</sup> In the Scholia Danielis then this collocation has the aspect of a stereotyped formula; in the Terence commentary *neque* and *enim* are employed simply as individual words.

Yet, though Donatus does not concern himself with the formula *neque enim*, he nevertheless has a favorite term which involves *enim*. *Etenim* is as typical of the Terence commentary as *neque enim* of the Scholia Danielis. There are twenty-seven occurrences of this word in the Terence commentary.<sup>40</sup> In the Scholia Danielis it scarcely appears—twice, according to my count.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>34</sup> E.g. *nonnulli*: I 1, 11, 25, 115, 138, 200, 298, 329, 395, 595; *multi*: I 4, 8, 42, 50, 112, 150, 203, 233, 246, 256.

<sup>35</sup> *Multi*: *Eun.* 458.

<sup>36</sup> E.g. I 184, 363, 378, 446, 621, II 601, 749, III 48, 83, 108.

<sup>37</sup> *Adel.* 45.

<sup>38</sup> E.g. I 193, 204, 305, 398, II 141, 145, 182, 344, 368, 387.

<sup>39</sup> *Eun.* 537, *Adel.* 265.

<sup>40</sup> E.g. *And.* 108, 183, 230, 439, 453, 455, 612, 642, 844, 855.

<sup>41</sup> III 246, VIII 552.

The asseverative particle *sane*, however, perhaps more than any other word points the distinction between the *Scholia Danielis* and the Terence commentary in a quantitative way. In the *Scholia Danielis* this word, as an introductory particle, is one of the commonest. It occurs some 350 times.<sup>42</sup> In the Terence commentary, however, *sane* is conspicuous for its rarity; I have been able to find only four occurrences.<sup>43</sup>

A singularly interesting trait of Donatus's style is his habit of using the Greek article  $\tauὸ$  almost with the force of our quotation marks, e.g. *And.* 380 *TVM ILLAE TVRBAE*  $\tauὸ$  'illae' *ad terrorem rettulit. And.* 668 *SCIO*  $\tauὸ$  'scio' *non ad deceptionem, sed ad defetigationem reddidit.* There are twenty-nine instances of  $\tauὸ$  so used in the Terence commentary.<sup>44</sup> This usage is carried a step farther in the expression  $\pi\rho\circ\circ$   $\tauὸ$  which has the literal Greek meaning, e.g. *And.* 404 *REVISQ QVID A. A. Q. C. C.*  $\pi\rho\circ\circ$   $\tauὸ$  'quid agant' *auribus est opus, πρὸς τὸ quid captent' prudentia et sagacitate. Hec.* 85 *MINIME EQVIDEM ME OBLECTAVI* 'me' *acutius proferendum est, quia respondet πρὸς τὸ te.'* In the Terence commentary  $\pi\rho\circ\circ$   $\tauὸ$  is employed in this way fourteen times.<sup>45</sup> In the *Scholia Danielis* neither of these usages is found.

Here and there I have hinted that certain stylistic traits of the Terence commentary seem to me to indicate the working of a spirit quite different from that manifested in the *Scholia Danielis*. I think that this view is strengthened by the presence in the Terence commentary of two forms of exclamation, the one introduced by *o*, the other by *quam* or a similar word. Let

<sup>42</sup> It must be noted that, although *sane* is one of the particles most frequently used by the compiler to attach Danielian scholia to Servian scholia (cf. Thilo, *op. cit.* (n. 3) I *Praef.* pp. XIII, XVIII), nevertheless it is found equally often as a sentence connective within Danielian comments. E.g. *connecting a Danielian comment with a Servian comment:* I 4, 12, 30, 39, 41, 47, 50, 52, 65, 79; *connecting two sentences within a Danielian comment:* 8, 13, 20, 28, 41, 76, 77, 92, 107, 144, 173.

<sup>43</sup> *Eun.* 861, *Adel.* 259, 447, 601. Also in *Eun.* 721, *Adel.* 278, but not as connective particle.

<sup>44</sup> E.g. *And.* 30, 235, 241, 242, 384, 667, 726, 804, *Eun.* 492, 836.

<sup>45</sup> E.g. *And.* 803, *Eun.* 559, *Adel.* 55, 118, 432, 458, *Hec.* 43, 613, *Phor.* 76, 184.

me offer an example or two of this particular sort of Donatian ecstasy: *Phor.* 262 *LENEM PATREM ILLVM o artificium poetae! in media patris saevitia mentionem lenitatis induxit, ut ostendat quam facile placari possit.* *Adel.* 95 *REI DARE OPERAM quam facete poeta haec omnia falsa ex contrario facit Demeam credere!* In the Terence commentary there are ten exclamations introduced by *o*, and twenty-one by *quam*, not to mention three by *quantus*, one by *qualis*, and one by the relative adjective.<sup>46</sup> Such exclamations are not found in the *Scholia Danielis*.

We can, I believe, see in these exclamations a suggestion of those qualities of personality which made Donatus the most popular teacher of his day. And I am convinced that the enthusiasm and the directness reflected in them are likewise to be seen in his ample use of *nota*, *vide*, *mire* and *recte*, in his preference for the personal *nota*, *vide* and *diximus* over the impersonal *notandum*, *sciendum* and *dictum est*, and in his introducing of his own views by expressions such as *sed ego puto*. No such animation is betrayed by the pedestrian and impersonal language of the *Scholia Danielis*.

No one could have hoped more sincerely than I, when I began this investigation, that the *Scholia Danielis* and the Terence commentary would prove to agree in every detail. But the evidence indicates that a considerable gap lies between the styles of these two bodies of scholia. If the Terence commentary has by and large preserved genuine characteristics of Donatus's style (and I am convinced that it has), the conclusion is inevitable that in the *Scholia Danielis* we do not have *ipsissima verba* of Donatus—that is, the *Scholia Danielis* are not pure and unadulterated excerpts from the master's Virgil commentary. But may not the *substance*, if not the actual words, of the *Scholia Danielis* derive from Donatus's work? And may not the *stylistic* divergence be attributed to reshaping by a later hand? That may well be; I

<sup>46</sup> *O*: *And.* 902, *Eun.* 236, 340, 566, 585, *Adel.* 261, 751, *Hec.* 489, 690, *Phor.* 262; *quam*: *And.* 239, *Eun.* 236, 240, 271, 336, 397, 595, 732, 961, 963, *Adel.* 95, 253, 298, 681, 693, 695, 795, 894, *Hec.* 331, 481, *Phor.* 286; *quantus*: *And.* 77, 146, *Adel.* 643; *qualis*: *Eun.* 668; *rel. adj.*: *Hec.* 43.

do not pretend that the evidence I have here presented necessarily disproves it. However, if the Scholia Danielis do derive in substance from the Virgil commentary of Donatus, they have been, from the point of view of exposition, so radically reshaped by that later hand that the voice and the personality of the master have been overwhelmed.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>47</sup> It may be suggested that the claim of the Scholia Danielis to *direct* Donatian authorship can be maintained, despite their stylistic divergences from the Terence commentary, by assuming that a considerable period of time elapsed between Donatus's writing of his Virgil and his Terence commentary, and that in this period his style and vocabulary underwent the changes which appear when the Terence commentary and the Scholia Danielis are compared. This seems to me, I must confess, decidedly improbable. Scholiastic diction is strongly conservative, as has been pointed out above. Many words and formulae are used over and over again without thought of change by the whole profession of scholiasts. Other words and formulae are peculiar to certain scholiasts, but are employed by them with no less constancy and inflexibility. We have seen how rigidly the author of the Scholia Danielis and Donatus hold to their usages throughout their respective lengthy commentaries, which were not, surely, written in a day. It is not, of course, impossible that a considerable period of time might bring about some change in the vocabulary of even so conservative a creature as the scholiast, but no lapse of time, I am convinced, could be held responsible for the broad and fundamental reversal of usage which one would have to assume if he maintained that both the Scholia Danielis and the Terence commentary come directly from the hand of Donatus. The idea seems to me doubly improbable because, as I tried to bring out above, the mechanical divergences of the two commentaries reflect a fundamental difference in personality and in pedagogical method. Upon what grounds may we assume that Donatus the man underwent so violent a metamorphosis? I cannot believe that the exuberant author of the Terence commentary with his battery of nota's, vide's, mire's, recte's, ego's and exclamations, could ever have been or have become the author of the matter-of-fact, impersonal and unimaginative language in which the Scholia Danielis are now written.



## SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D., 1941-1942

EDWARD LEWIS BASSETT—*De Metaphonia Latina*<sup>1</sup>

THE preface of this dissertation justifies the term *metaphonia*, as a Latin rendering of vowel-assimilation or Umlaut, and also the investigation itself, by pointing out that although there are discussions of Latin vowel-assimilation in the standard grammars, both Latin and Indo-European, no one seems to have examined inscriptions and vulgar Latin texts systematically for the purpose of collecting examples of metaphony.

The first chapter, dealing primarily with the history of Latin sounds, brings together the many possibilities there are for explaining forms which, at first sight, appear to be cases of metaphony but which, on closer investigation, have to be classified otherwise. They may be errors of the stone-cutter, that is, graphic rather than phonetic; they may reflect such common vulgar Latin changes as *ü* to *o* (CIL V 8750 *Erolorum* for *Herulorum*), *ō* to *u* (*Notizie degli scavi*, 1890, 171 *Herulurum* for *Herulorum*), *ı* to *e* (CIL XII 1501 *decema* for *decima*), or *ē* to *i* (CIL X 6565 *filiciter* for *feliciter*); they may have more connection with vowel-weakening than with vowel-assimilation; they may represent the closer pronunciation of a vowel followed by a nasal (*Rev. Arch.*, 1939, 136 *emen* for *amen*), *r* and another consonant (especially a labial), or even *r* alone (the Italic dialects show a closer pronunciation of *e* before *r*, Oscan more so than Umbrian; but, as far as vowel-weakening in Latin is concerned, *r* appears often to prevent closure); or they may be compounds which have retained the vocalism of the simplex (CIL X 7501 *consacravit* for *consecravit*; cf. *decema* cited above, which may have its *e* by analogy from *decem*).

The second chapter, the main part of the thesis, contains the inscriptive forms which seem to be examples of metaphony. These I have divided into the three categories of regressive,

<sup>1</sup> Degree in Classical Philology.

progressive, and double; and then subdivided according to the vowels undergoing mutation and those effecting mutation; that is, in the largest group (regressive), first come the examples of ē assimilated to a following *i*, then of ē written as *i* apparently because of a *u*-sound following, then of ē assimilated to a following *a*, *o*, or *u* (this time completely); next come the examples of assimilation of ö, å, ï, and ü; then the long vowels that seem to have suffered change. Typical cases of regressive metaphony are *pravato* for *probato* (CIL III 2007) and *genitrix* for *genetrix* (CIL XI 284); of progressive, *Artamisia* for *Artemisia* (CIL VI 16315) and *sistint* for *sistant* (CIL XIII 2478); of double, that is, cases where both a preceding and a following vowel seem to have contributed to the change, *Ildirix* for *Hilderix* (CIL VIII 10516) and *marmorarius* for *marmorarius* (*Eph. Epigr.* IX 698).

Fairly lengthy footnotes I have found necessary (a) to establish what the original or standard spelling of a word was, especially of proper names and adjectives, and (b) to call attention to the reasons other than metaphony that might, either alone or *along with* metaphony, explain a given form. *Ildirix*, for example, I have classified as an instance of vowel-assimilation since the standard spelling, to judge from all the available evidence, contained *e* in the middle syllable. But the *i* might represent merely a closer pronunciation before *r*, although a comparison of *pario*: *peperi* with *facio*: *perficio* gives weight to the theory that *r* prevents the raising of a vowel. Or it might be just graphic: the engraver, thinking back to *i* in the first syllable and ahead to *i* in the third syllable, carved *i* for *e* in the middle of the word. In general, however, to say just when the possibility of an engraver's error outweighs metaphony is a nice point. I myself feel that it can be adduced confidently only when the two-stroke E (II) is involved; FIILIICITIIR (CIL IV 5157), for example, may well be a stone-cutter's slip because of the series of vertical lines. Furthermore, *Artamisia* might be referred to a West Greek spelling of the divine name *Artemis*, and the old Latin *Marmor* must be taken into account in any consideration of the vulgar Latin *marmorarius* since the phonetic situation is the same in both words.

In the discussion of the evidence as a whole I have dealt, first of all, with the large number of forms which seem to show a mutation of the accented vowel. Some of these I have discredited by quoting them in their context and pointing out that their primary accent has become attenuated in the course of a phrase. For many others such explanations as vowel-weakening, the influence of nasals, and stone-cutters' errors seem more cogent than in most of the instances where an unaccented vowel has been changed. But enough remain to show that, in vulgar Latin, accented vowels are not entirely unaffected by metaphony.

The remaining conclusions to be drawn from the epigraphical evidence are set out in a series of tables which show how many times a given vowel seems to have been changed, how many times a given vowel seems to have changed another, and how many times a given consonant intervenes between the vowels in question. The vowel most open to metaphony is *ɛ*; the vowel most likely to change another, *ĩ*. Furthermore, *ɛ* is most commonly assimilated to *ĩ*; for the most frequent change I have noticed is *ɛ . . . ĩ: i . . . i*; the next most frequent *ĩ . . . ɛ: i . . . i*; the next, *ɔ . . . ĩ: u . . . i*. The consonants which occur so frequently between the mutating and the mutated vowels that they seem particularly conducive to metaphony are, in order, *n, r, l, s*, and *m*. Nor is this statement invalidated by the frequent closure of vowels before a nasal since the opposite is frequently found (cf. *Artamisia* above). Metaphony, then, is most likely to take place before or after consonants which, except for *s*, are themselves somewhat vocalic, that is, the nasals and the liquids. If they actually color the vowel, they give most often an *i*-color, as we should expect from the Italic evidence in general.

The third chapter contains the examples from vulgar Latin texts. Most of them are from manuscript G of Anthimus's letter *De observatione ciborum* and from the *Appendix Probi*. A typical instance of regressive metaphony is *salvatica* for *silvatica* (Anth. 86); of progressive, *dactali* for *dactyli* (Anth. 92); of double, *pastanaceae* for *pastinaceae* (Anth. 53). The form *salvatica*, showing a vocalism that is retained in the modern French *sauvage*, is interesting, because most of our examples of assimilation have

not been carried over into the Romance languages. They attained only the inception stage in phonemic change. In an appendix, I have quoted a few forms from the older codices of Vergil: for instance, *panates* for *penates* (*Aen.* XI 264 M). The literary examples agree for the most part with the inscriptional; for, although *ā* seems to have assimilated other vowels oftener than *ī* has, *ē* is still the most commonly assimilated, and the intervening consonants are, in order of frequency, *r*, *s*, *l*, *n*, and *m*.

The dissertation concludes with an index of the forms listed in the second chapter with geographical references.

KATHLEEN O. ELLIOTT—*Text, Authorship, and Use of the First Vatican Mythographer*<sup>1</sup>

IN 1831 Angelo Cardinal Mai, bibliothecarius of the Vatican Library, brought out the first edition of the three so-called Vatican Mythographers.<sup>2</sup> He had found their writings, three interrelated collections of classic myths, among the manuscripts in the Vatican. Their identity was unknown; hence their title. In 1834 Georg Bode brought out a second edition of these authors.<sup>3</sup> He reproduced, save for a few emendations, Mai's text for Mythographer I and II and used three additional manuscripts for Mythographer III. This thesis presents a first critical text of Mythographer I based directly on the only manuscript.

The only manuscript known to contain the collection of myths of Vatican Mythographer I is the *Vaticanus Reginensis* 1401, one of those manuscripts which had formed part of the library of Queen Christina of Sweden.

The introduction to the thesis contains a technical description of the manuscript. The principles upon which the manuscript was edited have been carefully explained, with examples, in some detail. Questions of orthography, emendations, the transcription

<sup>1</sup> Degree in Mediaeval Latin.

<sup>2</sup> *Classicorum Auctorum e Vaticanis Codicibus Editorum*, Tom. 3, pp. 1-82, Romae, 1831.

<sup>3</sup> *Scriptores Rerum Mythicarum Latini Tres*, pp. 1-73, Cellis, 1834.

of Greek words, word order, titles, punctuation, and the basis for selection of *testimonia* have been treated.

The text contains both primary and secondary *testimonia*, as well as an *apparatus criticus*.

I have critically examined the textual correspondences between my author and other writers in order to determine as completely as possible the date and methodology of *Mythographer I*. The post-*quem* of the work, we know, is the date (ca. 415) of Orosius, who is mentioned in Book III, 218.

The thesis treats *Mythographer I*'s direct sources (or writers with whom he may share a common source). The chief of these authors are: Hyginus, Solinus, Servius, Servius Danielis, the scholiast to Statius' *Thebaid* and *Achilleid*, Lactantius Placidus, Fulgentius, and Isidore.

In an examination of the use of these sources, there is evidence for the belief that he may have had direct access to Servius, possibly even to Servius Danielis, and the Scholia to Statius. But from these little can be gleaned, since, of course, the direct use of Servius tells us nothing of his *floruit*, and since the date of the Scholia to Statius is as difficult to determine as that of *Mythographer I*.<sup>4</sup>

Nor do we get much certain help from Fulgentius (480-550) and Isidore. *Mythographer I*'s borrowings from Fulgentius give no clue as to whether he used him directly or both used a common source. With Isidore *Mythographer I* agrees on few occasions, and never in a complete story. Hence it is a safe assumption that they had a common source. Thus Orosius is still the only definite post-*quem* for the work. Thus we still know only that the work must have been written after Orosius.

The collection of myths, partly Greek, partly Roman, of *Mythographer I* may well have been brought together in the early Middle Ages by some *grammaticus* who realized the necessity of such a handbook for scholiasts or authors. On the whole,

<sup>4</sup> Jahnke, the most recent editor of the Scholia to Statius refuses to commit himself on the question of date and authorship. *Lactantii Placidi Qui Dicitur Commentarii in Statii Thebaida et Commentarius in Achilleida*, Lipsiae, 1898, Praefatio p. IX.

the thoughtful reader of this work is left with the impression of an author who is attempting to preserve, rather than to regain knowledge, as would have been true of a later period. If it was a textbook for school boys, this would explain its anonymity and its apparent lack of popularity in the Middle Ages. Mythographers II and III relied heavily upon it, but elsewhere, I believe, the work is not found quoted. Until Mythographers II and III have also been critically edited and the chronology of all three tractates established, *sub iudice lis est*.

GORDON MYRON MESSING—*De Consonantibus Quae Laryngophoni Vocantur  
praecipue Quod ad Linguam Graecam Attinet*<sup>1</sup>

**I**N THIS dissertation it is proposed to examine and estimate all the evidence for the existence of laryngeal consonants in Indo-European. Ferdinand de Saussure in his *Mémoire sur le système primitif des voyelles en indo-européen* (1878) first suggested that the Indo-European non-ablaut long vowels were due to a combination of fundamental *e* (with its ablaut partner *o*) and a consonantal coefficient. Similarly, the Indo-Iranian voiceless aspirates were attributed to the combination of voiceless stop and laryngeal. While the theory found a few staunch advocates (Cuny, Möller, Pedersen) it was opposed by the German schools.

New evidence for laryngeal consonants, however, has been detected in the Hittite *H*, a sound of independent origin. This argument, together with that which sees the vocalization of an original laryngeal in the prothetic vowel of Greek and Armenian, seem most convincing. On the other hand, in the course of the discussion I find it necessary to reject many of the other arguments advanced to support the laryngeal hypothesis: one based on Vedic metrical irregularities (Kuryłowicz); one based on the occasional origin of Indo-Iranian voiced aspirates in the combination of voiced stop and laryngeal; Sturtevant's suggestions for the origin of the Greek aspirated and -κα perfect; Smith's hypothesis concerning Germanic "Verschärfung." In particular,

<sup>1</sup> Degree in Classical Philology.

the so-called "glottal stop of velar color" is disproved. In discussing the reduced and vanishing grades, I see no justification for the curious view of Kuryłowicz, that the weak grade is drawn from a parallel ("Schwebeabblaut") form of the root. Yet the related theory of Benveniste concerning the nature of the root is partially advocated. On the basis of a detailed examination of the Hittite evidence as well as of an explanation of the various phonetic factors to be considered, I am induced to assume the existence, as Couvreur does, of three laryngeals: the glottal stop, a voiceless and a voiced laryngeal spirant. Yet the third laryngeal is dependent upon the validity of a Hittite spelling distinction and on the existence of non-ablaut *o*. It follows that \**e+*' = ē, Hitt. *e*; \**e+h* = ā, Hitt. *ah(h)*; perhaps also \**e+‘* = ō, Hitt. *ah*.

PAUL ROBERT MURPHY—*De Lingua Antiqua Illyrica*<sup>1</sup>

ILLYRIAN may be defined as the Indo-European language spoken in its purest form in the northwestern part of the Balkan peninsula for over a millennium preceding the beginning of Greek influence early in the seventh and the Keltic invasion from the north late in the fifth century B.C. This language is of particular interest for the classical philologist because of the strong possibility that the Dorians, in the course of their migration into Greece from the north, came into contact with the Illyrians and were thereby influenced culturally and linguistically; and because the Iapygians, an Illyrian people usually known as Messapians after their leading tribe, settled in Apulia and Calabria between 1000 and 800 B.C. and left their mark on the Greek dialects of southern Italy.

For our knowledge of Illyrian as it was spoken in Illyria proper we are dependent on one very brief inscription<sup>2</sup> and a number of personal and local names.<sup>3</sup> Since, however, the vo-

<sup>1</sup> Degree in Classical Philology.

<sup>2</sup> *Wissenschaftliche Mitteilungen aus Bosnien und der Hercegovina*, XII (1912), 192.

<sup>3</sup> Hans Krahe: *Die alten balkanillyrischen geographischen Namen*, Heidelberg, 1925, and *Lexicon altillyrischer Personennamen*, Heidelberg, 1929.

calism of the Messapic dialect has been treated on the basis of its inscriptions,<sup>4</sup> and since a study has been made of Venetic,<sup>5</sup> the possibly Illyrian language of inscriptions found in what was ancient Venetia and Raetia and probably to be dated between 500 and 100 B.C., characteristics of these dialects may be used in analyzing the remains of the language spoken in Illyria proper and in detecting traces of Illyrian influence in Doric Greek words.

Since Illyrian has never received a really comprehensive treatment, it is the purpose of this thesis to assemble and evaluate the results of scattered research, especially concerning the etymologies of certain words, to add wherever possible the results of my own investigation, and thus to give an account of the treatment of the IE sounds in Illyria proper. For the sake of completeness and comparison the treatment of the various sounds in Messapic and Venetic is also indicated. It has been thought worthwhile to assemble examples of the fluctuations between sounds, both vowels and consonants, which occur in Illyrian words. Finally, I have been able to contribute several new words to the Illyrian thesaurus.

The following variations from the IE vowel system seem to have occurred in Illyrian: IE *ō*>Illyr. *ō* or *ă*, Mess. *ă*, Ven. *ō*; IE *ə*>Illyr. *ă*, Mess. *ă*, Ven. *ă*; IE *े*>Illyr. *ă*, Mess. *ă*, Ven. uncertain. IE *◦* possibly became *ō* in Venetic, but we have no indication of its treatment in Illyrian and Messapic. The semi-vowels *i* and *u* were preserved among all Illyrians.

These IE diphthongs suffered change: IE *ōi*>Illyr. *ōi* or *ăi*, Mess. *ăi*, Ven. uncertain; IE *ăi*>Illyr. *ăi* or *ae*, Mess. *ăi*, Ven. uncertain; IE *āi*>Illyr. *ā*, Mess. *ā*, Ven. *āi*; IE *ēu*>Illyr. *ēu*, Mess. *ōu* or *ū*, Ven. *ōu*; IE *ēu*>Illyr. *ēu*, Mess. *ēu* or *ē*, Ven. uncertain; IE *ōu*>Illyr. uncertain, Mess. *ōu* or *ō*; Ven. uncertain; IE *ău*>Illyr. *ău*, Mess. *ă*, Ven. uncertain; IE *āu* Illyr. uncertain, Mess. *ā* or *ău*, Ven. uncertain. IE *ōi* is unattested for Illyria

<sup>4</sup> Peter Fishman: *The Vocalism of Messapic*, Harvard dissertation, 1934. Summary in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* XLV (1934), 250-256.

<sup>5</sup> Madison Beeler: *The Phonology of Venetic*, Harvard dissertation, 1936. Summary in *HSCP* XLIX (1938), 265-268.

proper, but seems to have been preserved in Messapic and Venetic. Concerning IE *ēi*, *əi*, and *ōu* we can say nothing.

Both Messapic and Venetic show IE *m* preserved initially but changed to *n* in the final position. This sound was preserved initially in Illyrian, but we have no examples of final *m*. Our only evidence concerning the treatment of IE *m̥* and *n̥* comes from Illyria proper, where these sounds seem to have become *ām* and *ān*.

Of the IE liquids *r* and *l* remained unchanged, while *γ* and *ʎ* apparently became *r̥i* or *ir̥* and *l̥i* or *il̥* in Illyrian and Messapic. We have no Venetic examples.

The most interesting question concerning the treatment of the IE consonants in Illyrian is whether Illyrian was a centum or a satem language. Proof is here presented that the IE palatals, with the exception of the dubious *kh*, were preserved in Illyrian, Messapic, and Venetic. Those proposed etymologies of names are examined which, if valid, would indicate that the IE palatals were sibilized in Illyrian, and it is shown that none of them provides the only reasonable explanation for the name in question, and that they therefore fail to constitute evidence for the satem character of Illyrian. While the fact that we have here no certain example of the treatment of an IE labiovelar does not help to confirm the opinion that Illyrian was a centum language, it certainly does not militate against this view, unless we assume that Illyrian is so placed in the period before the separation of the IE languages into centum and satem groups. Of the pure velars only *q* seems to be attested for Illyrian, Messapic, and Venetic, though there is some evidence for the preservation of *g* in Illyrian and Venetic and for a change from IE *gh* to *g* in the latter.

Of the remaining IE consonants, all except the following seem to have been preserved in all forms of Illyrian: IE *bh* > Illyr. *b*, Mess. *b*, Ven. *f* initially and *b* medially; IE *dh* > Illyr. *d*, Mess. *d*, Ven. *f* initially and *d* medially. Concerning the treatment of IE *ph*, *th*, *sh*, and *z* there is no evidence.

In the course of the discussion of Illyrian sounds additional evidence is presented for the already suggested Illyrian origin

of the Greek *καλύβη* 'hut' (IE \**kel-ubh-*: Gr. *καλύπτω* and *κέλυφος* 'shell,' 'hut'). By comparison to the Lettish idiom *tautas meīta* 'stranger maiden,' it is established beyond doubt that the first element of the Illyrian name *Teut-meitis* is derived from IE \**tēutā-*.

Since the etymologies of most of the words cited in the chapter on Illyrian sound changes are uncertain, the material is presented rather for the purpose of classifying and preserving the evidence than of drawing definite conclusions.

The following words are proposed as additions to the thesaurus of Illyrian and its dialects:

1. *Βορμίων*, a name occurring in the Heraclean tables along with *Δάξιμος* (cf. Mess. *dazimas*) seems to be a Messapic corruption of the Greek *Φορμίων* (IE \**bher-* 'weave').

2. *λαβάβηρ*, which Hesychius interprets by *λακανίσκη* 'small dish,' seems to be composed of *λαβά* 'handle' and *-βηρ* [IE \**bher-* 'carry': Mess. *berada*: \**φέρητο* (subjunct.)].

3. *Κέρκυρ* and *Ιλλυρ*, the former of which occurs in a fragment of the Doric-writing poet Alcman and the latter in glosses on *Κέρκυρ*, seem to be Illyrian *r* stems comparable to Illyr. *iser*: Gr. *ἰερός*, especially in view of the people and place they designate.

FRIEDA SCHAUROTH UPSON—*The Kernos in Ancient Cult<sup>1</sup>*

THE term "kernos" is derived from literary sources. Archaeological materials answering to the literary descriptions have been widely accepted as kernoi, even though the literary descriptions are not in agreement with one another and the exact form of the kernos has never been clearly defined. Moreover, Eleusis has furnished a large proportion of the vessels commonly designated as "kernoi," although literary sources conspicuously omit to mention their use in the Eleusinian Mysteries. Only the cult of "Rhea-Cybele" is specifically mentioned.

That the kernos was more universally recognized as a cult instrument can be proved by the quantity of identically con-

<sup>1</sup> Degree in Classical Archaeology.

structed vessels which have come to light in Bronze Age sites of all periods. Chronologically there is no gap between the earliest Cypriote kernoī (E.C. III) and Eleusinian examples of the fourth century B.C., although in the intervening centuries kernoī were distributed far and wide throughout the Mediterranean world: to Egypt, Palestine, Crete, Asia Minor, the Aegean Islands, Sicily, Carthage, and the Greek Mainland. Neither the chronological continuity nor the geographical distribution of kernoī can be regarded as fortuitous. All ancient kernoī prove to be associated by provenance with the cult of an ancient vegetation goddess, such as became in later times the divinity of a mystery cult. Commercial activity provided the means for geographical distribution.

Finally, it is possible to show that the kernoī became a cult instrument of the Mysteries because of the nature of the sacrifice for which it was designed. The sacrifice itself has a history as ancient and as universal as does the kernoī. Moreover, the two are identical in that they originated as simple offerings to the dead, advanced to the service of the goddess who cared for the dead, and finally became an integral part of the mysteries attaching to the same divinity.

On the basis of the pertinent archaeological and religious data it is possible to reconcile the discrepancies of ancient literary testimonia and to present entirely new evidence for the use of the kernoī in the Eleusinian Mysteries.



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